138. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Ludlow) and the Counselor of the Israeli Embassy (Erell), Department of State, Washington, March 15, 19601
SUBJECT
- Palestine Refugees; Ben-Gurion’s Visit
In the course of an exchange of views and in commenting on Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s visit to Washington, I took the occasion to express to Erell our deep regret at the fact that Ben-Gurion’s reactions to our suggestions on the Arab refugee question had been so negative. I stressed that our recommendation that Israel accept the principle of repatriation or compensation as a means of getting at the solution of the refugee problem represented the views, from top to bottom, of our Executive Branch of Government. Inasmuch as the US was Israel’s closest friend, it had been put forward most sincerely by the Under Secretary in his initial meeting and again at the Vice President’s luncheon. I casually indicated that it had been planned for the President to speak on similar lines had there been time. Therefore, there could be no question that we earnestly felt that what we proposed to Israel had received the most careful consideration, and we felt it should receive the most careful consideration by Israel.
In our view, what we were proposing could not in any way be deemed unfriendly or contrary to Israel’s best interests. The Prime Minister’s apparent refusal to consider our proposal left us with no hope of any progress for the future solution of the refugee question. It should be patently clear to Israel by now that any possible across-the-board settlement involving not only the refugees, but other political [Page 301] problems as well, was out of the question. The refugee question was the key to getting at the ultimate solution of all the outstanding problems between Israel and the Arab States.
We sincerely felt that real progress toward the solution of the refugee question could redound to Israel’s advantage in that very few, if any, Members of the UN would be likely to give really serious ear to any further demands of the Arabs once the refugee question was solved. We had always assumed that the present territorial limits of Israel were of such importance to it that the avoidance of substantial concessions in this matter was a sine qua non to the security of Israel. A solution of the refugee problem would lessen any interest or desire on the part of other states to hark back to partition plans and the like.
In reply, Erell made the usual defenses of Israel’s position as set forth by Ben-Gurion, namely: that Israel would be prepared to consider repatriation of a restricted number of refugees in the context of an overall peace settlement. Perhaps inadvertently, he indicated that discussions had been held at the Embassy with the Prime Minister prior to the Prime Minister’s conversations with the President and other US officials, at which time Ben-Gurion had made quite clear that there would be no concessions on the subject of refugees.
Erell also made the usual observations concerning the threats to the security of Israel and stressed the utter irresponsibility of Arab leadership which, he said, would be epitomized in the tremendous propaganda campaign which they would undertake if Israel were ever to accept the principle of repatriation. He also laid great emphasis on the fact that Ben-Gurion has a deep and abiding distrust of all Arabs. This, as well as the other reasons, is why he is not prepared to “give” on the refugee question when he cannot trust the Arabs to do their part, not deter them from continuing their increasing demands against Israel.
My reply to this last mentioned point was to say that I was sure that all Israelis knew that the distrust was mutual, and that this was not only the basis, but the necessity for negotiation, if there were a friend of both who could help. I then reiterated what I had said previously concerning the need for phasing the solution of outstanding difficulties starting with the refugees.
He asked regarding a specificness of our ideas of a program of repatriation or compensation. I said that with regard to the question of propaganda, there was, of course, a genuine risk. Frankly, however, we did not contemplate Israel’s making any early public pronouncement concerning repatriation. What we were interested in was Israel’s private agreement so that quiet talks could profitably be undertaken with the Arabs which might lead to the development of a phased program which would ensure Israel’s interests and security while granting the option to the refugees. We felt that it was clear that [Page 302] qualifying conditions could and should be laid down for repatriation of an individual Arab refugee and that he should be fully acquainted with them. This would require indoctrination along the Panmunjom lines. Of course, there was the possibility that a very substantial number of refugees would initially opt for repatriation, particularly if Arab Governmental pressures were brought to bear on them; but if it were clear to them that they had to await their turn for repatriation and that there were other conditions for returning, we were confident that those that would ultimately persist in repatriation would be of manageable proportions. We, obviously, had no desire or intention of seeing any situation develop which would lead to a stampede of refugees across Israeli boundaries since this would involve inevitable serious bloodshed.
I repeated that what we wanted was some confidential basis for quiet negotiation with responsible Arab leaders. I stressed that we felt that there was an increasing degree of realism among responsible Arab leaders, particularly in the host Governments having the largest number of refugees. I said that I myself was convinced of this since I had had talks with some of them at the last General Assembly and on other occasions. I said that one of the reasons we had been interested in encouraging the role of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was that it might conceivably be a sort of “umbrella” for some quiet negotiations. I did not expect that much could or should be done of a formal or official nature, at least not for some time to come. Ben-Gurion’s very negative attitude, however, made more likely some sort of PCC action.
Finally, I said that if we, as Israel’s friend, could not have the hope of some positive concession from Israel, we could not hope for any constructive conversations with the Arabs, and we would be confronted with the knowledge of the hopelessness of the refugee situation as we went up before Congress to request them for money to continue support for the refugees.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.84A11/3–1560. Confidential. Drafted by Ludlow.↩