Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

141. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 11, 1960, 5 p.m.¹

Washington, April 11, 1960, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Department’s Initial Reponse to Israel’s Request for Arms Assistance

PARTICIPANTS

• The Under Secretary
• NEA—Mr. G. Lewis Jones
• NE—Mr. William Hamilton
• Ambassador Avraham Harman, Israel Embassy
• Minister Yaacov Herzog, Israel Embassy
• Minister Aryeh Manor, Israel Embassy

Under Secretary Dillon said he had invited Ambassador Harman to come in to inform him of our present thinking on Israel’s arms request, as expressed in the Embassy’s note of February 9 and subsequently modified by agreement to give selected items priority consideration. Noting that the priority list had been limited largely to missiles and air raid warning equipment, Mr. Dillon said that the Pentagon had produced a preliminary report.² Unfortunately, missiles appeared to be unavailable in terms of the immediacy with which Israel had asserted its requirements. The Hawk system is set aside for our own forces whose requirements will absorb the supply for several years to come. A more serious bottleneck is the availability of facilities for training missile operators. If Israel were to receive Hawks immediately after our own requirements for them had been met in 1963 or 1964, another year would pass before training slots could be made available to Israel personnel. Mr. Dillon also suggested certain technical limitations, e.g., within a small radius and to a height of 35,000 feet Hawks are very effective, but they are useless for aircraft flying above that ceiling.

The Under Secretary went on to say that prospects are much more favorable regarding the electronic warning equipment, i.e. many of the items desired by Israel could be made available in the relatively near future—some immediately from existing stocks, the balance as rapidly as new production permitted, deliveries to be completed in perhaps 18 months or two years. These items were now being considered in a package by the Pentagon so that we would be in a position fairly soon to discuss specifics. The equipment selected would expand Israel’s air defense capability very substantially, specifically by increasing the range of Israel’s interception capability.

Ambassador Harman expressed appreciation. Referring to the question of missiles, he recalled that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had given this weapon the first order of priority and would be very much disappointed if it could not be obtained. Was it not possible, Ambassador Harman wanted to know, for the Department to consider some partial satisfaction of the Israel request within a reasonable period of time?

Mr. Dillon said that he would not suggest that any possibility was permanently or totally out of the question. Nevertheless a more positive response was not possible for a considerable period and one wondered as to the utility of speculating about possibilities thereafter. Changes in this field are rapid and unpredictable. He cited the example of the Bomarc on which we had placed a very high evaluation and expended a great deal of money, none of which altered the fact that we had been obliged to relegate it to the category of obsolete weapons.

Ambassador Harman referred to a recent message from Jerusalem containing additional intelligence from very sound sources to the effect that MIG–19 deliveries to the UAR will begin perhaps as early as September and not later than the end of this year. Furthermore, he said, the UAR has now reached a state of competence permitting it to open jet conversion training schools in its own territory whereas heretofore it has had to rely on Soviet schools.

The Under Secretary recalled that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had talked a great deal about the MIG–19 as a formidable advanced type. Noting that MIG–19’s bomb-carrying capacity is limited, Mr. Dillon said he assumed that the Israelis were not concerned with MIG–19’s ability to destroy Israel urban centers but rather clearing the skies of the Israel fighters after which bombers would move in. Ambassador Herman agreed that this was the basis of Israel’s worry about the MIG–19’s.

Mr. Dillon said that knowing a little about the competence of the Israel Defense Forces, he was confident that Tel Aviv, for example, would not be destroyed in a day or two. He asked the Ambassador about the prospects for obtaining the French super-super Mystere, the Mirage. Ambassador Harman replied that it is his understanding the French are going ahead with production of this aircraft but that it would not be available for two or three years. He adverted to the missile question again, asking if Mr. Dillon would agree to study a more modest program on a longer delivery schedule.

Mr. Dillon replied that the Department is prepared to keep almost anything under review but he would not wish to stir up false Israel hopes for a different answer in the near future.

To Ambassador Harman’s inquiry as to the possibility of United States military establishments accepting IDF personnel for missile training, Mr. Dillon reiterated his earlier statement that training facilities represented a more serious bottleneck than the availability of missiles.

Ambassador Harman asked as to a feasible alternative to the Hawk. Mr. Dillon mentioned the British Bloodhound, Ambassador Harman replying he did not know the results of approaches to the United Kingdom concerning this weapon.

Ambassador Harman suggested that our two governments establish joint consideration of possible alternatives to Israel’s missiles request. He wondered whether Nikes might not be more readily available than Hawks. Mr. Dillon said he did not wish to give the impression that availability is our only problem with missiles. With the Nikes there is an additional consideration not present with the Hawk. This is the fact that the Nike is adaptable to ground-to-ground purposes. If the Arabs became aware of Israel’s acquisition of the Nike they would assume Israel had in mind its use against Arab cities and other land targets. Furthermore, the weapons are expensive and in the case of Nikes not too efficient. They had little versatility. A Hawk would pursue one target after another as long as aircraft were anywhere within its range; the Nike is a one-target weapon.

Ambassador Harman said it wasn’t exclusively a matter of firing missiles. Arab awareness of Israel possession of the weapon would have considerable deterrent effect. (This thought is somewhat at variance with Mr. Ben-Gurion’s assurances that Israel possession of missiles could be held a secret indefinitely.)

Mr. Dillon concluded by saying he appreciated that the US decision regarding missiles would be a disappointment to the Israelis but, having reached it, we had at the same time made a sincere effort in a field that would materially improve Israel’s defenses with the least possible delay.

In answer to Ambassador Harman’s question, Mr. Dillon said that Assistant Secretary Jones would be in touch with the Embassy to discuss specifics as soon as the Pentagon had completed its study of the items in the electronics list which could be made available.³

Ambassador Harman asked what consideration we had given to the economic aspects of Israel’s request. The Under Secretary replied that grant assistance appeared to be out of the question. We had in mind extending credit under the Reimbursable Aid Agreement as with the anti-tank recoilless rifles which were sold to the Israelis in 1959. If Israel’s economic straits worsened, we could consider other assistance, perhaps under PL 480 or DLF.

Ambassador Harman recalled Israel’s recent presentation to the Department of its development hopes for the next two or three years designed to cushion the impact of the end of German reparations and restitution payments. These projections might be adversely affected by the burden of arms payments. Mr. Dillon agreed that this was a possibility which required careful attention. He said this Government was most interested in the projections and we sincerely hope Israel will be able to realize them. If it appeared in the future that Israel’s projections were threatened by defense expenditures, the US might reconsider its attitude with respect to economic assistance, but, as the Israelis knew, we did not feel it was necessary at the moment.

Mr. Manor raised the possibility of purchase with Israel currency. Mr. Dillon was noncommittal, pointing out, however, that we could not accept local currencies under the same provisions of the act that would be employed to extend credit.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5–MSP/4–1169. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Jones and approved in U on April 20. A briefing paper for the conversation, April 8, is ibid., 784A.5–MSP/4–860. In addition to the request for arms assistance, Dillon and Harman discussed the effect the central Israel water conduit on U.S.–Israeli citrus competition. A memorandum of this part of the conversation is ibid., 784A.5–MSP/4–1160.
2. On March 19, Dillon wrote to the Secretary of Defense asking about the availability of Hawk missiles. (Ibid., 784A.56/3–1960) In a response on March 29, the Department of Defense noted the drawbacks which Dillon outlined here. (Ibid., 784A.56/3–2960)
3. On April 14, Herzog called on Jones to express Ben Gurion’s appreciation for the offer of electronic equipment and to ask the United States to keep under review the request for Hawk missiles despite the difficulties that Dillon had raised. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 784A.5–MSP/4–1460)