144. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare) and the President of the AFL-CIO (Meany), Washington, April 28, 19601
SUBJECT
- Arab Ship Situation
Mr. Meany called to tell me he had had a very long talk this morning with Paul Hall, head of the Seafarers’ International Union. He said it had developed that Mr. Hall’s chief grievance is against the State Department since he feels they have failed to protect American seamen who are the victims of Nasser’s policy of boycotting ships which have called at Israeli ports. Mr. Meany said that Mr. Hall’s antipathy for the Department also stemmed in part from bad feelings brought about a year ago as a result of a meeting in the Department on the question of foreign flag ships, which he attended and was subsequently “asked to leave” because he complained about American owners operating under foreign flags.
As examples of mistreatment of American sailors in the Middle East, Mr. Meany cited the following: At Arab ports American ships are boarded by authorities who examine the ship’s articles and blackball the American seamen with Jewish names; he mentioned the case of a vessel held in port for 28 days with Americans on board; he said that ships which have stopped at Israeli ports are barred from going [Page 314] through the Canal. Mr. Meany told me he thought Mr. Hall had a good case, and is fighting to protect his own people. He will hold to his position until the Department adopts anew policy and issues some sort of statement indicating its concern for the welfare of American seamen so victimized and its desire to be helpful.
I told Mr. Meany I was sorry to hear that Mr. Hall was aggrieved with the State Department. Our policy toward protecting American seamen was clear and had been repeated time and again. It is our duty as well as our policy to protect the rights of American soldiers to the limit, and we are doing so. Since there has never been any doubt about our policy, there is no question of a change in policy. The cases involving American seamen have been few and exceptional. As regards the incident of Americans being held in port aboard ship for 28 days, I explained that the owners had abandoned the ship and in so doing had treated the crew unfairly. The boycott is not imposed by Nasser alone but by the Arab nations, some of which are enemies of Nasser, and it is directed against all nationalities, not Americans solely. It is part of the whole Arab-Israel problem. Israeli ships are those under Israeli charter that are denied passage through the Canal, but blacklisted ships, although refused servicing, are permitted to go through.
I told Mr. Meany the trouble is being compounded by the Cleopatra affair and that soon the Arab retaliatory boycott will really hurt American seamen and ships in all the seaports of the Near East, and it may eventually be applied to U.S. airlines. The interests of the United States will be damaged. The important thing is to try to quiet things down and try to bring about normal relations with the Arab group. We have been trying very hard to do this. Following that an effort could be made eventually to improve Arab-Israeli relations.
I emphasized that there could not be a question of a change in U.S. policy. Our policy is to do everything possible to protect American seamen and we will continue to do so. Our policy regarding black-listing is also well known. I believed that there was a good deal of misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Hall. It is possible that there may be individual cases where some remedial action is necessary. If so, I wanted to know about them and proper action would be taken if the facts justify. I said I thought the misunderstanding could be cleared up if Mr. Hall would come to the Department and talk things out.
I told Mr. Meany that I had refrained from requesting the Department of Justice to send a representative to appear in the circuit court in New York yesterday because I did not think it would be the proper thing to do in light of my talk with him, as a result of which he had been trying to effect a settlement of the matter. A public position had not been taken by the Government in court in the hope that things could be straightened out quietly. Mr. Meany interrupted to say that [Page 315] Mr. Hall was confident the decision of the court would be in favor of the seamen, but if by chance the case were lost it would be taken to the Supreme Court.
I observed that much of the present difficulty would seem to center in the personal feelings of Mr. Hall. The question was how best to approach him; Mr. Meany himself was obviously in the best position to do so. Would he be willing to call Hall again? Mr. Meany quite readily agreed to do so and said he would once again talk the matter over with Hall and explain its implications. He would then call me again.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 811.062/4–2860. Confidential. Drafted by Hare. A memorandum of a similar conversation between Meany and Hare on April 24 is ibid.↩
- At a meeting on May 6, Meany and Dillon reached agreement on how to end the boycott effective that day. (Circular telegram 1501, May 6; ibid., 811.062/5–660) The agreement was embodied in an exchange of letters which were released to the press. Copies of the letters are attached, along with a statement of policy by the Department of State on the American Merchant Marine, to CA–9674, May 19. (Ibid., 911.73/5–1960) The unloading of the Cleopatra began on May 9 and the Arab counterboycott ended at the same time.↩