Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France²

Washington, January 15, 1958—7:09 p.m.

2580. Department greatly concerned over deadlock apparently fast developing in Franco-Tunisian negotiations³ and attempts part of Bourguiba to draw US (and UK) into middle dispute (Tunis 728 and 732)⁴ as well as French pressure obtain US recognition “special position” France North Africa.⁵ If deadlock continues on troop and base issue entirely possible we will be faced with heavy military and economic demands from GOT we not in position fulfill and offers re Bizerte, refusal of which would be embarrassing and acceptance disastrous to Franco-US relations. Similarly appeals for US support from French would also present great problems in terms of our interests and position North Africa. Although we do not wish be drawn into dispute with both parties we believe we may have to exert what influence we have both Paris and Tunis to get matters back on track and reduce pressures from both sides.

For Tunis. We believe effects Bourguiba’s alleged remarks to Gorse re “US–UK understanding” and tone his last speech (Tunis 731)⁶ highly unfortunate in terms Franco-Tunisian rapprochement, whatever provocation El Khangua incident.⁷ Embassy should therefore tell him frankly we not in position inject US directly into question status Bizerte in which we have only secondary interest and that our ability exercise helpful influence on French will be reduced to zero if public impression created France we have somehow arrived at understanding with GOT on this and other matters. Speaking as friend Tunisia we would therefore recommend utmost discretion re timing and content broadcasts and public reference matters under negotiation and particularly to US views thereon. Moreover while we entirely understand Tunisian preoccupation with GOT responsibilities for internal security we hope Bourguiba will show maximum flexibility in reaching arrangements with GOF since abrupt solutions present real problem for GOF in terms parliamentary opinion. We do not consider Tunisia as tied to any sphere influence and intend treat with her as independent nation but we would consider rupture of natural and historic relationship with France as tragic set-back to free world. We will of course also exercise best influence we can in Paris but our effectiveness depends on Bourguiba’s maximum discretion in referring to US attitudes.

For Paris. You may express frankly at high level FonOff our concern over Bourguiba’s recent utterances, assuring French we have not given him any grounds for encouragement re US support for Tunisian position either on Bizerte or other French installations Tunisia and have no understanding whatever with GOT thereon. On contrary, we have been urging utmost flexibility and moderation on Bourguiba this matter. (At same time you might at your discretion indicate along lines final paragraph Tunis 728 to Department desirability from point of view France and West if France were to accept promptly Bourguiba’s offer Bizerte and work out mutually satisfactory gradual phase-out French security responsibilities on other bases.)

In any case you should make clear we recognize French withdrawal from South presents political problems calling for courageous decisions but we believe permanent arrangements on Bizerte could perhaps override dissatisfaction with details re other bases if presented for what they are: An extraordinary manifestation of French reservoir good will in independent Arab state and possibility cooperate with it. In giving this advice we have no thought urging on French actions which run counter their own best judgments, but in wider Western interests we seriously apprehensive over breakdown in current negotiations and grave and perhaps irreparable consequences for France and Tunisia as well as Western position North Africa.

Tunis and Paris should also reiterate our concern re recrudescence incidents along Tunisian-Algerian border and our hope these may be satisfactorily resolved and future ones avoided.

FYI Department informing British Embassy our views this matter but will express opinion British démarche Paris would probably be unwise this time. End FYI.⁸

Dulles

2. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/1–1558. Secret. Drafted by Palmer and Bovey, cleared by Elbrick and Rountree, and initialed for Dulles by Murphy. Also sent to Tunis and repeated to London, Rabat, and Algiers.
3. France and Tunisia were engaged in discussions to settle outstanding differences between them. Despatch 404 from Tunis, January 9, outlined the Embassy’s recommendations for the U.S. stance during these negotiations. (Ibid., 651.72/1–958)
4. Telegram 728, January 9, reported a conversation between Gorse and Bourguiba and noted, “Gorse has commented to Paris that important element in Bourguiba’s position is his conviction that he will be understood and supported in London and Washington.” (Ibid.) Telegram 732, January 10, reported that Hourani would arrive in Washington January 12 to discuss strengthening U.S.-Tunisian cooperation. (Ibid., 033.7211/1–1058) Documentation on these discussions is ibid., 772.5–MSP/1–2458.
5. During a January 7 meeting with Dulles, Alphand had asked that Eisenhower make a statement acknowledging France’s position in North Africa. (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
6. Telegram 731, January 10, relayed the substance of Bourguiba’s January 9 radio broadcast, which questioned the nature of French intentions toward Tunisia and asked if France would respect Tunisian independence. (Ibid., Central Files, 651.72/1–1058)
7. On January 2, French troops surrounded and searched the Tunisian village of Foum El Khangua. Three Tunisians were killed, four wounded, and several taken prisoner during the incident.
8. A memorandum of Bovey’s January 17 conversation with Willie Morris of the British Embassy is in Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/1–1758. Telegram 765 from Tunis, January 16, reported that Bourguiba agreed with the U.S. position and realized good French-Tunisian relations would make it easier for the United States to help Tunisia. (Ibid., 651.72/1–1658) Telegram 3364 from Paris, also January 16, reported that France realized the United States would not support Tunisia’s position on Bizerte or other French installations in Tunisia. France had suspended negotiations and suggested Bourguiba define his position toward the Algerian rebellion and France. (Ibid.)