Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

46. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, November 4, 1958.

386. Deptel 341,² probably delayed by area atmospherics, not received until November 2, and because Cabinet meeting that day I unable deliver Secretary’s letter to Foreign Minister until afternoon November 3.

After carefully reading message Mrs. Meir asked me thank Secretary for his thoughtfulness in informing her of US views given Egyptians and expressed hope Department spokesman might find early opportunity make public statement along similar lines. British Foreign Office spokesman had already stated UK had no information to support Cairo and Moscow charges of Israeli mobilization and she thought it would be “extremely helpful” if US would make similar statement. She felt sure that all reports reaching Department confirmed Israel’s peaceful intention and lack of preparation for war and that public acknowledgment of such reports would have a salutary influence in Moscow and Cairo as well as helping to counteract erroneous impressions in US based on newspaper stories originating in Cairo.

In commenting on rumors, Mrs Meir repeated Ben-Gurion’s characterization of them as “baseless lies and complete fabrications.” (Soviet Ambassador knew this as well any other diplomat in Israel, she said, and she had summoned him for the following day to “give him a piece of her mind.”) However volume of propaganda on this subject being issued by Moscow and Cairo was of serious concern to GOI. It is well known that both Ben-Gurion and GOI are sincerely desirous that status quo in Jordan be maintained. Ben-Gurion’s newspaper interview suggestions for demilitarization of west bank were clearly predicated only a change in Jordanian status quo and change not brought about by Israel. There was no logical link between Ben-Gurion’s statement and accusation Israel was plotting aggression. “Therefore,” she said, “there must be some intention behind charges which Cairo and Moscow know are false.” In speculating on motive, Mrs. Meir sketched in two possibilities:

1. With British troops withdrawn from Jordan and Hussein out of country on holiday, Nasser might feel it propitious moment to stage situation in which he could pose as saving Jordan from Israeli aggression. His real reason, however, could be to forestall any Iraqi action against Jordan. Mrs. Meir believes Nasser worried about possible Jordan–Iraq merger which would deny him possibility of land bridge with his Syrian province and which might eventually attract Syria as a more natural geographic grouping. Evidence growing that some Syrians, awakening from their sweet dreams of UAR grandeur, regret their impulsive gift to Nasser of their independence. Also without taking any action in Jordan, Nasser might embark on series of provocations in hope of goading Israel to retaliate. “However,” she said, “we are not about to please Nasser by doing so.”

2. Moscow may be interested in blowing up situation into real war scare and then, if nothing happens, to claim its firm stand had prevented Israeli aggression and saved ME from armed conflict.

At end of conversation Mrs. Meir reiterated her hope Department would make some reassuring public statement.³

Baxter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/11–458. Secret; Priority. No time of transmission is on the source text. Received at 8:29 a.m.
2. See footnote 1, supra.
3. On November 7, Meir replied formally to Dulles’ letter, reiterating the substance of her comments to Lawson and stressing Israel’s interest in maintaining the status quo in Jordan. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/11–758)