91. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 29, 1959, 2 p.m.1

SUBJECT

  • Israel’s Arms Requirements

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • Mrs. Golda Meir, Israel Foreign Minister
  • Mr. Avraham Harman, Ambassador, Embassy of Israel
  • Mr. Yaacov Herzog, Minister, Embassy of Israel
  • NEAG. Lewis Jones
  • NEWilliam L. Hamilton

Mrs. Meir said that Prime Minister Ben Gurion had asked her to use the opportunity presented by this appointment to raise the question of Israel’s arms requirements, details of which the Embassy would supply later. The problem was developing in an increasingly serious form. Israel, like any democracy, could not devote all of its resources to security but must give adequate attention to education, health, and other social services. It was surrounded by neighbors, particularly the UAR, which are under no such limitations. While Israel is obliged to make full payment for anything it procures, the UAR obtains from the Soviet Union anything it desires at perhaps one-third of the market value and on the basis of long-term credits at low-interest rates. The UAR was little troubled by the social welfare of its people but could, if necessary ask the Soviet Union to alter the terms of arms deals to permit a small portion of UAR resources to go to social services.

She said that Israel did not hope to match the UAR quantitatively but felt that it must keep abreast in a qualitative sense, especially in certain major categories. It must have a combat plane as good as the UAR’s best, a tank as good and, now that Egypt has acquired a fleet of nine submarines, Israel must strike a balance there also. During the last three years, she said, Russia has supplied to the UAR 250 MIG–17 fighters; 50 Ilushyn bombers; nine submarines, eight of which are the long-range W type; 530 T–34 tanks, 70 T–54 tanks; and artillery of all kinds for a total value of $500 million.

[Page 203]

She recalled that in August 1958, the late Secretary Dulles in a letter to Prime Minister Ben Gurion had said: “We believe that Israel should be in a position to deter an attempt at aggression by indigenous forces, and are prepared to examine the military implications of this problem with an open mind.”2 The Secretary’s words had encouraged the Israelis to submit a request for assistance, involving both procurement in the United States and elsewhere on those items which the United States had declined to supply.

The Secretary pointed out that we had opened a line of credit; had permitted Israel to shop with United States industry for a wide range of equipment; and that the GOI had been able to obtain heavy equipment elsewhere; for example, tanks from Great Britain.

Mrs. Meir agreed but went on to say that the financial pinch had made it impossible for Israel to take full advantage of these opportunities. It had been unable to buy all of the tanks Britain had been able to offer. The same was true of material the United States had been prepared to license for export. Even now Israel had not purchased all that the United States had authorized it to buy from private sources.

Mrs. Meir argued that the Israel Defense Forces, in their present state of effectiveness, are the strongest deterrent to trouble in the area. Her Government remains convinced, however, that when the Arab states believe that the balance has tipped in their favor, they will not hesitate to attack Israel. Israel is unique, she said, in being beleaguered by superior numbers and yet has no ally to whom she can turn for arms or security treaty relationships. In the circumstances, she hoped the Department could make a favorable reply to the request it would receive from the Embassy.

[1 paragraph (2½ lines of source text) not declassified]

The Secretary told Mrs. Meir we would review the details of their problems as sympathetically as possible but reminded her that it has been our policy to supply to Israel only nominal quantities of purely defensive items, believing that Israel’s major requirements should be obtained from sources which have now become traditional.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Hamilton on September 30 and approved by Herter on October 6. See also infra. A third memorandum of this conversation, regarding Khrushchev’s visit to the United States, is not printed. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) A briefing paper for the meeting, September 28, is ibid., Central Files, 784A. 13/9–2859. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 278, September 30. (Ibid., 784A.56/9–3059) Meir was in the United States to attend the U.N. General Assembly.
  2. Document 32.