Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

321. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, October 5, 1958—noon.

785. Eyes only for Secretary and Under Secretary. Comment on Embassy telegram 775.² The degree of bitter public ridicule of recent and continuing maladministration of the affairs of the GOP and of its two provinces may provide sufficient popular support for the imposition of President’s rule upon the country to minimize immediate violent reactions, despite the lowered esteem which Iskander Mirza commands in common with legislative and administrative leaders of government, if the armed services of Pakistan stand solidly behind the President when he takes over, as Mirza claims they will. The army does have the respect of the people.

However, it is probable that accusations of US and even UK interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan will be provoked by President’s rule. These may well come from all political parties in circumstances in which elections will again be postponed. Mirza’s pro-West posture may well provide the unthinking with seeming justification for such accusations.

Arrests, which may mount beyond Mirza’s expectations, may contribute to violence or to nonviolent resistance which can end in violence.

The immediate cause of Mirza’s fear for Pakistan is compounded of (1) threat of a takeover by the army itself if the President himself does not act, and (2) stepped up Communist, UAR, and Indian subversive activities in combination with rising provincial disintegrative influences.

Back of the immediate causes (or justifications) lie Mirza’s personal predilections for dictatorial rather than democratic processes in an illiterate and Muslim nation, and Mirza’s desire to remain in power. These considerations are diluted by Mirza’s nationalism and an honest desire on his part to see his country acquire internal political and economic health and attain international respect.

Mirza tells me he has been urged for at least a year by some within the army (General Umrao for one) to take over, but that he has told them the “politicians must first be permitted to make asses of themselves.” Almost everyone in Pakistan would agree that this is what the politicians have now done. However, President’s rule will postpone elections and reaction to this aspect of the takeover may more than offset other considerations and result in “direct actions” which could produce widespread violence or, at least, smoldering and dangerous resentments with violence to follow later.

The President has in mind and hand only rough outlines of his course of procedure following imposition of President’s rule, and even the manner and the timing of that will depend upon the advice and assent of the army, as expressed in consultations with General Ayub which begin October 6. To the extent he can find and then induce good administrators to carry on the processes of government and able “lawgivers” to revamp the constitution will depend the ultimate success of his contemplated action.

Mirza believes constitutional reform is essential to establishment of stable government in Pakistan. He is probably right to the extent that the form of government alone can influence governmental stability. What Pakistan now has is a hybrid, part British and part American in form, and the results have not been dissimilar to recent experiences in France with somewhat similar forms.

The Embassy has made no effort to attempt to influence Mirza’s decision one way or another in this situation, in consultation with Under Secretary Dillon and Ambassador Cumming. Mirza does recall statement of US position in Department telegram resulting from prior Mirza consideration of takeover last winter.³

The Embassy will seek assurances from Mirza of police and army protection of foreign nationals if the takeover occurs and will undertake every possible security precaution it can to protect American lives and property.⁴

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/10–558. Top Secret; Niact.
2. In telegram 775, October 4, also captioned “eyes only for Secretary and Under Secretary,” Ambassador Langley reported that President Mirza informed him that day that “he would take over the Government of Pakistan probably within a week and simultaneously proclaim martial law. The constitution will be suspended, a commission created to write a new constitution, and elections now scheduled for February 15 will not be held.” Mirza told Langley that he was taking over to prevent a seizure of power by the army. (Ibid., 790D.00/10–458)
3. Reference is to Document 296.
4. In telegram 791 from Karachi, October 6, Langley reported that the application of Presidential rule and martial law upon Pakistan would take place at 11 a.m. on October 8. “There is no evidence of other than unanimous army support for the takeover,” the Ambassador commented. “Ayub, like Mirza, will support pro-West policies. He will want continued US aid. I believe the military will be united in this.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/10–658)