324. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Bartlett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree)1
SUBJECT
- Political Evolution in Pakistan
Pakistan’s steps toward the development of a stable constitutional government in eleven years of independence have been halting. It was almost nine years (1956) after independence that a democratic constitution was promulgated. By mid-summer 1958 it appeared that momentum toward the holding of elections no later than February, 1959, had achieved such force that it would be politically impossible to delay elections except through the intervention of authoritarian government. However, political tension began to mount and by the end of September political activity had resulted in incidents of violence in both East and West Pakistan. Popular disillusionment with the politicians forming the ruling group hit a new high, and cynicism re the improbability of eventual improvement characterized the political atmosphere. There was real doubt as to whether elections would in fact alter the basic political situation even if held as scheduled. Although events visible on the surface did not seem to offer a ready-made excuse for an authoritarian takeover, the public, including intellectuals, civil servants, Army officers, and the press, were perhaps better prepared than at any time in the past to accept extremist alternatives to the existing situation.
[Page 669]President Mirza has for several years made it clear privately that he was inclined toward “controlled democracy”, by which he clearly meant a republican, authoritarian form of government embodying a powerful executive on what he conceives as the “American” rather than the “parliamentary” pattern. Although we had speculated for many months that Mirza might “take-over” when circumstances were propitious, we had no reason to believe that a revolutionary timetable had been set. In recent months there was increasing evidence that the leaders of the Pakistan Army, who have long played a powerful but passive role in upholding the regime, were becoming increasingly sympathetic to the idea of authoritarian government.
On October 4, Mirza informed Ambassador Langley that he would take over the country within a few days. It is apparent that Mirza took the USG into his confidence almost as soon as his plan of action was formulated and agreed to by the key military leaders involved. On October 6 Mirza informed the Ambassador that the takeover would take place on the night of October 8. It was not immediately clear to what extent Mirza would attempt to abide by Pakistan’s present Constitution (which provides him with special emergency powers) while formulating the new constitution which he proposes to establish.
US Attitude:
Foreign policy issues are not directly involved in the present crisis. Mirza and Ayub, who would apparently dominate the new regime, have been architects and pillars of Pakistan’s pro-western foreign policy. Our concern arises from our interest in Pakistan’s stability, which we are not sure will be enhanced by authoritarian government, and from the fact that we might to some degree be ascribed responsibility, both by Pakistanis and others, for the suspension of democratic processes in Pakistan.
The U.S. Government has consistently sought to encourage in Pakistan the development of stable and representative government. This attitude has been implicit in our conduct toward Pakistan and has been made explicit to key Pakistani leaders, including Mirza. When the basic NSC policy paper on South Asia was rewritten in January 1957 (NSC 5701) the phrase “and representative” was included in the statement on the kind of government in Pakistan most compatible with U.S. interests. In a manner consistent with the principle of noninterference in Pakistan’s internal affairs, our efforts, both overt and covert, have been designed to encourage orderly development toward a stable regime under Pakistan’s democratic constitution of 1956. For example, we have given discreet encouragement to efforts to hold Pakistan’s first national direct elections under the new constitution. These elections were recently foreseen as taking place in February, [Page 670] 1959. Our Ambassador in Pakistan, acting on instructions and in the face of repeated indications from President Mirza that he was contemplating a possible authoritarian take-over, informed Mirza in May 1958 that, while the matter was of course one for Pakistanis themselves to decide, the people of the U.S. had for almost two centuries acted on the principle that in the long term democratic government is best.
This U.S. attitude has been predicated upon the view that, while a deterioration in the democratic process might at some point necessitate an authoritarian interlude in order to preserve stability, a popularly-based regime appeared to hold the best prospect for long term political stability in Pakistan.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/10–758. Top Secret. Drafted by Howison.↩