326. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Note: Coup d’Etat in Pakistan
The coup d’etat by President Mirza and General Ayub on October 7 was motivated by various forces in addition to the revulsion expressed in Mirza’s proclamation with the “political adventurers” and “traitors” who were held responsible for political and economic chaos within the country and for endangering Pakistan’s international position.
Mirza and Ayub feared Pakistan’s first national elections, scheduled for February 1959. Mirza particularly dreaded defeat at the hands of the Noon–Suhrawardy governing coalition which had just survived an assault by Mirza’s political allies in East Pakistan. Mirza and Ayub, both of whom depend predominantly on West Pakistan support, probably estimated that the elections would return a government increasingly influenced by Bengali interests who would demand greater autonomy and public funds for East Pakistan. Mirza was probably also concerned that the elections would be exploited to inflame sectarian jealousies, to which he is vulnerable as a member of the minority but influential Shia sect.
The problems with which Pakistan’s ineffectual parliamentary politicians could not cope are not likely to be mastered by the military dictatorship of Mirza and Ayub. They are not likely to provide the technical competence to formulate the necessary reforms or to arouse the widespread support which would be required to carry them [Page 673] through. Disillusionment with the inefficient and corrupt regimes of the past, although intense, has probably not prepared the general public for the arbitrary abrogation of constitutional government, and particularly in East Pakistan this move will be bitterly resented. It can be assumed that most leading politicians oppose the dictatorship. Support for Mirza and Ayub is probably fairly strong in the armed forces, especially among the leaders; however, the army’s new political role may prove distasteful to many both within and outside the armed forces who probably consider that it jeopardizes the army’s basic military mission and progress toward the construction of sound political institutions within Pakistan.
A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Under Secretary.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.00/10–958. Secret.↩