335. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) to the Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination (Barnes)1
Dear Mr. Barnes: In your letter of November 3,2 you raised several questions of a military nature regarding Pakistan, the answers to which you consider necessary in order to enable the Interagency Working Group to arrive at a balanced study of that country. The answers below correspond to the numbered questions in your letter.
- 1.
- (a) Strategic Force Objectives for Pakistan are designed to assist that country in maintaining internal and external security. They take into account the physical separation of West and East Pakistan, (b) No [Page 683] part of the Strategic Force Objectives envisions any military missions additional to those cited in (a) above. [3½ lines of source text not declassified]
- 2.
- Currently established JCS Strategic Force Objectives for Pakistan are considered the minimum essential for the stated purposes.
- 3.
- The elimination or substantial reduction of those forces now maintained by Pakistan beyond current JCS force levels would require no revision in JCS Strategic Force Objectives, but would be almost certain to impel Pakistan to press for a compensatory increase in MAP supported forces.
- 4.
- Qualitative improvement of Pakistani forces, in order to effect reductions, would, to a large degree, depend upon the ability of Pakistan to receive, operate and maintain the more sophisticated military hardware that qualitative improvement would introduce. There are serious reservations concerning the ability of Pakistan to absorb more advanced equipment. Additionally, the introduction of more advanced weapons systems might well prove to be prohibitively costly, not only from a U.S. point of view, but also from a Pakistani point of view. The over-all question of force reduction and/or improvements would have to be studied in the light of new U.S. policy objectives for Pakistan if and when such are established by the NSC.
- 5.
- The changed situation in the Middle East arising out of the coup in Iraq, the London Declaration and the lack of progress in mitigating Indian-Pakistani antagonism are all under continuing study in the Department of Defense. While the ultimate effects of these factors cannot as yet be known with certainty, the FY 1959 and 1960 MAP as proposed by the DOD do reflect current U.S. military requirements with regard to Pakistan.
- 6.
- To the degree that the MAP force objectives contribute to the security of Pakistan, they contribute substantially to the safety of U.S. military facilities there. They are not, however, specifically designed to meet United States requirements in this regard, except insofar as these requirements are ancillary to their overall missions. Should additional MAP support be sought by Pakistan as quid pro quo for additional base rights, solution to the question would be in the political, rather than in the military area.
It is hoped that the information and views furnished above will enable the Working Group promptly to complete its study and clear the way for implementation of the remainder of the FY 1959 program.
Sincerely yours,