Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

371. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, October 8, 1959—8 p.m.

853. Although we have not yet seen New Delhi’s reply Deptel 745,² in view Deptel 778,³ Embassy submits following:

1. Assuming recent overflights hostile acts which might continue, Pakistanis face real problem affecting their security. They cannot now deal with this problem and are depending on us. We feel some affirmative response is most important in terms our relations with Pakistanis and, within wider context, as evidence US interest meeting developing ChiCom threat Indian subcontinent.

2. In our view these considerations outweigh possible adverse Indian reaction although, on basis other evidence from Embassy New Delhi, Indian opinion seems to have moved considerably distant from that described Delhi’s telegram to Department 2428, April 17.⁴ Effective PAF capability would now appear to be in Indian as well as Pakistani interest.

3. We are somewhat concerned by implication Deptel 745 that Sidewinders may not be supplied Pakistanis unless we first are certain Indians can obtain comparable weapon from British. We assume supply British “Red Top” to Indians would be based on normal military requirement unrelated to Pakistan obtaining US Sidewinders.

4. Re last paragraph Deptel 745, current revision FY 1960 MAP available here does not contain site for Sidewinders. We earnestly hope moreover that any assistance decided upon to aid in overflight problem will be over and above existing programs FY 1960 and 1961 which already perilously low in meeting high priority items in content US objectives Pakistan.⁵

Rountree

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5612/10-859. Secret; Priority. Repeated to New Delhi, Kabul, Lahore, and Peshawar.
2. In this telegram, October 1, sent to New Delhi as telegram 1195 and repeated to Karachi as telegram 745, the Department requested the Embassy’s comments regarding the probable Indian reaction if the United States supplied Sidewinders to the Pakistani Air Force, particularly in light of recent reports by the Embassy in Pakistan of overflights by unidentified aircraft in the Gilgit area of Pakistan. (Ibid., 790D.5612/10-159)
3. In telegram 778, October 7, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 1254 and repeated to Karachi as telegram 778, the Department of State expressed its interest in an immediate reply to telegram 1195 (see footnote 2, above). (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5612/10-759)
4. Document 349.
5. In telegram 1263 from New Delhi, October 8, Ambassador Bunker informed the Department of State that the Indian reaction to the U.S. supplying Sidewinders to the Pakistani Air Force “would continue to be adverse and US would bear brunt of opprobrium.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5612/10-859)