Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, February 19, 1960—8:51 p.m.

2041. For Ambassador Rountree. Further to Deptel 1789 to Karachi,² 2850 to New Delhi, you authorized earliest opportunity not before February 25 convey following to Ayub. Suggest you make oral presentation and present Aide-Mémoire drawing on following points plus any additional ones you deem appropriate:

1. Ayub’s request to President for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapons (Embtel 1682)³ carefully considered by USG. Examination involved balanced consideration political, economic, military, technical and financial factors.

2. USG shares GOP concern for security Pakistan in face communist pressures on sub-continent and again assures GOP that security Pakistan of highest importance to USG. This security however well protected by present excellent Pakistan military establishment buttressed by collective security arrangements plus assurances U.S. support contained in American Doctrine, U.S.-Pakistan bilateral agreement and specific commitment in U.S. note of April 15, 1959 (Embtel 2328).⁴

3. Further evidence USG’s concern for Pakistan’s security is continuation military aid beyond 1954 commitment. Such aid designed help maintain present high standards Pakistan forces and provide orderly, gradual improvements as obsolete or worn-out equipment is replaced. Aid will necessarily take into account absorbtive capacity Pakistan armed forces as well as financial limitations both Pakistan and U.S.

4. To demonstrate U.S. sincere intention support Pakistan forces, U.S. prepared do following:

a. October 1954 Commitment—Complete this by providing inter alia aircraft for bomber squadron and certain naval vessels.

b. Sidewinders—Include Sidewinders in FY 1960 MAP thus materially increasing capabilities F–86’s. MAAG prepared discuss details programming, delivery, etc. DOD prepared send USAF team to Pakistan June for preliminary orientation in maintenance and utilization.

c. Radar Bombsishts—Provide these for B–57 bombers commencing with eight aircraft in FY 1960 MAP.

5. In addition our future plans include continuation programs to assist Pakistan military with consideration of following categories subject to congressional appropriations.

a. Tanks—Further progressive modernization of tank requirements.

b. Air Transport Squadron—Give sympathetic consideration to provision, at appropriate time, suitable replacements for PAF transport squadron.

c. M–14 Rifle M–60 Machine Gun—In light Pakistan intense interest these weapons U.S. prepared make available drawings and specifications provided it clearly understood that U.S. not prepared extend financial aid for manufacture these weapons in Pakistan. This connection wish stress that commercial mass production these weapons has not yet proceeded to point that drawings and manufacturing processes finalized. After thorough study, U.S. has concluded manufacture these weapons in Pakistan uneconomic and impracticable. Believe GOP will arrive same conclusion after study. As alternative GOP may wish consider requesting under future MAP provision M–1 rifles at nominal costs.

6. USG regards provision F–104s premature for following reasons:

a. Although recognized that eventually F–86s will require replacement by higher performance aircraft, increased capabilities F–86s equipped with Sidewinders reduces need replace them now.

b. Cost F–104s (about $40 million for 30 planes with spares plus very substantial yearly maintenance) would place excessive financial burdens on U.S and GOP at time when latter husbanding its resources in laudable effort economic development.

c. Stringency military aid funds means F–104s could be supplied only at cost disrupting present orderly program for strengthening overall Pakistan defenses and subordinating basic needs both ground and air forces.

d. Introduction new type aircraft at this time would further complicate effort improve logistic and maintenance capabilities PAF, particularly at time it must absorb jet bombers and Sidewinders.

e. U.S. military aid to Pakistan not dependent on attitude third countries. There is risk provision F–104s to Pakistan would tend increase Indo-Pakistan tensions when countries coming closer together and important Indus dispute nearing solution. Would also tend increase likehood general public criticism military aid in U.S. which might react to detriment our basic program in Pakistan.

7. For same reasons stated Paragraph 6 above, USG unable this time give favorable consideration other advanced weapons mentioned by Ayub to President.

8. Re informing GOI on Sidewinders (Deptel 1973 to Karachi,⁵ 3128 to New Delhi, and Karachi’s 1942,⁶ Ambassador should discuss matter frankly with Ayub, pointing out USG considers it advisable at early date inform GOI in general terms our decision provide Sidewinders to Pakistan and reasons therefor. Ambassador should stress fact that, since decision represents introduction missiles for first time in South Asian area, frank explanation to GOI essential in order forestall possible adverse impact on current favorable trend in Indo-Pakistan relations if, as seems likely, GOI should learn independently of Side-winder program. Ambassador should however endeavor persuade Ayub inform GOI himself with object encouraging Indo-Pakistan military cooperation and possibly initiating exchange pertinent information. By being forthright, GOP and USG would be in stronger position retain confidence GOI.

Reply soonest on Ayub’s response for foregoing approach in order enable Department instruct New Delhi on manner and timing of announcement to GOI. Request New Delhi expedite reply Deptel 3128.⁷

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/2–1960. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Poullada and Spengler; cleared with Bell, Raymond G. Hare, and OSD/ISA; and approved by G. Lewis Jones. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. See footnote 6, Document 348.
5. In telegram 1973, February 12, the Department of State noted that it considered it desirable to reply to Ayub about February 25 along the lines of telegram 1789 to Karachi, and suggested the possibility of asking Ayub to inform the Indian Government of Pakistan’s purchase of the Sidewinders. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5622/2–1260)
6. In telegram 1942, February 18, Ambassador Rountree offered his views regarding the question of how to inform the Indian Government of the U.S. decision to furnish Sidewinders to Pakistan. “Requesting Ayub tell GOI in hopes this would initiate exchange significant military information may be forcing pace with respect to Pakistan-Indian relations,” he stated in part. “No evidence here either side would now be willing make such exchanges.” (Ibid., 790D.5612/2–1860)
7. Footnote [231/2; lines of text] not declassified.