Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

393. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare)¹

Washington, December 2, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of November 25 from Embassy of Pakistan Re Strengthening of Pakistan Defense

Attached is a memorandum handed to me on November 25 (Tab B)² by the Ambassador of Pakistan in which it is proposed that steps be taken to strengthen Pakistan’s defenses because of an increase in the communist threat to Pakistan’s security—particularly noticeable since the U–2 incident (May 1, 1960).

The memorandum refers to the talk between the President and the President of Pakistan on December 8, 1959, in which President Ayub said Pakistan’s force goal should be raised.³ The memorandum likewise refers to similar suggestions made to the Secretary by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in his conversation of June 2, 1960,⁴ and by the Ambassador of Pakistan in his conversation with me on July 2, 1960.⁵

The memorandum, in my opinion, contains very little new. It discusses the continuing and increasing threat of Soviet and Chinese Communist expansion but does not present convincing arguments that this threat affects Pakistan to a greater degree than it affects a number of other countries. Generally speaking, the facts and arguments in the memorandum have been fully considered in the course of our planning and do not reveal any problems new to the United States. It goes without saying that we must continue to assist Pakistan to maintain armed forces to defend its borders against the increasing danger of Sino-Soviet aggression, and that we must foster the conviction that we are a loyal ally.

The memorandum lists five principal points, on which NEA has the following comments:

(a) Increased Russian hostility and suspicion directed specifically against Pakistan: There was a sharp reaction at the time of the U–2 incident, but our information does not indicate that this treatment has continued. The Russians, whatever their real intentions, appear to have gone out of their way in recent months to handle the Pakistanis gently—e.g., their conclusion of an oil exploration agreement; indications that they will offer other forms of technical assistance; and a more friendly tone in broadcasts to Pakistan. We must likewise take into consideration the fact that some Pakistanis seem to favor an accommodation with the Russians and that Pakistan maintains diplomatic relations with Peiping. In pursuing our endeavors to prevent the Pakistanis from being deceived by Russian or Chinese Communist offers of aid, we must, of course, continue to provide military assistance in quantities adequate to give them confidence in their ability to defend their borders—at least in a limited war.

(b) Russians’ open encouragement of Afghans “vis-à-vis Pakistan”: While Khrushchev’s public support of Afghan pretensions in “Pushtunistan” may have helped to encourage Prime Minister Daud in launching the recent ill-fated tribal incursion into Pakistani territory, we have no evidence that the Russians openly encouraged the Afghans in their Bajaur venture. Regardless of possible covert support, and regardless of Russian exploitation of “Pushtunistan” propaganda, we know of no recent increase in overt Russian efforts to stimulate Afghan enmity of Pakistan. At the same time we cannot blame the Pakistanis for being unhappy about Khrushchev’s reported remark on May 9, shortly after the U–2 incident, to the effect that a country such as “Pakhtunistan” might conceivably exist.

(c) Summit collapse and RB–47 incidents: These were evidence of Russian aggressiveness and belligerency, but aimed primarily against the United States, and not specifically against Pakistan.

(d) Growing Russian hostility and intransigence at the UN: These are cause for concern, but were directed against the West in general and only indirectly against Pakistan.

(e) Chinese Communist territorial claims against Pakistan: Maps showing portions of peripheral countries as part of China were published many years ago, and unless a map showing a new claim to Pakistan territory has been issued very recently, this problem cannot be regarded as a post U–2 development. Nevertheless, Pakistan has good reason to look to her northern frontiers. As you know, we are assisting her in a road-building project which will give the Pakistani forces better access to Gilgit.

The statement that the Afghans have now “openly come out with the demand that ‘Pakhtunistan’ should be part of Afghan territory” may be based on newspaper stories or radio propaganda which have not come to our attention. It is our understanding, however, that the official Afghan line, as presented by Prince Naim to the British Embassy, Kabul only last week is still that the Afghans have no territorial ambitions in the Pushtu-speaking areas of Pakistan.

The Pakistani contention that our commitments under multilateral and bilateral agreements for common defense are “so unspecific that it is feared that such a statement would probably not deter the Soviets …”⁷ seems to imply a lack of faith in our intentions. The Pakistan memorandum contends that “the known reluctance of the Free World to get involved in a global war might encourage the communists in the belief that they could go to a very considerable length in stirring up trouble against their weak neighbors without fear of inviting western intervention.” Here we can only demonstrate by our general posture and our specific actions, as occasion may warrant, that this fear is unfounded.

Suggested Meeting in Pakistan

You will note that the memorandum refers to the Ambassador of Pakistan’s suggestion “that appropriate officials of the departments concerned in the two governments should meet in Pakistan to determine the extent of the threat and that if it was established that it had in fact increased, suggest such measures as may be necessary to strengthen Pakistan defenses to meet this new threat.” The memorandum adds that the Government of Pakistan would welcome such a meeting at an early date.

I believe we should do our utmost to avoid paper exchanges with the Government of Pakistan on this subject, and that until the scope and nature of our future aid patterns are clearer, there is little to be gained by setting up a special meeting in Pakistan as the memorandum proposes. The following lines of action are proposed:

1. That we send a copy of the memorandum to the field for comment.

2. That you send a copy of the memorandum to the Department of Defense (suggested letter to Mr. Irwin attached, Tab A).⁸

3. That when comments from the field and the Department of Defense have been received, you or I (or both of us) meet with the Ambassador of Pakistan and discuss the memorandum along the lines indicated herein, and suggest that regular contacts between representatives of our two governments in Pakistan and Washington appear to cover adequately the subjects mentioned in the memorandum.

4. That we suggest to the Ambassador of Pakistan that in our opinion no special meeting is required.⁹

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5/12–260. Secret. Drafted by Weil, Hart and G. Lewis Jones and concurred in by Bell.
2. Not attached to the source text; it is ibid., 790D.5/11–2560.
3. See Document 376.
4. See Document 388.
5. Reference is presumably to Jones’ conversation with Aziz Ahmed on July 7; a memorandum of that conversation, drafted by Spengler, is in Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/7–760.
7. Ellipsis in the source text.
8. Not found; regarding the letter as sent, see footnote 9 below.

9. Hare initialed his approval of the first recommendation; under recommendations 3 and 4, he made the following handwritten comment: “decide later.”

   No action is indicated for the second recommendation. On December 7, however, Hare transmitted a copy of the Pakistani memorandum to Irwin under cover of a letter which reads in part as follows: “While the memorandum proposes a meeting of United States and Pakistan officials in Pakistan, I propose, following receipt of your views and those of our interested posts in the field, to convey our views orally to the Pakistan Ambassador, and hopefully to avoid paper exchanges with the Government of Pakistan on this subject.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5/12-760)

   On February 17, 1961, Jones handed Ambassador Ahmed a note enclosing a memorandum in reply to the November 25 Pakistani memorandum. The U.S. reply is ibid., 790D.5/2–1761.