432. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Philippines1

1763. Joint State–Defense message. Refs: (a) Embtel 1749, 1692, 1680. (b) Deptel 1341.2

FYI. Approval obtained in accordance NSC action 15503 to inform Philippine Government main elements proposed FY 1960 military assistance program (MAP) as follows: [Page 912]

a.
Six 155 mm. howitzers and seven M–41 tanks for first regular infantry division.
b.
Ordnance and electronic equipment for one destroyer escort (contingent upon Philippines acquiring one DE through Japanese reparations).
c.
Third squadron of F–86F aircraft.
d.
Sidewinders and rocket dyne engines for improving combat capability of Philippine jet aircraft.
e.
Dollar costs to the extent of approximately $1.5 million in connection with construction of:
1)
A training center at Laur, Nueva Ecija Province, Luzon.
2)
The Basa airfield, Pampanga Province, Luzon.
3)
Aircraft control and warning sites.

Final program approval of course will be contingent on Congressional action on global MAP for FY 1960 which Executive Branch will submit early in 1959 Session. At time we inform Philippine Government of program we will also wish to place strong emphasis on fact that program items will only be delivered commensurate with Philippine ability absorb and utilize them.

Before authorizing you inform Philippines main elements proposed FY 1960 MAP we would like your comments on how gain maximum impact from this step and improve our position vis-à-vis key Philippine officials. We see three possibilities: 1) Give information to Serrano in context his talks last October with Secretary,3 and his continuing interest this subject; this would bolster Serrano’s stock and possibly mellow his attitude in bases negotiations by allowing him take full credit for obtaining advance commitment from US on FY 1960 MAP; 2) give information Serrano without connecting it his talks last October; state in connection with his recent testimony before Philippine Senate Committee on national defense that while US considers Military Assistance Agreement has served useful purpose and desires continue it, we would of course entertain request terminate it if Philippines felt it no longer served their interests; this would serve create impression this routine step on our part and at same time indicate Serrano we consider his sounding off to Committee not very helpful; 3) give information to Vargas, either informally or via letter, instead of to Serrano; this might bolster Vargas’ position.

Would appreciate your comments before we authorize you inform Phil Govt.4 End FYI.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 796.5–MSP/12–358. Secret. Drafted by Charles R. Tanguy of SPA; approved by Parsons; and cleared with SPA, FE, W/MSC, ICA, and OSD/ISA. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACREPPHIL, COMNAVPHIL, and 13th AF.
  2. Telegram 1341 to Manila, November 12, 1958; telegram 1680 from Manila, November 26, 1958; telegrams 1692 and 1749 from Manila, November 27 and December 3, 1958, respectively, all discuss U.S. military assistance to the Philippines for fiscal year 1960 and adverse reaction to it in the Philippine press. All are ibid., 796.5–MSP.
  3. NSC Action No. 1550, “Policy Regarding Future Commitments for Foreign Assistance,” was taken during the 283d NSC meeting, May 3, 1956. (Ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)
  4. See Document 426.
  5. In telegram 2131 from Manila, January 16, Bohlen replied that the Country Team had concluded that the first course of action was preferable. (Department of State, Central Files, 796.5-MSP/1–1659)