Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

562. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, November 5, 1960—2 p.m.

809. Reference: Embtels 789 and 797 (latter paraphrased in our telegram repeated to Moscow 2).² Statements by Prime Minister and Luang Wichit on closer relations with and possible acceptance of aid from Soviets are rather transparent tactics designed give US dramatic warning that Thailand serious about (1) their dissatisfaction with US attitude on Lao situation and their feeling US and SEATO actions to meet dangers to Thailand inadequate, and (2) long-standing complaint that “neutrals” not only receive more aid, which committed nation like RTG foregoes, but also are better treated by US than committed nation. At present I do not believe that government will implement Prime Minister’s general statements to any significant extent. Interesting to note in support of view this done for US benefit that World editor Berrigan told Embassy officer here of call from Public Relations Department calling special attention to Soviet Ambassador’s “offer” and Thailand response, thus assuring that it would get big splash in English-language press.

Of course even if only tactical move on part of Thailand it dangerous one. Left-wing and nuetralist elements here which have been effectively silenced for past two years sure to be encouraged by statements government even willing to consider prospect of accepting aid from and conducting student and cultural exchanges with Soviets. Soviets could follow up with highly attractive offer which would strengthen hand of left-wing elements here even though government might refuse accept and perhaps never intended accept offer. Anti-Commie elements will find government’s attitude confusing. Therefore even though government intends no shift in its tough line toward domestic leftist elements it may find it has in fact encouraged them and made them more difficult to control.

In terms of reasons Thailand chose to take this step, Embtel 744 (which being repeated Moscow) emphasized factors arising out of present Lao situation which have created discontent among Thais.³ Long before Laos situation arose, as Embassy often pointed out, many Thais were disturbed by way “neutrals” treated in US programs relative to RTG. Thais have watched Cambodia most closely this respect, and such cases as Pakistan moves toward obtaining Soviet assistance and recent announcement US aid program to Guinea no doubt have had some impact. These cases provide ammunition for group in government (e.g. nationalists like Foreign Minister Thanat and Luang Wichit and probably also left-wingers Generals Net and Amphorn) who appear believe RTG should move toward neutralism at least to extent pressuring US for greater aid by what they would call “blackmail” if done by Cambodia, for example. Lao situation has played into hands this group by creating sense frustration among “men of action” such as Sarit and apparently made it possible for them to convince Sarit of wisdom making these statements.

In order keep incident in perspective, would like point out that new Soviet Ambassador was making routine courtesy call on Prime Minister which latter could not have refused accept.

I propose, for time being, to take no action and to shrug off any leading questions from RTG officials in order avoid playing into their hands.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.92/11–560. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Moscow.

2. Telegram 789, November 3, informed the Department of front-page coverage in the Thai English language press concerning reports by Prime Minister Sarit’s Assistant Luang Vichit Vadakarn of the call by the new Soviet Ambassador on Sarit on October 31. Luang Vichit said that the Ambassador proposed commercial, technical, scientific, and cultural relations with Thailand to which the Prime Minister replied that Thailand would be glad to agree but asked that the Soviets not propound their political ideology or carry out subversive activity in the country. (Ibid., 661.92/11–360)

   Telegram 797, November 4, provided more reporting on press coverage concerning the possibility of closer Thai-Soviet relations, and quoted from press interviews with Sarit in which he emphasized that he and the Soviet Ambassador had talked about increased trade as a way to promote closer ties, although Sarit emphasized Thai dislike for Communist ideology. (Ibid., 661.92/11–460)

3. Telegram 744 from Bangkok, October 26, conveyed Johnson’s view that, in spite of Thai unhappiness and dissatisfaction with U.S. policy in Laos and with French and British unwillingness to consider a stronger SEATO role in Laos, Thailand’s policy of close adherence to the United States would not change in the absence of further adverse developments. (Ibid., 692.00/10–2660)