Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, April 7, 1958—7:42 p.m.

1222. Your 1678.²

1. Indication reftel Souphanouvong planning use ICC as leverage improve NLHX chances, combined with intelligence report Souvanna Phouma desires election at least two NLHX candidates, most disturbing and raises serious question bona fides Souvanna’s role in joint U.S.-Lao efforts elections. Should two candidates be Souphanouvong and Phoumi it would appear their retention in new Souvanna government intended regardless overall results elections.

2. U.S. acceptance deferral monetary negotiations until after elections and various U.S. arrangements support United Conservative Front intended build up RLG strength for all out effort defeat NLHX. Objective is not assure NLHX minimum representation Assembly but totally deny them such representation and inflict on them maximum loss prestige and influence, eliminating them from next government.

3. Request Embassy comments including any information available as result contact Nationalist and Independent leaders.³ Embassy authorized in its discretion use substance paragraph 2 above in talks with them or Souvanna himself if deemed feasible query him on above report.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–458. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Corcoran, revised by Parsons, cleared by Whittington, and approved by Parsons.
2. In telegram 1678, April 4, the Embassy reported that it learned that Souphanouvong now considered retention of the ICC after the May 4 elections necessary and that he was preparing a dossier of illegal Lao Government campaign activities against the NLHX for the ICC to investigate. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1714 from Vientiane, April 11, Smith agreed that all NLHX candidates should be defeated in the elections, but concluded that the only way it could be done was by fraud and force which would be undesirable and possibly counterproductive. Smith suggested instead a joint Western effort in Vientiane to keep future NLHX Assembly members out of the next Lao Cabinet. (ibid., 751J.00/4–1158; included in the microfiche supplement)