383. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

407. Manila for MLG. Addressees pass interested agencies. Ref: Deptel 243 rptd Bangkok 256,2 Bangkok’s 368 to Dept rptd Vientiane 214.3 Concur informing Sarit our messages Phoumi and Souvanna but believe important he should also be informed of second message to [Page 826] Phoumi sent through me4 in which we mention our encouragement at common effort being made by Phoumi and Souvanna to find peaceful solution. Sarit could well be told again, as he has already been told, of our confidence in Phoumi, our efforts to help Somsanith government before its resignation, our opposition Kong Le, and our belief essentiality maintenance FAL as barrier PL, and our efforts see it paid and fed. Phoumi and Ouan (not Souvanna) are negotiating on pay and we supporting any agreement they reach. But he should also be convinced our support Phoumi not complete blank check and is contingent upon Phoumi’s cooperating in seeking solution which will reestablish firm government and unified command of military and avoid outside intervention and internal bloodshed.

Agreement Assembly meeting Luang Prabang and more moderate tone Radio Savannakhet encouraging evidence such cooperation by Phoumi as is Souvanna’s statement he prepared resign, accept verdict Assembly, and report that if chosen again as Prime Minister he would enlarge Cabinet to include former Ministers. On debit side is Ouan’s reported increasing bitterness as result Phoumi accusations he Communist, increasing anti-Thai feeling here as result continued Thai blockade Vientiane, and rumored Thai support Phoumi, and failure to date recover arms from villagers.

Have not yet told Zellweger about messages as dubious his discretion as result his performance on Luang Prabang visit.

Thai Ambassador in considerable agitation and busy evacuating Thai nationals. Will try send estimate his views separately. Am not informing him of messages.

Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2860. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, London, Paris, and Manila.
  2. In telegram 243 to Vientiane, August 26, the Department suggested that Unger stress to Sarit that the United States believed that force should be used only after it became clear that reasonable efforts for a peaceful settlement had failed. The U.S. objective was elimination of Kong Le’s influence and preservation of Lao independence and territorial integrity. (ibid., 751J.00/8–2560; included in the microfiche supplement)
  3. In telegram 368 from Bangkok, August 27, Unger reported that Ambassador Johnson was returning to Bangkok that night and would meet with Sarit. Telegram 396, August 30, reported that Johnson met with Sarit for 2 hours on the morning of August 30 and made the points as the Department suggested in the telegram printed here. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2760 and 751J.00/8–3060, respectively; both included in the microfiche supplement)
  4. See Document 382.