Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

400. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, September 18, 1960—5:30 p.m.

320. For Ambassador from Parsons.

1. Will be going to UN tomorrow and will be somewhat out of touch with Lao affairs for one week. Would therefore like send you my present thinking.

2. Am a little disturbed by lack of understanding which appears to be developing between us. (Your 549² referred only to compelling reasons why we cannot throw our support to Phoumi but not to those equally compelling why we cannot throw our support exclusively to Souvanna. Presume you will be sending fuller reaction to our 316³ than your 549 which arrived garbled.) Specific issue is our attitude toward Souvanna and Phoumi.

3. While Souvanna is legally constituted authority, we must not forget that direction his policies is inimical to US interests, is contrary to thesis that softness in face of communist pressure is wrong tactic and that in past he has not been identified as friend of US. Therefore although return to stability is primary present objective, we should have no illusions re problems we shall be facing if and when Souvanna gets firmly in saddle. In first place this will be considered US defeat.

4. While Phoumi is “bull-headed”, vaultingly ambitious, and relies too exclusively on force, nevertheless he is known as pro-US and anti-communist. Moreover his “Revolution” not just that of single general against legal government, but encompasses great majority southern leadership and evidently has sympathy of King. (Am satisfied that your reading of King’s attitudes is correct and not that of Souvanna or Falaize.) It appears to us there is real danger that in last extremity Phoumi will declare separate state of Champassac and that GVN and RTG will recognize this state forthwith. In conclusion we do not believe that Phoumi can be excluded from playing important role within government apparatus, whether as Minister or as General manipulating FAL which is at present key source of power in Laos. Consequently we cannot treat him like a pariah even if he may have deserved it.

5. Above views are strengthened by Embtels [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of this morning which seem to indicate that Ouane is not in control of Vientiane, that Kong Le has power delay take off of aircraft, and that latter is in close touch with PL to extent that apparently his paras on supply mission to Sam Neua dropped leaflets signed by Phoumi Vongvichit who known communist. Thus General Phoumi’s affirmation that Vientiane is controlled by communists may not be so groundless.

6. Am now pretty convinced that political situation cannot be resolved except by proceeding along course of action defined in Deptel 316. Nothing less than a blast will do it. But insofar as military situation concerned, I do think that we must currently insure supply of troops so long as they are effective bastion against PL in field and make this point clear to both Souvanna and Phoumi. We must also recognize that supplying troops through Souvanna does strengthen him and does seriously undercut Phoumi’s position. Therefore in any area where local commander is favorable to Phoumi I think it most important supply mission be run through general (except as yesterday in case of overriding combat emergency). In fact Kong Le’s capability delay aircraft and use this aircraft by paras to drop PL leaflets raise grave doubts in my mind that Souvanna–Ouane channel can any longer be used satisfactorily to supply troops.

7. Let Steeves have your thoughts on above on No Distribution basis but please repeat your key telegrams to USUN slugged for me.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1760. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Chapman, cleared by Usher, and approved by Parsons.
2. Telegram 549 from Vientiane, September 17, stated that U.S. support for Phoumi would be regarded as interference in Lao internal affairs which the situation in Sam Neua did not yet justify. (ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Document 398.