Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

412. Telegram From the Department of State to the Ambassador in Laos¹

Washington, October 1, 1960—4:55 p.m.

365. Eyes only Ambassador. Exclusive for CINCPAC and POLAD. At high level meeting 30th between Department representatives and Joint Chiefs, a comprehensive review of Laos situation took place.² On basis your most recent reports and intelligence amply clear state of crisis nearer and if Laos or a portion of it is to be salvaged from Communist control, further decisive action required.

You are instructed to seek immediate audience with the King pointing out to him that political and military leadership now in such stage of disintegration that the only solution for salvaging his country is for King to take authority into his own hands and appoint what would be equivalent of caretaker government under royal decree. He would himself assume leadership of government or at least name a Prime Minister other than Souvanna Phouma who from all indications is either unable, unwilling or (more seriously) actively conniving with the Communists to gradually hand over Laos. Secondly, the King would name a Commander-in-Chief of his forces in whom he has the most confidence and whom he feels best able to rally remnants of FAL now bitterly divided between several loyalties.

King should set forth his action in radio appeal to the country and use any other information media which could be provided to disseminate this royal decree and ask for support for those he has named to support him in this hour of crisis.

You should point out to the King that our aid to the armed forces is now not only ineffectual but in real danger of supporting dangerous elements like Kong Le who from all appearances would seem to be in active support of Pathet Lao and even soliciting outside Communist aid. Continuation our pay to the FAL and other type of aid is therefore contingent upon his assumption of this authority in setting up channels through which we can funnel assistance to those who would support the royal purpose.

You should assure him that if he willing to take this decisive step, the United States is willing to give him all feasible support in order to reestablish integrity of his realm. As part of his action King’s presence in Vientiane at seat of Government would in our opinion be a good symbolic move and make a more efficient administration possible.

In connection with the above the Department of course bears in mind that the second stage of the operation the King is already attempting to execute is a political solution following the meeting two days ago of the military leaders.³ This would merely be a hastening of that act. Therefore, the political meeting already scheduled may be the vehicle by which he can carry out the very purposes we have outlined above. In order to lend urgency and seriousness to our approach to the King he should be told that no further payment of troops or other forms of aid are to be forthcoming until this political step has been taken. This includes the release requested in your 635.⁴

In revealing appropriate portions of your instructions to Souvanna when requesting immediate audience you should inform him that uncertainty regarding situation at Sam Neua, continued assault by Kong Le’s forces against FAL units south of Nam Ca Dinh, and what we regard as probability that PL forces are playing significant role in both these situations, clearly reveal disintegration non-Communist elements still in progress and PL gaining stronger position in Laos as each day passes. US cannot be party to take-over of Laos by Communists and we cannot support or condone any government of Laos which is instrumental in such process. Unless cease-fire agreed upon by military leaders Luang Prabang becomes effective immediately and unless contemplated meeting in Luang Prabang to settle political issues can be held forthwith to reunite country under single government, US will have to review its position and determine some new approach to problem of helping preserve Lao independence.

You might then review our efforts bring about peaceful national reconciliation since August 9. Remind him of our cooperation with him in trying re-establish stability of regime; of our encouragement to Phoumi to serve in his government; of our exertions prevent attacks on Vientiane; and of our seeking RTG cooperation in lifting blockade. In light present situation question is posed: Are the Lao willing and able to preserve independence their country? We can understand desire of Lao to stop killing each other, but it seems to us this desire should apply with special force against FAL killing FAL. For us to effect releases now would amount to financing both sides of civil war. Under these circumstances US has decided withhold all releases until situation is clearer.

FYI: Believe you should know that there is strong and growing sentiment here to give exclusive and all-out support to those able and willing to salvage at least that portion of the country centered in Savannakhet if the King unwilling or unable to take such leadership suggested above. FYI.⁵

British, French and Australians informed substance foregoing except FYI portion.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–160. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Steeves and Chapman and cleared with SEA, with the Department of Defense and Secretary Herter in substance, and with Merchant in draft. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, Canberra, and CINCPAC.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. The meeting took place on September 28 at Luang Prabang. According to telegram 646, September 29, the Lao military leaders (excluding Kong Le who was not at the meeting) agreed to remain under their respective commands of Savannakhet and Vientiane, to fight together against the Pathet Lao, and to respect a cease-fire among themselves. They did raise the possibility of Boun Oum as Prime Minister with Souvanna as his deputy. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–2960; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. In telegram 635, September 28, the Embassy requested authorization for the release of 58 million kip for the FAL, 20 million for civilian budget support, and 12 million for police services. The Embassy stated that it would release this money, if authorized, only after certain assurances were received from the Souvanna government, such as a prohibition of a pay raise for the FAL without consultation with the United States and a promise that the Royal Lao Government would make these funds available throughout all Lao provinces. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/9–2860)
5. In telegram 591 from Bangkok, October 2, Johnson reported his impression that Phoumi and his forces at Savannakhet were so demoralized by Kong Le’s recent military victory that U.S. policy in Laos should not be based on exclusive support of Phoumi without first making a careful assessment of the situation. (ibid., 751J.00/10–2660; included in the microfiche supplement)