60. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, June 1, 1960, 9:45 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Prime Minister Nash
- G. D. L. White, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of New Zealand
- J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
After amenities Mr. Nash remarked that with reference to the recent unfortunate U–2 incident he had been much impressed by the openness shown by the United States Government. He thought that this frankness had been a good show. The President indicated that our government system with its divided power leads to such openness and that he had often discussed with the late Mr. Dulles the advantages and disadvantages of this. Turning to the abortive Summit Conference, the President said that the interesting thing was why did Khrushchev decide to demolish the Conference. He had known about the U–2 for two years or so and he had proved this by even giving the date of a flight previous to the recent one which failed. One could not, of course, know what Khrushchev’s reasons were but there were various possibilities. The President mentioned some of these such as dissatisfaction from Stalinist, Soviet military and also Chinese Communist sources. He described the events in Paris surrounding President De Gaulle’s written invitation to Khrushchev to come back to another meeting and Khrushchev’s failure to reply or appear. It was obvious too, the President pointed out, that Khrushchev had come to Paris with the intention of scuttling the Conference and he described the long documentation with translations already provided which Khrushchev had used soon after his opening mild statements on arrival. There was mention that Mr. Khrushchev badly misjudged American psychology as was evident from his apparent effort to intervene in our forthcoming elections.
Mr. Nash dilated at some length on his own visit to Moscow2 and gave every evidence of having been impressed with Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Nash thought that he sincerely wanted disarmament and commented that he had been able to tell Khrushchev that on the basis of recent personal contacts he could assure him that two of the other [Page 185] three world leaders also sincerely wanted disarmament, which was the biggest issue of our day. He went on to say that Mr. Khrushchev seemed thwarted by the negotiations in Geneva whether in the test ban conference or the group of ten. He was in fact obsessed by intervention in Russian affairs and talked at length about those who had intervened after the first World War. When Mr. Nash added that he had had a grandfather at the Crimean War, Mr. Khrushchev pointed at him and said that he, Mr. Nash, was an interventionist also. Returning to the subject of overflights, he commented favorably on the cessation of these flights. The President indicated that he had already decided this before going to Paris and it was therefore simple to so inform Khrushchev. He commented however, that one could not possibly prevent Chiang Kai-shek from making flights over the area immediately adjacent to Taiwan. In further reference to Khrushchev and his intemperate personal attacks, the President remarked that he himself in his political life had always been careful not to impugn the motives of others.
During discussion of China, Mr. Nash spoke with disfavor of the Soong family and others who had surrounded Chiang Kai-shek in the old days. He quite evidently did not regard the present situation on Formosa with much favor, mentioning his concern for the Formosan people and also his view that the future of Formosa should be guaranteed by some means or other, perhaps by the United Nations. He also expressed the view that the offshore islands belonged to “China” (not Formosa) and that this situation should be dealt with lest there be more bad trouble.
With respect to Communist China, Mr. Nash made clear that he felt the present situation was unfortunate and that it would be best to come to some means of dealing with this nation which controlled a vast population, as otherwise there might be even worse trouble later. The President made it emphatically clear that under present circumstances the United States would not recognize Communist China and that if its government gained admittance to the United Nations he feared that the public reaction in the United States would be so strong as to possibly destroy the United Nations. Mr. Nash responded that if that were the case with respect to public opinion here, it might be best to start trying to change that opinion. The President said that public opinion here could only change when it had facts to go on. The facts were, however, that the Communist Chinese were continuing to imprison our people and failing to give an accounting for many of those who had disappeared after the Korean war. They had also refused to renounce force and all the while were carrying on a vigorous hate campaign against us.
[Page 186]Turning to Laos and Vie-tnam, Mr. Nash expressed concern at the way elections had been rigged in these two countries and he said he did not know what could be done about such situations. He indicated that New Zealand wished to take a constructive and cooperative position, but it was obvious that he was dissatisfied with the handling of affairs in these two countries and felt that this boded no good for the future.
During additional discussion of European matters, Mr. Nash expressed the view that Khrushchev and the Communists were opposed to a plebiscite in Germany because he knew that such a plebiscite could not possibly be won. There would have to be three plebiscites in the two Germanys and Berlin for a fair test. The President indicated that the free world side was perfectly willing to have one plebiscite or three plebiscites, or any other proper voting procedure. Mr. Nash remarked that in his opinion Mr. Khrushchev had a really first-class political mind, a view from which the President dissented somewhat by saying that in his observation he struck him as more of a shrewd, quick and tough debater.
At the close of the conversation the President spoke with emphasis on the sincerity and strength of the desire of the American people for peace, disarmament and a proper relaxation of tensions. He added that despite the disappointment of the Paris collapse he was not pessimistic about the future. It was notable that unity between the French, the British and ourselves had never been more complete.