Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

259. Special National Intelligence Estimate⁰

SNIE 65–2–60

Washington, May 24, 1960.

THE WEST NEW GUINEA PROBLEM

The Problem

To estimate probable developments in the West New Guinea situation over the next six months or so.

Conclusions

1. We believe that Indonesia will not attempt an armed attack against West New Guinea during the next six months at least. Indonesia will probably continue to seek its objectives in New Guinea by international political pressure and by attempts to subvert the Papuans and Indonesians in West New Guinea. (Paras. 10–11, A–9)

2. Dutch reinforcement of its New Guinea defenses and the planned flag-showing cruise by the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman will evoke an intense emotional and nationalistic response in Indonesia. However, we believe that neither the Dutch nor the Indonesians will attempt to provoke an armed conflict. Although we believe that a deliberate military action is unlikely during the period of this estimate, we cannot exclude the possibility of military incidents, such as an irrational attack against Dutch naval units or settlements in New Guinea or an accidental armed clash. (Paras. 12–14)

3. The furor over Dutch action will almost certainly work to the advantage of both Sukarno and the Communists. It will enable Sukarno to rally opinion behind him and divert attention from Indonesia’s internal problems. The PKI will be able to consolidate further its claim as a nationalist movement and Sukarno’s most loyal supporter. Any efforts of General Nasution and the army to combine with anti-Communist elements against Sukarno’s tendency to increase Communist participation in the government will be seriously undermined. (Para. 15)

[Here follow a 3-page Discussion section, an annex on Dutch and Indonesia military capabilities in the area, and a map; see Supplement.]

0. Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. The CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on May 24, except representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.