Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

265. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State⁰

The Hague, May 31, 1960, 6 p.m.

1538. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference Deptel 1732,¹ repeated Djakarta 2075.

1. As planned (Embtel 1528,² repeated Djakarta 99) I had 45-minute talk this morning with Prime Minister De Quay, who is also acting Foreign Minister in Luns’ absence. I covered all points contained in reftel, as instructed, but did not refer to any Indonesian source by name. De Quay confirmed that same had been covered in his report from Ambassador Van Roijen, although latter was not nearly as specific. De Quay was pleased that we would continue our investigations of question Indonesian threat to New Guinea and appreciated fact that we understand Dutch concern in this matter (paragraph 6 reftel). He commented that he too regards taking matter to Security Council as last resort. He said if Dutch took problem up in Security Council they should probably do so only once and he felt case was not strong enough to do so now.

However, he did not rule out possibility of doing so later. De Quay also emphasized fact that Dutch are doing everything possible to minimize tension and avoid any act or incident which might be considered provocative.

2. When I had finished my summary, De Quay stated he would like to give me his interpretation and thinking, especially re approach made by Indonesian army to US. De Quay added he was sending message today to Van Roijen outlining his thinking on this matter.

3. De Quay said that his analysis of this situation leads him to conclusion that there may very well be some real danger of an Indonesian landing operation, if not a larger attack on New Guinea, and that Dutch worries in this respect are substantiated by Indonesian army approach to US. De Quay feels that Sukarno is pretty far left, although he may not be communist in name or fact; that Sukarno definitely is going to play ball to some extent with communists as well as with leftist political leaders and groups in Indonesia; and that eventually, if Sukarno remains in power, he will align Indonesia to much greater extent than he has so far with communist bloc. De Quay sees General Nasution as counter-balance, an anti-communist who wishes to continue to play ball with US and West. De Quay feels that Nasution will not and cannot afford to break with Sukarno, at least at this time, and that Sukarno can still pull together and command great personal following among Indonesians. Thus, De Quay sees two basically conflicting approaches and personalities in Sukarno and Nasution, but he believes that, if Sukarno directed Nasution to make military threat or landing on one of off-shore islands of Netherlands New Guinea, Nasution would still obey orders and do it. Thus, De Quay interprets Indonesian army approach in Djakarta as method whereby Nasution is attempting to augment pressure from US and others on Sukarno to refrain from any military adventure in New Guinea. According to De Quay, all these pressures would keep Sukarno from engaging in such military adventure and would thus keep Nasution in position where he would not have to receive such an order for military operation against Western interests. De Quay therefore reasons that Indonesian army approach to US substantiates fact that there is danger of a military operation ordered by Sukarno to which Nasution might not subscribe, but which he would have to support. In this connection, De Quay noted that it was Sukarno and not Nasution who had directly ordered present build-up and other military measures in East Indonesian territory.

4. De Quay stated flatly that of course Dutch Government could not talk with Nasution, his representative, or Indonesian army. Dutch Government could only talk with Indonesian Government and that, therefore, any such conversations directly between Dutch Government and Indonesian army were out of question.

5. De Quay went on to say that he had talked with British Ambassador Sir Paul Mason who had reflected to De Quay British feeling that there was no imminent threat of military action against WNG. Mason informed De Quay that British Government had made representations to Indonesian Government urging that nothing be done of provocative nature by Indonesians and stating that of course Dutch had no aggressive intent against Indonesia. De Quay again pointed out that he felt such representations were most useful as deterrent and hoped that US would continue to make such representations in view of what he considers to be continuing danger as outlined in paragraph three above.

6. De Quay said that in his conversations with Malayan Prime Minister on May 28, Malayan Prime Minister had little use for Sukarno and felt very strongly that Sukarno would line up with communists. Malayan Prime Minister also told De Quay that Sukarno would continue to play Western assistance against Eastern assistance as long as he possibly could and that there was no question but what Sukarno would line up with East in event of any show-down, although trying to maintain air of independent neutrality in meantime.

7. De Quay urged that US make further representations to Indonesian Government in accordance with Dutch Government’s request given me by Luns (paragraph 2, Embtel 1524,³ repeated Djakarta 96). I pointed out to De Quay that this had been done again very recently and, in fact, we had received written aide-mémoire from Indonesian Government as recently as May 18⁴ affirming its assurances re West New Guinea. This information had been given to Ambassador Van Roijen and Luns was fully familiar with it. In view of this and many times before it that we had gone to Indonesian Government on same matter, I had some feeling that such approaches could lose their effectiveness by being pushed too hard. After further conversation, De Quay said he fully understood our position and that certainly he agreed that we should not push on this matter so hard and so often that it became meaningless. Thus, although he was reconciled to fact we were not anxious to make any representations to Indonesian Government at this time, he still felt we should point out our concern to Indonesians based on press notices of Indonesian military build-up in Eastern territory, for these moves could only increase tension at time when everyone wished to reduce it.

8. De Quay referred to fact that Karel Doorman had already sailed May 30 on its cruise and again emphasized route which he considered to be as non-provocative as possible. I noted reports in Dutch press that Doorman had sailed day earlier than originally scheduled; De Quay replied with chuckle that it had, and indicated he was waiting to see if anything might happen today as result of it. This was undoubtedly a reference to Luns point (paragraph 5, Embtel 1524) that Indonesians would engage in some kind of provocative action at time Karel Doorman sailed, and the implication by De Quay was that Doorman’s schedule was moved up one day on purpose just to throw off any possible Indonesian timing. (While Doorman actually sailed from Rotterdam May 30, it is off-shore and will not leave Dutch waters until today.)

9. Djakarta’s 3402 to Department⁵ received after my talk with De Quay. Message garbled and not clear what additional “informal understanding” Indonesians seek. As De Quay is cabling his comments to Van Roijen, and if Department has further information re this “informal understanding” and its potential coverage, it may wish take subject up with Van Roijen if Department still wishes pursue effort find some way to establish informal contact between Indonesian army and Dutch.

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–3160. Top Secret; Niact. Transmitted in two sections.
1. Document 264.
2. In telegram 1528, May 30, Young reported that he was scheduled to meet with Prime Minister De Quay at 11 a.m. on May 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–3060)
3. Document 262.
4. See Document 256.
5. In telegram 3402, May 31, Henderson reported on a conversation he had with Sukendro the previous day. The Chargé noted that the “informal understanding” that the Indonesian Army sought from the Dutch went beyond the Karel Doorman incident. “From Sukendro’s point of view,” Henderson stated, “he is now in position of waiting for message from Dutch through us at which time he now understands it will be necessary for him to take initiative for direct contact if exchange is to be continued.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5856/5–3160) See Supplement.