Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

376. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, April 30, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Message from the Dalai Lama

I enclose herewith a paraphrased message from the Dalai Lama received through his brother, Gyalo Thondup, on April 23, 1959 for transmission to this Government.¹

In this message the Dalai Lama thanks the United States Government for its help and makes two main requests. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He also asks that the United States recognize the Free Tibetan Government and influence other countries to do so. In this connection, he emphasizes his determination to work for complete independence, regardless of the time required for ending the opposition of India, and declares that autonomy is not enough. Later in the message, he says that he has not had time to think the whole problem through.

With reference to the Dalai Lama’s request for supplies, a separate memorandum will be furnished.²

As the Dalai Lama has not publicly asked for international recognition of the Free Tibetan Government, his request for United States recognition is probably intended to feel out the United States attitude as a guide to his future moves. Recognition is a political act and we could grant recognition when publicly asked if such a step is in the national interest. In response to previous approaches from the Dalai Lama in 1949–1951 we refrained from committing ourselves to recognition of Tibet as an independent state.³ We continue to recognize both the claim of the Republic of China to suzerainty over Tibet and Tibet’s claim to de facto autonomy.

If the Dalai Lama should now publicly ask for international recognition for Tibet as an independent state, and if this request is met by a substantial number of recognitions from the world community, including Asian states, it would be a most helpful step from the free world point of view. On the other hand, if such a request should not be well received it would be a severe setback. Therefore, the Dalai Lama should not be encouraged to make such a public request until and unless we can be certain that it will be well received. The United States position is a key element here, but it is highly desirable that we avoid moves which could give the impression that we are endeavoring to take advantage of the Tibetan situation for general cold war purposes. India is still opposing Tibetan independence and as Tibet’s neighbor in control of the main roads into Tibet and as the Dalai Lama’s host, India is an important factor. From the onset of the current crisis we have been remaining in the background so as to permit opinion in the “uncommitted” Asian states on which Indian opinion is influential to crystallize favorably. The developments to date in India and in these “uncommitted” Asian states have been very favorable from a free world point of view even though India has not acted as aggressively as we would have liked. We cannot of course allow the future decision as to our course to rest in India’s hands, but we must take into account world opinion, including especially that of other Asian states.

Therefore, we should avoid taking a position which might appear to encourage the Dalai Lama to seek international recognition in the absence of clear knowledge of the firmness of his plans or of the attitudes which other friendly states are likely to take.

In this situation we propose in our reply to the Dalai Lama:

a) To restate the concern and sympathy of the U.S. Government and people with his and his people’s courageous struggle against Chinese Communist efforts to crush Tibet’s freedom, destroy its religion and kill its people;

b) To assure him that developments in Tibet have your personal attention and the personal attention of the Secretary and other high officials here;

c) To tell him that we are giving immediate study to his requests concerning recognition, and that we are considering what we might do and what others might do;

d) To say that in connection with our study we would like to know his further thinking on his future steps;

e) To assure him again of our desire to be helpful.

The Department is also considering what steps this Government might appropriately take to ensure that the Dalai Lama and his followers have a full opportunity to present their case to world opinion. Depending on developments and the attitudes of other key governments, it might be useful for the United States to favor, though preferably not directly to initiate, a hearing of the Dalai Lama’s case before the United Nations. We also intend discreetly to sound out our close friends, beginning with the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic of China (which technically continues to claim suzerainty over Tibet) on the attitude they would take if the Dalai Lama requests recognition. It seems to us that we could regard recognition as a practical measure only if it is believed that the request would meet with a warm response on the part of other nations, including Asian nations. We do not, however, plan at this stage to mention to the Dalai Lama the matters referred to in this paragraph.⁴

Douglas Dillon

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. A handwritten notation by John Eisenhower on the source text reads: “Briefed to President 2 May 59. JSDE.”
1. See Supplement.
2. Not found.
3. For documentation on U.S. policy toward Tibet between 1949 and 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. IX, pp. 1064–1097; ibid., 1950, vol. VI, pp. 272–618 passim; and ibid., 1951, vol. VII, pp. 1506–1858 passim.
4. A draft message to the Ambassador in New Delhi, incorporating a draft message to the Dalai Lama, was sent to John Eisenhower for the President’s approval with a covering memorandum of May 2 from Murphy’s special assistant Joseph W. Scott. The message to the Dalai Lama, which the Ambassador was to deliver orally, was based on subparagraphs (a) through (e) of this memorandum. The message to the Ambassador also stated that it might be suggested informally to the Dalai Lama (1 ) that it would be inadvisable for him to make a public request for international recognition unless it could be determined that it would meet with a warm response from other nations, including Asian nations, and (2) that he should use all means at his disposal to determine the attitude of Asian nations toward eventual recognition before making such a request. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File; see Supplement) No further record of the message has been found.