Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

60. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, February 14, 1962—11 a.m.

2474. Departmentʼs telegram 2692.²

1. As instructed last paragraph reference telegram, I presented views set forth reference telegram in some detail to Commonwealth Secretary Gundevia February 13. He listened attentively and then commented as follows: large-scale influx US aid clearly transgresses Geneva accords. GOI position as made clear informally to USG was that if US assistance could be covered under GA, this was “all right with GOI up to a point”. However, USG has made no effort whatsoever do this. Thus, way things are going, impossible situation being created for ICC.

2. Gundevia went on to ask what USG thought would happen if ICC/VN were to abdicate? He thought open war would result. Added that Parthasarathy sending “frantic” telegrams saying he has already had protest from DRV and USS Core deliveries and matter will be brought up with him by Poles. On issue subversion, Gundevia said ICC bound hand and foot by GA and cannot change rules. If USG wishes see a conference convened and rules rewritten this another matter, but experience at Laos Conference in this respect is anything but encouraging precedent. Gundevia referred to policy statement on subversion agreed by ICC/VN in 1961 after months of wrangling and Polish opposition. Said ICC cannot investigate subversion, as this outside GA, but can investigate breaches of specific GA provisions. (Gundevia, who has been away from MEA for 4 months, did not refer to work apparently currently being done on subversion issue by ICC legal committee—third paragraph Saigonʼs 999 to Department³—and he may not be abreast of it. Could Department or Saigon summarize substantive status for our background, since Saigonʼs 999 seems indicate some possibility DRV being cited for subversion, which seems contrary to thrust of Gundeviaʼs comments.)

3. Gundevia said acting Canadian Hicom Campbell came in few days ago with proposal that ICC investigate a specific GVN charge each time it takes up a DRV complaint, in order obtain simultaneous citation GVN and DRV. Gundevia admitted DRV concealing violations but said US committing “daylight robbery” and that this not GOIʼs fault. ICC cannot juggle words or ignore what is openly taking place. Thus he saw little chance that simultaneous citation could be achieved or that repeated citations of GVN could be avoided.

4. According Gundevia, Parthasarathy feels that US assistance to GVN outside GA has gone so far that situation heading for crisis and real danger hostilities. Gundevia said he not so pessimistic over immediate situation as Parthasarathy but thinks future black. Parthasarathy holds that “moderates” in DRV weakening and extremists gaining on issue of letting ChiComs in.

5. Gundevia reverted to favorite thesis by asking whether US wants another Korea. In event shooting war, said ChiComs would take over “whole area”. Asked whether US had attempted talk seriously to Soviets on Viet-Nam.

6. Comment: Foregoing summarizes Gundeviaʼs lengthy and often rambling and emotional comments. Gundevia did not contest US view that subversion is at heart of insecurity in SEA, which I pressed hard, but fell back on restrictive ICC terms of reference. He did not address himself to US legal argument regarding increased support. Gundevia clearly worried and uncomfortable, and protested several times that GOI caught in middle of thankless task, which many people wished India were out of, since India being blamed for events over which she has no control. Gundevia concluded by saying he thought matter had been carried as far as possible in this session but he wished have another talk with me in few days. I asked Gundevia what was tenor of MEAʼs recent instructions to Parthasarathy and he said latter had been told to press for early decisions on Nam case and other pending issues.

7. Would welcome Departmentʼs observations and further guidance.

Department will appreciate there is virtual vacuum in MEA at this time, with PM away electioneering and Desai ill. Gundevia, who far from well himself, therefore likely be calling shots on GOI policy toward ICC and Viet-Nam for at least some weeks, which is unfortunate.

Timmons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2-1462. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Saigon, London, Bangkok, Paris, Ottawa, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Vientiane.
2. Printed as telegram 974, Document 55.
3. See footnote 2, Document 55.