Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

81. Telegram From their Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

Honolulu, February 22, 1962—10:15 p.m.

230815Z. Appraisal of SVN situation.

A. Your 220001Z cite JCS 3384.

B. Your 220210Z cite JCS 3388.

C. Your 220727Z cite JCS 3389.

D. Your 132228Z cite JCS 3272.²

1. In appraising the situation in SVN we must proceed from three basic facts: first, the communists are presently forcing us to fight on their terms. Second, by its non-conventional nature this form of warfare is designed to be prolonged so as to militarily/politically sap GVN strength. Third, enemy is extremely elusive and operates by methods designed to place conventional military elements at disadvantage where the power of GVNʼs more modern armaments/force are often negated to significant extent.

2. Proceeding then from these facts, I equate situation as follows. As regards GVN relative strength vis-à-vis Viet Cong, the current situation, although showing a temporary diminution in VC activity, does not portend any significant lessening of VC capabilities. Following is submitted in support of this statement.

a. Main VC military body has not been defeated; conversely, it is numerically stronger than ever before, and militarily/politically the VC is very active.

b. Viet Cong still possess their various base areas and exert control over generally same territorial extent as 1961.

c. Routes of infiltrations from DRV are still open to VC through Laos and support is still coming over these routes.

d. Militarily, VC can attack at will, move swiftly, and has an offensive posture, whereas many GVN ground force elements are, by circumstances, forced into sedentary-fixed defenses, and, where GVN forces undertake offensive they handicapped by VC elusiveness. Further,GVN forces handicapped by inadequate timely intelligence on

e. Will, determination, and fighting ability of VC is at least equal to GVN. Until only recently, the VC were far in the lead in offensive/aggressive posture, thus engendering more hope/confidence in rank and file.

f. Politically VC has support of a significant segment of rural population; politically, time appears on the side of Viet Cong.

g. Lastly, length and nature of the conflict combine to breed circumstances wherein an anti-government coup could be launched, but conversely, no anti-communist coup is likely to topple Viet Cong.

3. In respect to our strength position throughout country, GVN military strength is comparatively uniform but GVNʼs political strength is not. Generally the GVNʼs political conbro1 is greatest in the major urban areas and along coastal plain where good routes of communication exist. On other hand, GVN control is virtually nonexistent in Phuoc Thanh province which is largely encompassed by Viet Congʼs stronghold of war Zone D. Viet Cong are also dominant in much of the Ca Mau Peninsula swamp area and in much of high plateau area along the Laos border—both regions where terrain/lack of roads tend to restrict movement of conventional forces. A program of province surveys is underway. Reports on first two provinces surveyed (Tay Ninh and Binh Long) illustrate variance of GVN strength in different areas. In Tay Ninh of 56 villages, GVN has some control of 33, and full control in only 12 of these. In Binh Long province, however, GVN has full political conbro1 of 14 of 15 ethnic Vietnamese villages and partial control of the 16 Montagnard villages.

4. In regard to enemy and friendly activities, VC have expanded political activity while maintaining their previous pattern of military activity. VC have established a new party: South Vietnam Peopleʼs Revolutionary Party. Also, Southern Liberation Front has established number of subsidiary fronts designed to establish a firm hold on SVN by organizing each segment of society in VC support. New propaganda station has begun broadcasting to SVN in five languages. VC are concentrating on getting firm grass roots support.

a. That VC will attempt to establish a liberated area in SVN is indicated by above political developments. Advantages of establishment of liberation govt are manifold as witnessed by Laos example in which KL/PL gained diplomatic recognition and considerable bloc material support after establishing stronghold in PDJ. With US-backed GVN actions becoming more effective against VC, communists probably feel forced to respond.

b. On the military side, VC pattern is largely a continuation of the small unit actions: ambushes of GVN forces, mining of roads, destruction of ground lines of communications, and attacks of small GVN units, particularly CG/SDC installations. VC dedicated to destruction of CG/SDC which are a basic threat to VC as military means of GVN to separate VC from people. VC have capability of concentrating forces to achieve local numerical superiority over GVN forces in any local area. The VC avoids standup battles with RVNAF. While VC have successfully evaded most of RVNAF larger scale operations, existence of RVNAF forces in vicinity of VC infested areas has probably prevented large scale VC operations. With new training and weapons being provided SDC/CG forces, they stand to possibly cause increasing damage to VC hold on certain areas. VC casualties suffered from CG, SDC, and RVNAF about evenly divided, one third from each.

c. Considerable civil activity will be required to take bulk of basically neutral villages firmly into GVN camp. More Civic Action Teams are needed. These, together with implementation of strategic hamlet plan should be a proper complement to improved GVN military posture.

d. GVN military operations have increased numerically—28 January there were 232 operations involving forces BN size or larger. Real war of attrition, however, being fought by CG/SDC platoons/companies. These operations are responsible for killing most of VC. When these forces encounter any strong VC concentrations they have responsive backing by RVNAF which increasingly aggressive and exploiting their new air mobility.

5. In regard to future VC military activity.

a. In coming months is expected generally to follow past pattern/tactics. We may anticipate continuation of large numbers of low-level incidents with occasional attack in BN strength. Expect more VC emphasis to put on organization/training to further develop larger tactical units. Also,VC may obtain better weapons for use against helicopters/low flying aircraft. VC will endeavor to sabotage aircraft, and improve their intelligence and defensive means of obtaining warning re air/ground attacks. VC will try to retain present numerical strength thru local recruitment plus infiltration. Concerted attempts will be made to capture as well as infiltrate arms.

b. Politically VC will stress themes of: US military intervention, US interference in internal affairs, use of defoliants, and presence of US aircraft. National Liberation Front will continue to expand its activities by setting up Red organizations to reach/supervise people. There will be greater emphasis on political efforts in cities as well as countryside, with continuous effort to gain populaceʼs support, and to recruit, VC may even make a dramatic appeal for world support for any so called liberation government.

6. In regard to specific questions posed by your para 2, ref d, following submitted:

a. VC strength is estimated at 20,000 to 25,000. This is a net increase of at least 2,000 from our Dec 61 estimate of nearly 18,000. Believe that at least half this increase due to active recruiting, with remainder infiltrated largely overland.

b. Review of casualties/incident statistics over past year indicates that the 3rd Corps area has been most active in both categories. The 2nd and 1st Corps zones, however, have shown a broadening of VC initiated incidents since last summer. Noteworthy in analysis of GVN casualties during the last six months of 1961 is that while losses in the regular armed forces remained generally constant, there was a significant rise in SDC losses. In fact they have sustained greatest number of losses each month since Oct.

c. Incidents run the gamut of armed attacks, acts of terrorism, sabotage, and propaganda. Criteria has been constant for past two years.

d. The increase in number of VC initiated incidents and in SVN casualties must be attributed to the buildup of both GVN and VC forces, and to a lesser extent to the expanding of RVNAF operations. To some extent, increased number and scope of GVN military operations apparently induces temporary increased retaliatory VC incidents probably as a psychological tactic. Viet Congʼs high incident rate in 3rd Corps remained generally constant while total of incidents went up as VC strength increase permitted a spread of operations into other two corps zones. VC losses have increased substantially each month and almost doubled from June 1961 to January 1962. Acting to destroy SDC forces VC have caused a deadly conflict increasing losses on both sides. As RVNAF have increased operational tempo they have increased their troops’ exposure to steady minor losses from snipers/ambushes.

e. Better reporting methods have been developed over past few months, but this has not necessarily caused increase in events reported upon.

7. In overall summary, VC are feeling results of improvement of GVN military posture, but they have not suffered major setbacks or loss of territory.VC plan a prolonged form of athritiona1 warfare. VC cannot be defeated by purely military means. They will not yet stand and fight in open. Until they change from subterranean tactics, they cannot be routed/defeated solely by bayonet. While military superiority is a prerequisite to solution final success will come only when people can be alienated away from Viet Cong and given adequate protection/security.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series. Secret. Repeated to CONCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, PACAF, MAC/V, and MAAG Vietnam.
2. None printed.