224. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

98. CINCPAC for POLAD. Almost continuous discussions, probings and negotiations with Diem, Nhu and Thuan have been aimed at averting political upheaval here. Some results beginning to show. Question of course, is whether Diem will take action and demonstrate his sincerity to his people (and to the world) in time and in manner to save himself and his government. I hence bore down increasingly hard on requirements from our side-in terms of U.S. public and Congressional opinion. In very frank discussion with Nhu yesterday (during which there was no sign whatsoever of any designs on his part to overthrow Diem), I was able to get his promise to support a move by

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Diem to take GVN’s case to the people in a broad and magnanimous way aimed at calming the situation. This promise extracted despite Nhu’s conviction that Buddhist agitation represents no real threat.

Thuan reports this morning that Diem talked with Nhu last night following our conversation, agreed in principle that he would make such a move, and directed that speech be written by Tho committee. Speech, according to Thuan, was to contain not only a general appeal but further specifics for guaranteeing full religious liberties and implementation June 16 agreements.

Upon hearing of further demonstrations in Saigon this morning (septel),2 I called Thuan stressing necessity to act quickly. I urged that Diem not wait until committee had completed draft speech, but that he should immediately make a general appeal for calm and order and engage his own prestige re fulfillment June 16 agreements; this to be followed as soon as possible by fuller and more specific delineation of measures to be taken. Thuan is now trying to sell this. I have given draft speech3 to Thuan for possible use in this connection.

Incidentally, Thuan reported that Diem agreed last night not to rely exclusively on Province Chiefs’ reports re religious grievances, but to make special investigations from Saigon of all Buddhist complaints. This may be belated reaction to our continued questioning of information on which some of his decisions and non-actions have been based.

As to prospects here, experience has demonstrated, I think, that there is enormous potential for stretch in Vietnamese body politic. Events which normally would indicate imminent downfall of a government would not necessarily do so here. I continue to feel there is reasonably good prospect of GVN’s surmounting the present two-headed crisis (Buddhist agitation and coup plotting). It is, of course, imperative that Diem come forward with positive appeal and measures, and this has been made amply clear to him. We have the promise of Nhu’s support to this end. We may therefore have sufficient influence working in same direction to get Diem to move, although no one can guarantee what the baby will look like if and when it is born.

Thuan has just informed us that he expects President will deliver speech today. If it is sufficiently forthcoming and conciliatory (will cable opinion this point when text available), I believe it is important that US promptly make supporting statement,4 expressing confidence in GVN intent to carry through on June 16 agreement and to pursue anti-Communist struggle with support of all patriotic Vietnamese.

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Prompt action of this sort by USG will, I believe, have important effect in getting Buddhists to limit themselves to religious objectives and in discouraging coup plotters.

Nolting
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC.
  2. See footnote 4, Document 223.
  3. Not found.
  4. See Documents 228 and 229.