21. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Saigon1

65032. Reference: CAS Saigon [document number not declassified].2

1.
HQS highly concerned by implications of reference particularly re vital factors of initiative. Query where subsequent Sta contacts with Generals now stand re General Kim warning in paragraph 5 reference.
2.
We fully aware need U.S. Government determine rebel Generals plans capabilities before committing them support, but at same time do not feel that other, perhaps more vital factors, should be sacrificed for sake of coordination. Can means other than personal meetings be used to keep contact with Generals such as radio, S/W, cut outs, et cetera.
3.
Request Sta check with Ambassador Lodge to determine any actions to be taken prior expiration 24 hours cited by [less than 1 line not declassified] source. Urge all bear in mind that GVN may be circulating such reports in order pressure Generals into premature steps which easy to foil. Please advise OPIM.
4.
Secretary Hilsman informed of reference. He shares our concern.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 S VIET. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is a copy the CIA sent the Department of State exclusive for Rusk, Ball Harriman, and Hilsman. Copies were also sent to the White House exclusive for Bundy and to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, exclusive for McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, and Krulak. Received at the Department of State at 1:58 p.m. According to CAP 63468, August 30, the President read this cable. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, State Cables)
  2. Document 19.