Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

179. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Interpretation of U.S. Policy

PARTICIPANTS

• Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador to Moscow

At a luncheon conversation today Dobrynin raised the question of the Alsop article and the stir this had caused in Moscow.¹ He said they had been particularly upset about the timing of the article. I explained that the Saturday Evening Post had a lead time of, I thought, something in the neighborhood of five weeks. He said he thought that surely in an article of this importance the article could have been changed in order not to be related to the discussions of the Berlin problem. I said I was sure that this was not possible since the Post was published in millions of copies and I also felt certain that no one had really considered at the time the interview was given what the situation might be at the time it was published. I explained that the way these things usually work, as far as I understand them, was that the President would give an interview and that the text might be checked by the Presidentʼs staff in the White House, but probably not by him personally.

I expressed the opinion that one of our difficulties in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was their tendency to read into press stories policy indications that were actually non-existent. Dobrynin said that he knew of the frequent and close contact the President had with the press, and he was therefore inclined to take press stories as much more indicative of the Presidentʼs policy than was the case with President Eisenhower. I pointed out that there were a great many people who talked to the press besides the President and that this tendency to read Government policy implications into press stories was a great mistake, since a great many press stories had absolutely no relation to government policy.

I said I thought there was one area in which he could greatly improve over previous practice, and that was that when he was in doubt about what some press story or government action meant, he should contact appropriate officials in the State Department and informally get their opinions. I said that, from my observations, the Soviets tended to read into instances policy implications which did not exist, and that very often there was a simple explanation which our people will be glad to give him. He expressed surprise that he could ask for this kind of information and said he was somewhat put off by the fact that every time he called at the State Department, it turned out to be a big operation with the press waiting for him when he left. I explained that this was inevitable but that there was no need for him to make any substantive comment and that, after a while, the press would become used to this, although they would always be there in case he had something to say.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/4-662. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson on April 9.
1. “Kennedyʼs Grand Strategy,” Saturday Evening Post, March 31, 1962. In this article Stewart Alsop, basing his remarks on an interview with the President, wrote that in some circumstances the United States might employ a first strike.
2. During the luncheon conversation Dobrynin also asked Thompsonʼs advice about contacts with the Department of State, Congress, and the Cabinet and compared various aspects of the Department of State and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Memoranda of these conversations are in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/4-662.