Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement

191. Memorandum of Conversation, July 8, among Meeting of Committee of Principals¹

July 8, 1963

SUBJECT

• General Approach of US Policy in Disarmament Negotiations, Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State

  • The Secretary of State, Chairman
  • Mr. W. Averell Harriman
  • Mr. George Ball
  • Mr. Raymond A. Garthoff

• ACDA

  • Mr. William C. Foster, Director
  • Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director
  • Dr. George Rathjens, Reporting Officer

• White House

  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Mr. Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Dr. Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

• Department of Defense

  • Mr. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary
  • Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
  • Mr. Arthur Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Arms Control)
  • Captain Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Arms Control)

• Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • General Maxwell Taylor, USA, Chairman
  • Colonel Philip A. Sykes, Office of the Special Assistant for Arms Control

• Atomic Energy Commission

  • Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman
  • Mr. John G. Palfrey, Commissioner
  • Dr. George M. Kavanagh, Assistant to the General Manager for Disarmament

• Central Intelligence Agency

  • Mr. John A. McCone, Director
  • Mr. Louis Marengo, Assistant to the Deputy Director

• USIA

  • Mr. Donald M. Wilson, Acting Director
• • NASA
  • Mr. John A. Johnson, General Counsel

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by asking Mr. Foster to summarize the developments leading to the proposals under consideration and the content of the proposals. Mr. Foster began by pointing out first that the proposals were in response to NSAM 239. He reviewed the history of the Russian position on reductions in strategic delivery vehicles, pointing out that the Gromyko proposals of last fall did represent a substantial change and that we had been at every opportunity since attempting to get them to elaborate on the Gromyko proposal and that there had been some elaboration in a recent Co-chairmen’s meeting in Geneva.

Mr. Foster then pointed out that the purpose of today’s meeting was in his opinion not to get an agreement on either of the two proposals under consideration but rather to determine whether there was any virtue in pursuing either one of these further. In addition, he felt it appropriate that an attempt be made to decide what sort of guidance Mr. Harriman should have for the Moscow meeting with respect to the Gromyko proposals and the question of reductions in strategic delivery vehicles. Mr. Foster then outlined the main features of the Separable First-Stage proposal, and followed this with a brief outline of the Gradual Approach.

Secretary Rusk then asked Secretary McNamara if he had studied the proposals and if he had any comments. Secretary McNamara replied that they had had some consideration in the DOD but he had not had an opportunity personally to study them in great detail. He strongly favored the Gradual Approach. He felt that the proposal for 50 to 75% reductions had several disadvantages. First, it reduced the credibility of the West’s nuclear deterrent and this would especially be the view of our NATO Allies. While he did not share their views regarding the role of strategic forces as a deterrent in all respects, he did agree that these proposals would be undesirable in that there would be a reduction in credibility. Secondly, Secretary McNamara felt that the proposals would result in a wasting of the West’s superior nuclear power without our getting any substantial compensating reductions in Soviet superior conventional strength. Thirdly, he felt that the inspection provisions, particularly those for a 50% reduction, were inadequate to give us the protection we require. Fourthly, he saw no advantage as compared with our presently tabled proposal. In particular, he did not see that there would be any reduction in risk of war as a result of the proposals, and suggested that in fact the risk might increase and that the slight reduction in damage that would result from implementing the proposals would not compensate for the increased risk. He reiterated that he leans strongly toward the Gradual Approach, and favored some confidence building measures such as the recently negotiated “hot-line” agreement.

Secretary Rusk then queried Mr. McCone on the reliability of our intelligence. Mr. McCone expressed concern about relying on intelligence as a substitute for agreed inspection. He was particularly concerned about the 50% reduction proposal. He then reviewed the intelligence techniques that might be relevant in the event of implementation of such proposals, and concluded by pointing out that they were inadequate to provide sufficiently accurate knowledge of retained levels of armaments. He added that we presently know nothing of Soviet missile reload capability and little about missile manufacturing facilities. He pointed out further that existing intelligence techniques may be perishable and that in addition they can be deceived. Mr. McCone then pointed out that there were certain to be differences in the Soviet declarations of their forces and in our estimates of them and that the resolution of these differences would require some compromise of our methods. He added that public and congressional pressure can also lead to an undesirable compromise of methods. Finally, he pointed out that we could certainly not do as well intelligence-wise as we had in Cuba and that we were uneasy about our knowledge of armaments there. In summary, he felt that we must have an acceptable means of verifying retained levels.

Secretary Rusk asked if Mr. McCone’s remarks applied specifically to big missiles and Mr. McCone replied in the affirmative. Secretary Rusk then asked if there was any evidence of camouflage by the Soviets. Mr. McCone replied there was not, though he cited a conversation with Khrushchev in 1959 wherein Khrushchev claimed that we could not know the numbers of their missiles because they could successfully hide them in canyons. Secretary Rusk then asked Mr. McCone if there had been any hints from defectors and Mr. McCone replied in the negative.

Secretary Rusk then asked for General Taylor’s comments regarding the proposals. General Taylor stated that he concurred with Secretary McNamara and had nothing to add. Mr. McCone said he also concurred with Secretary McNamara.

Secretary Rusk then asked for Dr. Wiesner’s views. Dr. Wiesner said that he saw no reason for abandoning our present treaty and making drastic proposals without evidence of Soviet interests. He suggested, however, that our intelligence capabilities had changed and that he thought it might be possible for us to modify the inspection provisions of our present Treaty Outline. He also pointed out that we now felt that differences of plus or minus 15% in the number of missiles either side might have were not very significant. Regarding the question of verification of remainders, he agreed with Mr. McCone in the case of very deep reductions but felt that 30% and possibly 50% reductions might be safe relying only on inspection of factories and of the weapons destroyed. Because of uncertainties regarding the numbers of missiles, he indicated a preference for discussing reductions in terms of absolute numbers rather than percentages. He concluded by remarking that he thought it would be desirable if Mr. Harriman could explore with the Russians general disarmament measures in addition to a test ban.

Secretary Rusk then asked Dr. Seaborg for his views. Dr. Seaborg replied that he had nothing to add. Secretary Rusk then asked about the report he had read to the effect that we were considering cutting our fissionable material production program by $1 billion. Secretary McNamara replied that the DOD had been examining their needs for fissionable materials, but that the examination was not completed and the news reports were premature. He believed that we are reaching a point where we can stabilize weapons’ requirements, and that one of the plans they were considering would lead to a cut in the AEC production of materials for weapons by a factor of two. He said that he would like to discuss this with Dr. Seaborg, who agreed to do so. Secretary McNamara then said that it was likely there would be some kind of reduction, and that he had received a paper from the Chiefs on that subject.

Secretary Rusk then suggested the possibility of our continuing discussions with the Russians not on the basis of specific agreements, but rather on a basis of continuing consultation in which each side would report on the steps it was taking relevant to disarmament. He then raised as an example the question of what difference it would make to us if the Soviets were to announce to us that they were taking ten divisions out of East Germany. He also argued that it would be unfortunate if we received no reciprocal response from the Soviets to a reduction in fissionable material production.

There followed a discussion of our estimates regarding intelligence on Soviet missiles, in which Mr. McCone concluded by remarking that there was a possibility that a reduction by categories scheme could leave us in a situation in which the Soviets might have enormous destructive power concentrated in a relatively small number of missiles.

Returning to Secretary Rusk’s remarks regarding a unilateral Soviet decision to reduce their strength in East Germany, Secretary McNamara suggested that we might respond not by reducing our forces but rather by seeking to take advantage of the Soviet reductions, in this instance by a buildup in NATO strength since with such reductions on the part of the Soviets the possibility of a conventional balance in Europe would seem more plausible to our Allies than under existing conditions.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that he felt that with such reductions on the part of the Soviets there would be no realistic chance of new buildup in NATO. Mr. Foster disagreed with Secretary McNamara on the question of the relationship of risks and reductions in forces, pointing out that he felt that reductions of the kind proposed would lead to both a reduction in the risk of war and in the destructive consequences if war should occur. He then indicated that he was under the impression that we had been making substantial progress in redressing the conventional imbalance. Secretary McNamara agreed that we had made substantial progress but that we were still clearly behind. He reiterated his objections to the proposals and indicated he felt we would be giving up a substantial part of our superiority in the strategic nuclear capability.

Mr. Foster then discussed the Gromyko proposal as being a possibly serious concession on their part, indicating that a move in that direction might well be appealing to the Soviet Union. Secretary McNamara wondered why the Soviets would not be willing to cut conventional forces. Dr. Wiesner then pointed out that the proposals under discussion were in response, he thought, to DOD views in which it was indicated that the DOD had a preference for not reducing conventional forces.

Mr. Foster pointed out that under the proposal calling for 75% reductions in armaments, there would be a considerable ability to check on retained levels by means other than intelligence, but that the 50% proposal was based on the assumption that our intelligence, coupled with inspection of production and quantities destroyed, would be adequate. He indicated that he was puzzled by Mr. McCone’s lack of confidence in our intelligence regarding big missile launchers. He pointed out that in building our forces we relied on intelligence—he did not see why we could not rely on intelligence in going the other way. Secretary McNamara replied that in building forces we did so with a 100% safety factor. He then reviewed Soviet and US positions relating to reductions in strategic and conventional forces pointing out that the present proposals seemed to be a move toward Soviet desires to reduce strategic delivery capability before dealing with conventional armaments, and he could not see why the Soviets should not move from their position towards our’s on this subject. Mr. Foster cited the Gromyko proposal of last fall as a move from their previous position and a move towards our’s. He also indicated the Soviets had expressed preference for reduction by categories. Secretary McNamara then asked the question, “Weren’t the Soviets, in their position, simply asking to retain their advantages?” Mr. Foster agreed that this might be true but also suggested that they may have other motivations in making their proposals.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that our present position had inspection provisions in it that appear to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Secretary McNamara again raised the question as to why we should be willing to accept the change in strategic balance which the Separable First-Stage would lead to without the conventional balance being affected.

Mr. Fisher then reviewed some of the discussion at the Deputies’ level pointing out that it had appeared that the conventional imbalance was not as great as had previously been thought to be the case and that, accordingly, proposals of the kind under consideration had seemed acceptable. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor dissented, pointing out that they felt there had been no significant change in the estimate of Soviet conventional superiority. Mr. Fisher then pointed out that there appeared to have been no satisfaction with the idea of equal percentage cuts in conventional armaments in the light of the superiority on the part of the Soviets in reserve armaments. He indicated that it was not clear by what mechanism the DOD wanted to redress the conventional imbalance. Secretary McNamara said this could be done by applying the same percentage cuts to conventional armaments as would be applied to strategic armaments. Mr. Fisher indicated that he thought there has been no acceptance of that idea on the part of the DOD. Secretary McNamara again raised the question as to why we are considering disturbing the existing balance and indicated that the DOD would prefer to accept 30% reductions across-the-board and then greater reductions later.

Dr. Wiesner pointed out that he felt that the ACDA proposals were a response to DOD pressure and that Fisher was explaining how ACDA was trying to respond to what it thought were DOD views. Mr. Nitze reacted that his position has been that he felt that it was worthwhile to explore various alternatives.

Mr. Fisher pointed out that there had been a weakening in the Soviet position, and the question was whether we should disregard this and stick with our present position, or alternatively explore whether our interests could be served by a move in the direction of the Gromyko proposal. He reiterated that 30% reductions applied to conventional armaments might have a worse impact on us than on the Soviets because of their superiority in reserve armaments and that limitations on force levels might not be an effective way of dealing with this Soviet superiority.

Secretary McNamara replied that in that case we must come up with a more precise conventional plan. He reiterated his opposition to the Separable First-Stage proposal, making two arguments. First, the Soviets were ahead in conventional forces, and second, that the Soviets had proposed emphasizing reductions in strategic delivery vehicles and this automatically caused him to question whether it was in our interest. Mr. Fisher replied that the Separable First-Stage was in part based on the assumption by the staff that the conventional confrontation is not really in such imbalance, particularly as one looked at it, as one should, from a NATO-Warsaw Pact basis rather than on a purely bilateral basis, and that under such circumstances the response to the Gromyko proposals and the cuts suggested might be better than none at all.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that there seemed to be two major obstacles to any agreement. One was Soviet unwillingness, or perhaps inability, to do anything about areas of confrontation such as Laos, and two, Soviet unwillingness to accept significant inspection procedures. He felt that if the Soviets were really serious about disarmament they should respond affirmatively on these points. He then raised the question regarding the political considerations involved in a transition from Stages I to II, and in particular asked what would be the political prerequisites to collapsing both stages into one. He wondered if it was feasible to do this if the necessary political prerequisites could be made.

Mr. Foster suggested that the major problem was time required for building up the necessary international institutions. Dr. Wiesner suggested that it might be more reasonable to consider collapsing Stages II and III into one. Mr. Nitze said that these had been looked into right after the Cuban crisis.

Secretary Rusk expressed concern that Khrushchev holds in his hands the possibility of forcing unilateral disarmament by the US, in that such would probably be our response to any concerted relaxation of Communist pressure that might occur in Southeast Asia, Berlin and elsewhere. Secretary McNamara said he was concerned that Khrushchev had not arranged for any such relaxation, and then pointed out that the Separable First-Stage plan under consideration would allow the Communists to keep up the pressure in Southeast Asia, Berlin and elsewhere and at the same time to maintain superior conventional forces. General Taylor questioned how the plan would affect the confrontation between the two Alliances, particularly in Europe. Mr. Foster pointed out that, with respect to the question of participation, it was felt that a bilateral agreement might be more negotiable, but that the possibility of participation of other states was left open.

Mr. Fisher discussed the threat to Europe by Soviet IRBM’s and the threat to the Soviet Union from NATO forces based in Europe and indicated that the development of the proposal was based on the assumption that it would be necessary to consider its effect on the total confrontation. General Taylor raised the question as to whether there would be consultation with our Allies before surfacing any such proposals. Mr. Kaysen pointed out that with respect to the question of building up of our forces that the degree of consultation with our Allies was somewhat obscure. Mr. Nitze suggested that in his view the Germans and the French might be justified in looking to their own forces for security in the event such a plan were surfaced.

Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Foster to enumerate the issues on which there was authorization for discussion with the Soviets. Mr. Foster did so calling off the following: B–47/Badger deal; the cut-off of fissionable material production and transfer to peaceful purposes; exchange of military missions; announcement of maneuvers prior to their taking place; controls on expenditures; and a prohibition on the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. Mr. Fisher added nuclear free zones, and Mr. Foster qualified this indicating in particular the question of a nuclear free zone in Latin America. Mr. Harriman raised the question of an African free zone.

Secretary Rusk observed that Mr. Harriman had a great deal to talk about with the Soviets. He indicated that if pressed by the Soviets on the question of the Gromyko proposal Mr. Harriman might indicate that the strategic delivery problem was under study but that we should seek to find out how the Soviets proposed to deal with conventional forces. Secretary Rusk then observed that conceivably we might go to 50% reductions in Stage I. Secretary McNamara agreed with this, but Mr. Foster raised the question of whether 50% reductions across-the-board would be acceptable with China not a party to the agreement. General Taylor raised the question as to why we could not deal with absolute numbers of armaments to be destroyed rather than with percentages. Mr. Foster observed that this had been tried before but unsuccessfully.

Dr. Wiesner suggested that we should look to see how much inspection would be necessary for reductions of 30 and 50%. He felt the requirements might be quite different from those in our present Treaty Outline. Mr. McCone asked him to elaborate. Dr. Wiesner said that at the 30% level and perhaps even at the 50% level, it might be possible for us to depend on inspection of plants and armaments destroyed only. He also questioned whether we could not change our position with respect to continued production of armaments during the First Stage. He felt that we should modify our presently tabled Treaty Outline to bring it into agreement with our present thinking on these subjects. He felt that in view of the discussion, the old Treaty Outline would be a more desirable basis for analysis and modification than a Separable First-Stage. Mr. Nitze argued that we should abandon the present Separable First-Stage, as it currently is not acceptable, but that we should continue to look for a Separable First-Stage that might be acceptable.

Secretary Rusk again raised the question of a continuous spectrum of small increments of disarmament as contrasted with a proposal involving large discrete stages. Mr. Kaysen asked Secretary McNamara whether his views would be the same regarding a reduction scheme that might involve, say, 50% cuts in strategic systems coupled with 30% cuts in conventional armaments, as they would be with respect to schemes involving strategic delivery vehicles only. Secretary McNamara replied affirmatively. He added that he was concerned that we were spending a disproportionate amount of time on proposals that might be of propaganda value and not enough on smaller measures that might prove practicable. He felt that there was too much distrust between the US and the USSR at the present time to consider measures involving such drastic cuts as 75% and that we were wasting our time in such considerations. Mr. Kaysen suggested that we should raise the question as to what are the minimum stakes required to get into a serious disarmament game. He observed, if the minimum price involved 75% reductions that perhaps we were not prepared to pay that price at this time. He suggested perhaps it was part of Mr. Harriman’s job to get a better feeling for what that minimum price might be.

Secretary Rusk observed that in the last two years we have added 25% to the DOD budget and wondered whether or not any of the factors that had influenced us in arriving at those increases had changed. General Taylor observed that there had been no change. Secretary Rusk wondered whether the increases in the US defense budget might have led to a greater interest on the part of the USSR in disarmament. General Taylor observed that he thought they had; that the increased economic burdens of high defense expenditures would be an added incentive for the Soviets to move towards disarmament.

Mr. Nitze observed that there had been some changes in the last couple of years. In particular, there had been at least a partially favorable resolution of the Cuban problem, some degree of relaxation in the Berlin crisis, and the growing split between the USSR and China, which might make it possible for us to do things now that could not have been done two years ago.

Mr. McCone expressed concern about the evidence of long term plans on the part of the Soviet Union to go ahead with the build up in military strength. In particular he expressed concern about indications that Soviets were going ahead to increase their fissionable material production capability while we were talking about cutting back on ours. Dr. Wiesner expressed the opinion that this was understandable considering our very great superiority.

Secretary Rusk asked if a look could be taken at the damage that might be done to the US by 15 to 20 Soviet missiles each with a 50 MT warhead. General Taylor indicated that this could be done. Secretary McNamara observed that as a first approximation one might expect two million deaths per weapon.

Secretary Rusk suggested that a draft be made of instructions for Mr. Harriman for response to any Soviet query regarding our reaction to the Gromyko proposals. He then adjourned the meeting.

1. General approach of U.S. policy in disarmament negotiations. Top Secret. 13 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, 3/61–11/63.