49. Telegram 1235 from Paris, September 51

Reference: Deptel 1290. [Facsimile Page 1] Per reftel met with Dixon last night and we agreed, best tactic would be to see Couve this morning. I have just come from talking with him. I began by saying to Couve that the British and ourselves have been in discussion with the Soviets in Geneva on nuclear testing and controls, that the recent USUK statement proposing the cessation of in-atmosphere testing came from that association. Since having issued the statement, however, we have discussed the matter further and we are now aware that the Soviets in their reply might seek to take advantage of the fact the French were not party to that statement. Further, since General de Gaulle will be having a press conference today we feel it important that if he discuss the matter, he associate himself with our point of view and, in any event, not take a point of view opposed to US. Couve doubts that de Gaulle will bring up subject in his press conference. However, a question on it may be asked. Couve seemed quite confident that de Gaulle would take positive point of view associating himself with the USUK statement. He seemed equally as confident that he would not take a position against our statement. I pointed out possibility that Soviets may charge us with bad faith and with having the intention of having French conduct tests [Facsimile Page 2] for us. Couve said he aware they might do this but it would be obviously absurd. French plan no in-atmosphere tests at any time in foreseeable future and probably not until they are ready to do H-bomb testing, which, according to Couve, is a long way off. They plan some underground tests next spring.

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To explore Couve’s thinking and as far as possible, de Gaulle’s, I suggested it might be understandable if de Gaulle is bit disturbed France left out of USUK note. Couve said absolutely no, they understood why note was sent. He thought it good idea to have sent it.

Couve concluded by assuring me our views would be presented to de Gaulle.

Dixon saw Couve about 10 to 15 minutes after I talked with him. In turn, I have just talked to Dixon when he returned from Quai. Dixon tells me Couve said de Gaulle could not associate himself with USUK proposal because, after all, some day French may want to have in-atmosphere tests. Further, the need to impress the neutral nations meeting at Belgrade has no particular appeal to de Gaulle. Couve believes most likely event is de Gaulle will not raise subject nor comment upon it if it can be avoided. Of course, we will not know until his press conference. In reply to whether or not we should try to see him, Couve said not a chance, de Gaulle busy reworking his statements he intends make press conference.

The foregoing is at variance with my meeting with Couve. Dixon was kept waiting and we agree that during that time Couve very likely talked to someone close to de Gaulle, if not de Gaulle himself. Incidentally, this highlights the difficult situation in which Couve so often finds himself.

Gavin
  1. U.S.–U.K. statement: French disassociation. Secret. 2 pp. Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/9–561.