56. Letter from Seaborg to Rusk, October 71
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Recent cables from the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations (refs. ET is 968, 990, 1011 and 1044) raise important questions regarding the nuclear testing issue. These cables also pose various possibilities with regard to resolutions being introduced at the current U.N. General Assembly discussions.
I would like to comment on the questions posed. The U.S. has already observed a lengthy moratorium without controls. During this 34 month period we have had no way of knowing whether or not the Soviets have tested clandestinely. Even if they have not done so, they have demonstrated quite clearly that they can readily agree to an uncontrolled moratorium, and when ready to test be adequately prepared to do so effectively, whereas we have been and would be constrained by the dictates of our open society to limit our preparations.
I do not think it desirable that the U.S. propose substantive changes in the U.S.–U.K. resolution of September 23, 1961, which set forth our readiness to cease tests provided that there was a signed treaty which included provisions for an international control system. The lessons of the past three years should not be lost to us and the point that we have learned them should be put forth to the world.
A moratorium with negotiations for a specifically limited period may be appealing to many nations in the U.N. However, we should not be led into thinking that any adopted time limit would not be extended and re-extended until the Soviet Union found it to its interests to break off the moratorium. At the end of any agreed time period we would be placed in the position of having to reject an extension of negotiations or of breaking off such negotiations.
In view of the above comments, I would hope that any Department guidance sent to the U.S. Delegation in New York would reflect a position of definite and specific opposition to any resolution or appeal which urges reinstitution of an uncontrolled moratorium. This position should be the same for an unlimited or limited duration moratorium, with or without negotiations.
[Facsimile Page 2] [Typeset Page 165]With regard to moratoria on atmospheric testing only, I realize that the political problems are complex; however certain considerations must be borne in mind.
The comprehensive nature of the current Soviet tests has given them an important relative advantage. The President has urged that rapid progress be made in our own test program. But, at best, the rate of progress is much slower underground than would be the case if atmospheric tests were included in the program; certain unforeseen difficulties in our present series have emphasized this fact. Furthermore, high yield tests, tests for determination of various important weapons effects, and tests to prove out complete weapons systems cannot be accomplished underground.
In our opinion, these factors clearly constitute strong reasons for retaining the President’s power to initiate atmospheric testing should he deem it necessary in the interest of national security.
I would urge a Principals’ meeting at a very early date to further explore these problems in order to make recommendations to the President. Therefore, I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Secretary McNamara.
Sincerely yours,
- Seaborg’s opposition to reinstitution of an uncontrolled moratorium. No classification marking. 2 pp. Seaborg, Journal, Vol. 2, pp. 225–226.↩