Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

56. Minutes of Meeting⁰

Washington, August 17, 1961, 4–5:30 p.m.

MINUTES OF MEETING OF COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS WITH THE PRESIDENT AUGUST 17, 1961

PRESENT

• Dean Rusk—Secretary of State
• Robert S. McNamara—Secretary of Defense
• Roswell L. Gilpatric—Deputy Secretary of Defense
• General Lyman Lemnitzer—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Allen W. Dulles—Director of Central Intelligence
• Glenn T. Seaborg—Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
• John J. McCloy—Adviser to the President on Disarmament
• Arthur Dean—Chairman, US Delegation Nuclear Test Ban Talks
• William Foster—Consultant to Mr. McCloy
• McGeorge Bundy—Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Adrian Fisher—Deputy to Mr. McCloy
• Don Wilson—Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency
• Robert W. Komer—National Security Council
• Spurgeon Keeny—Science and Technology

The test ban talks were taken up first. Ambassador Dean noted we have word from the UK, etc. that Soviets will probably attack us on grounds our desire to sign treaty a fraud, because we would just learn to cheat below 4.75 threshold, and then end moratorium. We were also worried about appeal of Indian Resolution¹ to uncommitted states. So Dean would like to go back to Geneva, explain we didn’t invent moratorium but recognized couldn’t monitor below this threshold with presently proposed controls. Hence we would express willingness to explore with Soviets any number of variants during moratorium period to reduce threshold, also to cluster inspection stations in earthquake zone. The UK has always favored a comprehensive treaty. Ambassador Dean didn’t think we ought to go that far, but should go far enough to take wind out of Soviet sails at GA, and reduce appeal of Indian Resolution. We should surface this at Geneva before 1 September Neutrals’ Conference.

The President queried why not propose also to stop fallout tests even if no treaty? Dean feared Khrushchev would buy and then say let’s go on and ban all tests, claiming Soviets were prepared to do so right now. Secretary Rusk asked why we couldn’t respond that atmospheric tests can be monitored unilaterally and thus detected without treaty apparatus? Dean felt that the problem was not that easy.² He would prefer not to raise fallout issue till we need it in GA to counter Indian Resolution.

The President expressed the thought that after Dean came back we’d announce AEC undertaking contingent preparations but President would say no final decision taken yet; we were still trying to get a treaty. Would this be O.K? Would it create new support for Indian Resolution? Ambassador Dean felt that it would.

Dr. Seaborg thought the proposal good. Secretary Rusk felt we could bring in the fallout problem at this point. Mr. Bundy concluded that we would save the announcement till the appropriate time.

He then raised five specific points proposed by Dean.³ They amount really to moving from “no, unless” re threshold to “yes, if.” Dr. Seaborg was concerned about how far down we should go on the threshold. One could never fully eliminate threshold without violating principle of a policed treaty. Mr. McCloy raised decoupling. Dr. Seaborg agreed this was always a possibility. Ambassador Dean commented that Dr. Press⁴ feels we can reduce threshold with further research. However, Dr. Seaborg noted that we can’t remove it entirely without violating principle of no disarmament without inspection.

Mr. McCloy said there was not a prayer that Soviets will turn around and accept our new proposals. In Secretary Rusk’s opinion, if we proposed to go down to zero without linking to possibility of detection, this would be bad, but if we agreed to go down as far as research will permit, this was better. Mr. Keeny pointed out that unmanned stations would permit going way down if you had enough of them. The President observed that tying to scientific possibilities protects us.

Ambassador Dean pointed out that Indians say they think Soviets not testing and two sides merely need to agree not to test. We must do everything we can to lower threshold so as to give credibility to our position with Indians.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the Soviets might tamper with unmanned stations. Ambassador Dean mentioned Raytheon proposal which would make them difficult to tamper with.

The President noted Macmillan’s letter⁵ saying we’ll have hard time stopping the Indian Resolution. Ambassador Dean thought we could block any majority for it.

The President queried if there would be any problem on the Hill? Ambassador Dean was going to explain to Holifield tomorrow. He thought he’d have no problem. The President asked Dean to bring Indian Resolution to the JCAE’s attention and explain our UN problem to them.

The President raised Macmillan proposal for a last step. Ambassador Dean explained that UK wanted a comprehensive treaty article covering underground tests like that on outer space, saying there would be no tests but calling for a review of the detection machinery after three years. At that point we could get out if the scientists said such tests couldn’t be monitored.

Dr. Seaborg reiterated his comment about the difficulty of saying threshold could be removed entirely. The President might be subjected to criticism if the US proposed going into an area that couldn’t be policed. Ambassador Dean and Dr. Seaborg exchanged views on whether we should propose eliminating threshold. Dean agreed he would change the language of his proposal to make clear we were “only going so far as scientists tell us” we can. This might in effect be down to laboratory level, but we would not say we’d remove threshold entirely.

Mr. Keeny noted that this change would rob the proposal of much of its popular appeal. Ambassador Dean granted this, but it would still have some merit as step forward.

Mr. Keeny noted the Berkner Panel⁶ view that around 400-600 unmanned stations would identify 98% of events over 1 kt, and would have a detection threshold of tens of tons.

Secretary Rusk observed that the very people who would like to have an unpoliced moratorium now, e.g. Indians, would condemn us if Soviets got real jump on us through clandestine testing. We can’t defer too much to transitory world opinion. The President decided that we would go ahead with Dean’s proposals,⁷ and at the appropriate point make a statement on contingent preparations for testing.⁸ Mr. Bundy asked if the President would make this statement himself? The President said when DOD has finished its review of what it needs and Dean is back, the AEC can announce contingency preparations; then he would say this didn’t mean we were resuming tests.

Mr. Bundy asked why, when we actually resume, should we announce the tests? If we could get to the stage where we could conduct tests without announcing them, we’d be in a good position. However, the President felt they’d either become public or Congress would start complaining that there was no testing. Let’s defer these questions and let State/Defense/AEC consider them with Mr. Bundy.

Then, said the President, we should attempt to convince Macmillan we need to test positively, in view of his expressed hope (in his letter) that we wouldn’t resume for “negative” reasons alone. Mr. McCloy agreed we should challenge Macmillan on this. Mr. Bundy said that he took such argumentation out of initial reply⁹ because there was plenty of time to debate this with the UK at a later date. The President thought we might have to send someone qualified over to see Macmillan from DOD or AEC. No one was optimistic over the chances of convincing the UK. In Mr. Bundy’s opinion the best we’d get from Macmillan was agreement not to be publicly critical.

The USDA comprehensive disarmament proposals (11 August draft)¹⁰ were then presented by Mr. McCloy. He said the allies approved of them, except for the French, who think this is the wrong time to present anything at all. It is an outline plan, with a good deal of emphasis on peace-keeping machinery. He wanted the President’s approval before sending the final version to the others of the Western Five, as well as the NAC. The last remaining issue to be resolved was “linkage” of nuclear delivery vehicle reductions to concurrent reductions in conventional armaments in Stage I. The DOD wanted a specific link. But this would lessen the public opinion impact by diluting the idea that we are willing promptly to deal with nuclear delivery vehicles. The Soviets emphasize this latter need in their proposals.

Secretary McNamara said the only issue was the sentence proposed in footnote on page 8. DOD believed this sentence protected us and doesn’t reduce propaganda value. Mr. Gilpatric added that originally DOD had wanted a materials cut-off linked too.¹¹ The DOD regarded the issue as fundamental. Our nuclear deterrent deters conventional attack as well as nuclear. Until we’ve raised conventional capabilities much higher it must continue to do so. Since nuclear disarmament measures would take a long time to carry out in any case, he didn’t see why linking should reduce propaganda appeal. General Lemnitzer pointed out the strong feelings of the JCS on this issue. If the Soviets didn’t agree to conventional limitations at the time when we both cut nuclear capabilities, we’d be at a military disadvantage. The JCS fear a materials cut-off would force us to remodel our whole nuclear weapons posture. The DOD disagrees with JCS on linking a materials cut-off too, Mr. Gilpatric said; DOD wants only delivery vehicles linkage. Mr. McCloy noted that absence of an explicit link doesn’t mean we wouldn’t take all these factors into account. We’re well protected by the caveats in the USDA proposals. We just don’t want too much restrictive language. Secretary McNamara said that DOD just doesn’t think we should give up our nuclear advantage before the other guy gives up his conventional advantage. He was not so much worried by the USDA language itself as about the intent behind the language. Did USDA really favor nuclear controls first? Mr. Bundy felt that this was the real issue. He could see advantages in leaving out linkage language, but Mr. McNamara’s point is that before we enter into any serious negotiations we ought to take a real look at the linkage problem. The solution might be to have the President rule that in any serious negotiations, the DOD position would be safeguarded. Mr. McNamara thought that would be fine from DOD viewpoint. At Mr. Bundy’s request, Mr. Wilson pointed out USIA feeling that there would be real propaganda disadvantages if linkage language were left in. The President asked why? Mr. Bundy responded that it was because conventional disarmament was an old tired issue, whereas nuclear disarmament was what world worried about. It had more mileage.

Secretary Rusk added that the Soviets will take care of linkage if we don’t. The USDA position was right at this point, but if we get into real negotiations we should stick with the DOD principle. The President asked why can’t we put in “concurrently balanced steps” or similar language? This was fine for DOD, but Mr. Bundy pointed out that as long as we understand what we mean within the government, the USDA paper’s language doesn’t create a real problem. At Mr. Rusk’s suggestion all agreed to a minute to this effect.

Mr. Foster mentioned the work of his panel, which had focused on the strategic weapons problem. The panel felt that the way to begin disarmament is to commence. It started with cuts in medium bombers, then reduced strategic vehicles, with zonal inspections, then moved to some tricky conventional disarmament measures. But the panel was not ready to report yet. He hoped we could keep the door open to the panel’s ideas, since they were more dramatic than the USDA proposals.

The President didn’t see why all the fuss about the word “linkage”, at which point Mr. Bundy read his draft minute, which called for reopening the issue whenever serious negotiations seemed in prospect. The President asked whether it should be put positively (i.e. we would link such measures at that point) but Mr. Bundy pointed out that this might create the problem Mr. Foster was worried about. As Mr. McCloy put it, we really wanted to assure DOD its day in court.

The President turned to page 7 of the USDA proposals and asked how we get the French to buy para. (d) on no transfers of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Dean rejoined they haven’t raised this, but object violently to Section F on page 9, especially (c) and (d), as looking like acceptance of the Rapacki Plan.

Mr. McCloy’s view was that we should get NATO comments before deciding to eliminate Section F. We might get the French to buy it without (c) and (d). He went on to mention that Ambassador Stevenson liked the 11 August paper, but favored reducing to 1.9 million in the First Stage.¹² McCloy admitted he didn’t know what this would imply, hence he would prefer not to take on DOD on this issue. He also raised Ambassador Stevenson’s proposal to delete from para. (b) on page 14 covering the UN peace force the reference to “weapons of mass destruction”, etc.¹³ No objections were raised.

Mr. McCloy then proposed including in the USDA proposals a reference to the test ban. There would be a void in the program if it were not in. Of course the Soviets were trying to merge these issues, but if DOD had no objection he would like to put in a reference on page 6. USIA favored putting it in the “initial declaration” instead but there was no discussion of Mr. Wilson’s point. The President asked “Don’t we get in danger if we put the test ban and GCD together?” Mr. McCloy felt we could keep them separate as negotiating matters; he simply wanted to show it was part of GCD.

The President asked “Have the Soviets or anyone ever proposed simply ‘ban the bomb’?” Several present pointed out they had, so it was agreed to amend the proposed language to include the idea of “an effective” test ban treaty.

The President suggested that after the Foster Panel does its work, we would consider whether we can add it in. Mr. Foster pointed out that it might mean some substantial changes in the USDA proposals. However, Mr. Bundy was not sure this would be the case.

Finally, the President asked whether there were any problems which still concerned the JCS? General Lemnitzer asked whether the agreed minute would link a materials cut-off or just delivery vehicles to conventional reductions. Mr. Bundy agreed that it would cover both. General Lemnitzer then questioned the reference to AICBMs in para. (b) on page 8. The JCS could not see any limitation on defensive capabilities as realistic. Ambassador Dean explained the rationale as being to protect us in the event that the Soviets achieved an AICBM capability first and destabilized any agreed limitations on delivery vehicles. In General Lemnitzer’s view, if all that was being done was to indicate the relationship between the offensive and defensive aspects, then this was all right.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Committee of Principals, 3/61-11/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Komer. The time of the meeting is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.)
1. See footnote 3, Document 54.
2. Dean set forth his views on the difficulties in eliminating atmospheric tests only in an August 4 memorandum to the President. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban General, 4/61-8/61) See the Supplement.
3. Detailed information regarding these proposals is in Nusup 1387 to Geneva, August 16. The delegation’s reply, which argued against fresh proposals on the threshold issue at that time, is in Supnu 1741, August 17. (Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/8-1661 and 397.5611-GE/8-1761, respectively) Both are in the Supplement.
4. Frank Press, a geophysicist at the California Institute of Technology, was a member of the Panofsky Panel and the President’s Science Advisory Committee.
5. Document 54.
6. Lloyd V. Berkner, Chairman of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, headed a panel of U.S. earthquake experts appointed by the Eisenhower administration to study the problem of detection of underground nuclear tests. The Panel completed its report on March 7, 1959.
7. For text of the proposals as presented by Dean at Geneva on August 28, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 292-302.
8. Dean, in an August 18 memorandum to McCloy, and Seaborg, in an August 23 memorandum to the files, submitted recommendations on this topic. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, Nuclear Weapons Testing, 8/10-8/30/61) Both memoranda are in the Supplement.
9. See footnote 2, Document 55.
10. Not found. In a covering memorandum to the President, also dated August 11, McCloy stated that “with the exception of France, which prefers not to be associated with any disarmament proposal at this time, the paper has the strong support of the other members of the Western Five and is regarded by them as a major advance over past U.S. proposals.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament General) See the Supplement. Documentation concerning meetings of representatives of the “Western Five” in Washington regarding the general disarmament proposals is in Department of State, Central File 397.5611-GE for June through August 1961.
11. McNamara agreed to abandonment of this linkage in an August 10 letter to McCloy, provided both a Soviet production cutoff and a total test ban could be adequately verified, but he added: “Our stockpile depends on a continuous supply of tritium. The production of tritium must not be cut off.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Department and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament General)
12. Stevenson suggested this reduction in a letter to Bundy dated August 11. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations, 4/28/61-3/62) Rusk, in an August 17 memorandum to Bundy, stated that the proposal “would improve the salability of our proposal in the General Assembly context,” but questioned changing the figure “without further study of its military implications.” (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/8-1761) Both documents are in the Supplement.
13. The proposal to ban all weapons of mass destruction was from the Stage III, or final, list of proposed measures. Stevenson in his letter of August 11 pointed out that nuclear weapons might be retained for the U.N. peace force, also envisaged in Stage III. Rusk agreed with the point in his August 17 memorandum to Bundy.