64. Editorial Note
On December 11, 1961, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence, submitted, as Chairman of the NSC Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force, to McGeorge Bundy and General Taylor a report entitled “Elements of U.S. Strategy To Deal with ‘Wars of National Liberation.’” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, CIA General 12/61) See the Supplement. The other members of the Task Force were Edward Lansdale, Walt Rostow, and Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Council. According to a December 13 memorandum from Rostow to George McGhee, the members served as individuals, not agency representatives. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Dec 61)
The report concluded that while there existed a “clear consensus within the U.S. Government as to the magnitude and urgency” of the problem presented by Communist indirect aggression, there was “no single high-level locus of authority and responsibility” to undertake “vitally needed concerting of interagency resources.” The Task Force recommended that this function should be added to the responsibilities of the NSC 5412 Special Group, whose Chairman was General Taylor. The Special Group should designate areas where subversive violence was already a “major factor” or a “potentially serious threat.” For “critically threatened” countries as designated by the Special Group, the Secretary of State should establish interagency task forces to develop and review action programs.
In a December 12 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Robert Komer stated that he had pressed for designation of the Special Group in the report because “Taylor is already heavily involved in this problem area, and expansion of Special Group functions builds on a going concern. Walt and I touched base with Taylor; he is in full agreement.” To overcome what Komer believed were problems in obtaining interagency concurrence, “the technique we decided on was to have Bissell transmit the report to you so that you could send a chit to the agencies concerned suggesting that we have an NSC meeting on it.” In the margin of his own memorandum, Komer commented: “This is also so it doesn’t look like a CIA power play.” Concerning the recommendations, Komer wrote: “I had to do them quick and dirty in order to force everybody’s hand and avoid another six weeks of delay.” Komer believed that the Department of State might “not wholly approve giving Taylor such broad terms of reference.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Komer 11/61-12/61) See the Supplement.
In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting on December 13, Colonel Ewell stated that Bundy brought up the report and “jumped on the general idea” because he felt it would [Page 230] downgrade the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretaries. “I sense that some very quick action is necessary to get this thing back on the track.” In his memorandum of the daily staff meeting on December 15, Ewell wrote: “I mentioned the cold war paper. Bundy said that he had your memorandum from the Special Group. He is generally opposed to the Special Group getting into the consideration of organizational policy. He plans to talk to you about your memorandum. I suspect that Bundy has straightforward reservations about the Special Group—cold war idea, and I also feel that he has deep reservations, which are not quite so straightforward, about letting a strong, decisive group get hold of a block of decisions. This tends to inhibit the free-wheelers around here who find that they are unable to tinker around with the approach to a problem if the policy formulation in its final stages is reserved to a small group. My guess would be that the Bundy-Kaysen-Henry Owen axis is initiating a preventive war on this idea and will try to sink it without a trace.” (Both in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12/61) Although written for the record, Ewell’s memoranda were customarily circulated to Taylor and his staff. The memorandum from the Special Group has not been found. Henry D. Owen was a member of the Policy Planning Council.
Apparently a decision had been taken by January 10, 1962, not to assign the new function to the 5412 Special Group, because on this date Lemnitzer commented in a memorandum to Taylor on a draft NSAM, not found, which established a new Special Group (Counter-Insurgency). Lemnitzer advocated that the work of the new Special Group should in the long run not be confined to “those areas in which the Communists have already taken root” but should also concentrate on areas of the “most strategic significance to the United States such as Brazil, in which a well-coordinated, effective National Plan for progress should now be in implementation.” Lemnitzer added that it was “wishful thinking” to expect potential Special Group members to have much time to devote to their new functions, and suggested “a small, highly-qualified staff” of six to eight people to prepare recommendations and do “necessary spade work to permit monitoring the over-all accomplishments and/or operations.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, JMF 3360 (18 Jan 62) Sec 1) For NSAM No. 124 as issued, see Document 68.