Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

129. Airgram A–142 from Guatemala City, September 11¹

Guatemala City, September 11, 1962, 3:17 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Guatemala

Policy—Limit Distribution—S/S

The attached paper was prepared prior to the receipt today of a revised draft of “Guidelines of United States Policy and Operations Towards Guatemala.” While comment on that draft will be forwarded as requested, this paper, it is requested, should be distributed on a limited basis to those concerned with U.S. policy towards Guatemala.

John O. Bell

Attachment

Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Guatemala

A variety of stimuli prompt me to the belief that it is timely to attempt a general review of U.S. policy and program in Guatemala in an effort to suggest a course for the future or at least for the balance of the legal term of office of the present government.

Eight months of opportunity to observe and study the Guatemalan scene and to revalue prior judgments and opinions is one such stimulus. The promised advent of the Byroade team with its mission of inquiry is another. A congeries of instructions from Washington reflecting a desire for emphasis upon particular goals and directing focussing of plans and programs to their ends is another.

In April of this year draft guidelines for policy and objectives for Guatemala were prepared by the Department in consultation with other interested Departments and Agencies. We are also in receipt of instructions which establish “youth” and “youth” programs as important goals, cite Central American integration and “regionalism” as warranting priority; call for development of internal defense plans “because Guatemala is within the cognizance of the Special Group (counterinsurgency)”—presumably as a country considered to be threatened by subversive insurgency; direct development of “civic action” programs as important priority needs; insist upon “reforms” in accordance with Alianza “pledges” as essential to security; direct participation in regional health programs for mobile health units despite earlier insistence on reducing health activities to achieve “concentration”; direct participation in regional scholarship programs as important for U.S. interest; stress the need for military and police participation in health programs; emphasize the importance of child-feeding programs in our interest; warn of required emphasis on police programs, etc., etc., etc.

While it could not be contended that all of these instructions were inconsistent with or contradictory of the April guidelines, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile all of them into a coherent pattern of policy and program for Guatemala. I am familiar with the variety of reasons which lead to organizational arrangements and ensuing instructions emphasizing functional goals. I appreciate that it is hardly possible to draft these so as to be readily applicable to the particular and peculiar situations to be found in each foreign nation with which we have relations. Presumably it is the function and responsibility of the field mission to assure that the interpretation and application of these instructions is so accomplished as to fit the needs of U.S. interests in the country to which it is accredited.

It seems to me at this point in time that the definition of U.S. objectives set forth in the April draft require considerably more alteration and adjustment than was suggested by this mission in May. The purpose of this message is to discuss the first of the stated objectives.

To my mind the primary and overriding objective of U.S. policy in Guatemala should be to prevent it becoming a Communist state. I am not convinced that the objective set forth in the April guidelines: “the continuance of a legally established constitutional government in Guatemala, including the peaceful transfer of administration following the 1963 elections,” if accomplished, would necessarily assure that Guatemala would be saved from Communism.

It is entirely conceivable, that Juan José Arévalo could be elected in a free election, and a peaceful transfer of administration achieved. If this occurred, political power in Guatemala would be in the hands of a man not only passionately and pathologically antagonistic to the United States and all its works, but a man who certainly paved the way for the accession of Communism into power in Guatemala during the Arbenz regime. In my opinion the coming of Arévalo again into power would be most likely to set into motion again a chain of events leading toward a seizure of power by the Communists. A close review of Guatemalan history certainly supports the contention that Arévalo paved the way for Communist control; if he did not realize he was doing so, he is dangerously stupid; if he did realize the logical results of his acts, he must be assumed to have intended or to have accepted those results. In either case, it is hardly credible that the nature of the man has changed. He was nearly 50 years old at that time; he was no misguided, well-meaning youthful reformer. Even if one were prepared to make the very risky assumption that Arévalo, as President, would try to keep the Communists at arms length, the prospects for any cooperation with the U.S. in the Alliance for Progress would still be very slim indeed, and this would certainly contribute to the strengthening of Communism in Guatemala.

To many Guatemalans, perhaps to a majority, Arévalo is a dramatic figure of great appeal. Arévalo was the first President following the overthrow of the Ubico dictatorship and while his role in that overthrow was far from being the primary or even a significantly contributory one, he fell heir to the role of hero as a result. It is true that during the early days of his regime some reforms occurred; probably these would have taken place under any leadership succeeding Ubico, but Arévalo inherits the credit and the public image of a reformer. Coffee prices were high, the economy prosperous in Arévalo’s days—although the fact of his administration had nothing to do with this, so that people think of Arévalo in terms of the “good old days.” Arévalo succeeded in attaining recognition as a teacher outside of Guatemala; an international status is always an important asset to a politician in a small country. He has carefully avoided connecting himself in the public mind with the regime of his successor under whom Guatemala was given into Communist hands. He has been absent from Guatemala for many years and wisely remained aloof from the problems and issues with which other politicians have had to deal. At home, the competitors—rival politicians—are readily visible; their dimensions as men are apparent; their faults and weaknesses are open to notice. Given all these factors, it is not unnatural, especially among people largely inexperienced in self government, culturally conditioned over centuries to the concepts of the caudillo and the evasion of individual and group responsibility for political decisions, that Arévalo should appear to be the man on horseback whose return to power would assure a return to good times and relieve the people of having to worry about conditions.

To many other Guatemalans, however, especially and naturally those who have a more advanced economic status, those who are more politically sophisticated and have longer and more accurate memories of the past, as well as to a majority of the senior officers of the military, the prospect of an Arévalo return is a frightening and dismaying one. I am convinced that the single greatest reason and much more influential than all other reasons, which discourages Guatemalan capital investment and encourages its flight, is the fear of an Arévalo return. There is ample evidence now available to support the belief that conservatives and military leaders are seriously and with increasing determination considering how to achieve a coup as a means of preventing an Arévalo return. The Minister of Defense, Col. Peralta, has recently said “the Army of Guatemala will not permit Arévalo to be President.” Whether these men can or will muster the courage and the force to overthrow the Government probably depends on their assessment of the degree of probability of Arévalo’s success, their assessment of public reaction, and their assessment of U.S. attitudes. The events in Peru have been the subject of close and careful scrutiny. It is quite conceivable that in the final analysis the decision of these people as to whether or not to attempt a coup will depend on U.S. attitudes.

I am not suggesting that I believe we should encourage or abet those who are considering the solution of the Arévalo problem by means of a coup; certainly I think such action at this time unwise. I do suggest that it is conceivable that the time may come when the literal application of the stated policy objective would place us in the position of trying to assure Arévalo’s assumption of power and thus the probability of a Communist Guatemala. If that situation should arise, and our policy were to be as indicated, I would ask to be relieved of any responsibility for its execution, since I believe such a course of action would be inimical to the interests of both the United States and Guatemala.

It seems to me that the objective of policy and operation earlier quoted might well be replaced by two objectives somewhat as follows:

“1. The prevention of the accession to power of the Communists in Guatemala.

“2. The continuance, if possible within the framework of objective No. 1, of a legally established, constitutional government of Guatemala, including the peaceful transfer of administration following the 1963 elections.”

I do not think that the people of Guatemala really want what I think Arévalo would bring; I do not believe there are many Guatemalans who seek a Communist state. Nevertheless, Arévalo’s appeal, his very real demagogic and political capabilities can serve to maintain the illusion in the minds of many Guatemalans that his Government would not be a Communist one or the inevitable forerunner of such a Government.

I am not prepared to concede at this point in time that another and acceptable candidate cannot be brought to victory over Arévalo at the polls, although many obstacles impede that achievement and although some Embassy personnel believe that such an achievement is not possible. I am not convinced that a coup to forestall Arévalo’s election is presently practicable, even if we wanted one, and I am very doubtful that such a coup would prove to be more than a stopgap measure. The election of an acceptable successor to Ydigoras through constitutional processes and democratic procedures is the only solution which would fully satisfy the needs of both the U.S. and Guatemala. I think our efforts must be directed toward this goal and that it should be considered the primary goal. If, in order to promote its attainment, we need to defer other goals, or to subordinate other desiderata, then we should do so. Nevertheless, as earlier indicated, we cannot exclude the possibility of failure nor the possibility of having to consider alternatives which fall short of the ideal solution.

I am convinced that the attainment of the objectives suggested above necessitates on our part a maximum effort to exert whatever influence and power we can bring to bear to coalesce support around a non-Communist opponent to Arévalo, to obtain a maximum unification of politicians and parties to this end.

In any such effort the role of Ydigoras is of considerable significance. Few would contend that Ydigoras could dictate the choice of his successor—certainly he does not have this power—but acquiescence in or support for the candidacy of Arévalo by Ydigoras would materially and perhaps fatally weaken the chances for defeating him.

It also seems apparent to me that the prospects for Arévalo’s election would be materially improved if for the balance of Ydigoras’ term the economic and fiscal situation were to deteriorate further. A growing conviction of failure of the Alianza to effect improvement in Guatemala’s present status, regardless of where responsibility for such failure properly should be attributed, would certainly increase the political attractiveness of the great “spiritual socialist” Arévalo with his implication of capacity to solve all problems through acceptance of his mystic xenophobic doctrine. In this context (the economic and financial scene) the role of Ydigoras is also significant.

Ydigoras is the President of Guatemala. While his power and influence for the future surely wane as his term of office draws to a close, he is nevertheless the most powerful man in the country. The acts and functions of his government will directly and greatly influence the people, not only in their daily lives but in their assessment of the future and of the kind of government they will choose.

I am concerned, I hope unduly, that our relations with Ydigoras have been and may be handicapped by our attitudes toward him and his Government having been and perhaps being more harsh and more condemnatory than objective and realistic in terms of U.S. interests. This concern prompts me to an elaboration of this point, since I consider, as indicated above, that it is of considerable importance to our objectives to possess the maximum capability possible to influence Ydigoras.

Our relations with Ydigoras, while outwardly correct and friendly, are in fact as pleasant as they are primarily because the General is an intensely practical politician. He has realized and accepted the necessity, in his own self-interest and preservation, of maintaining friendly relations with the U.S. and, in my opinion, has done his best to do so. The U.S., for reasons based on evaluations which do not appear to stand the test of hindsight judgment, was strongly opposed to Ydigoras’ candidacy for President, and supported an opponent in that election with very considerable financial and other assistance. This fact was well known to Ydigoras, but he presented himself to Washington shortly thereafter as nevertheless determined to follow policies at home and abroad with which we would be in accord. We accepted the olive branch officially but, to express it crudely, we appear to have classified him as a “bad guy” and, while occasionally prepared to concede he might not be all “bad” and might have “some” good points or do some “right” things, essentially our attitude seems to me to have been one of doubt, suspicion and derogation. At any rate, this is generally believed here to have been the U.S. attitude. Ydigoras has certainly thought so. Similarly, other political groups in Guatemala have sensed U.S. reserve regarding Ydigoras; both the President and his opposition have believed we were against him and I believe with reason. The attitudes of U.S. officials toward Ydigoras, our readiness to see and accent the bad side of his regime and our discounting of its accomplishments, cannot really be dissociated from the uniformly unfavorable press which he has received in the U.S. No U.S. newspaper or periodical or news service has maintained or stationed an American reporter in Guatemala. (TIME is an exception, although its correspondent is more Guatemalan than American.) Reliance is placed on spasmodic visits in times of trouble by reporters, whose stories appear to have been written before they arrived, and/or local nationals whose objectivity is hardly noteworthy. It seems quite probable that the U.S. press detects an hostile attitude by U.S. officials, as do Ydigoras and his opponents.

Such an attitude on our part, I would suggest, has not been and is not justified, even if one believes antipathy warranted on moral grounds. We must not let it color our judgment and influence our decision when to do so is counterproductive to our interests.

The criticisms of Ydigoras are many and not without some degree of validity. It is not my purpose to portray him favorably or unfavorably; my point is that it is he with whom we have to deal—whether we like him or not is unimportant and irrelevant; we need to understand him, to know his strengths and weaknesses, to evaluate correctly what he can and cannot do, and to use this knowledge to our advantage. It is my opinion that his record to date, all factors taken into consideration, does not compare unfavorably with other Latin Chiefs of State. The background portion of the April guidelines states: “The ill-defined social and economic objectives to which he gives lip service are more nearly identified with those of the liberal-leftist opposition than of his erstwhile conservative supporters . . . . . So far, a shrewd political touch has enabled him to maintain himself in power in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds. The tragedy is that Ydigoras has neither chosen nor been able to use his abilities to rally support behind the fundamental changes which he apparently approves.”

Ydigoras is not a man to originate nor to hold deep attachment for particular social or economic theories; he is not politically original nor creative. Nevertheless, in his own stubborn way he has sought to develop and to practice democracy in Guatemala within the limits of maintaining himself in power, the limited capability and willingness of the Guatemalan citizenry to practice it, and the nature of his own cultural and educational formation. If Washington is disappointed that he did not push or has not pushed (or tried to push regardless of the prospects of success) those ideas of the liberal leftists on which platform he did not run; the conservatives who elected him are similarly disappointed that he has not been a strong and dominant leader who would establish and maintain conservative government. In evaluating him, we must consider his power to act in realistic terms.

As noted in the background quoted above, Ydigoras has faced great difficulty in maintaining power. Submission of political differences and personal ambition to accept the fact of victory on the part of the opposition is not a characteristic of Guatemalan politicians and parties. (The recent vote in the Congress on the Investment Guaranty Agreement, for example, featured adverse votes by a number of Congressmen who, to my personal knowledge, believe the agreement important to Guatemala’s progress but were more interested in opposing the Government for the sheer sake of opposition.) Our own attitudes referred to earlier have done little to temper or discourage the non-cooperative approach of the Ydigoras opposition; indeed, they may well have served to strengthen and encourage this position. From Ydigoras’ point of view, he has been in a precarious position from the outset of his term, surrounded by opponents on all sides, denied full support by his own following, denied U.S. confidence and support if not actually denigrated by U.S. attitudes and actions, attacked by his enemies on any and every pretext. He has described his position as equivalent to a man on a slack wire equipped with a balancing pole which required careful and constant adjustment if he was to remain on the wire. His efforts to induce the so-called “better elements” of society to participate in government met with little success. His reaction to these circumstances has been to play off persons and groups against each other so that no one group would obtain enough power to upset him and so that a coalition of opposition would not occur. This had led him to a tolerance of Communists internally in the country. It has led him as well to wish to maintain the appearance of friendly relations with the U.S. despite our opposition to his election and our subsequent attitudes. It has led him to even greater reliance on his own judgment and instinct in dealing with problems, since he has felt a lack of confidence in both the capability and the trustworthiness of those who surround him. It has been pretty much a one-man government, but very far indeed from being dictatorship. Whether for tactical reasons of self-preservation, or from a conviction of the importance of human rights and the necessity for cultivating the growth of constitutional concepts, it is noteworthy that there has been during most of his term the maintenance of civil liberties for the great majority of Guatemalans.

Ydigoras in some ways is suggestive of a big city boss of the old Tammany type. He has maintained a personal relationship with the people especially the poorer elements in the country and in the city. He is always open to a personal appeal from such elements and provides help in enough cases to maintain their confidence that he has basic good will toward them and interest in their problems. He has sought to bring advancement to the country; since 1960 he has built 189 new schools and 126 more are under way, as compared with 370 in 63 years preceding; he has supported and stimulated efforts to deal with illiteracy; he has supported and stimulated distribution of land to the campesinos, 4,613 new owners have been created; he has supported and stimulated low cost housing programs, 2,568 new houses have already been built under this program and more are included in approved projects; he has pushed road and highway construction; he has spent a larger percentage of the federal increase on development activities than his predecessors. During his regime there is no doubt that personal profit has been taken. Give the well-established Latin tradition that to the victor belongs the spoils, it would have been remarkable if Ydigoras had broken the practice of some self-aggrandizement which has characterized all previous regimes. Critics claim his take has been excessive; supporters claim it has been less; no one claims 100% honesty—hardly anyone seems to have expected that or even to regard it as sensible! The moral standard seems to be one of reasonableness in profit taking. It is doubtful that Ydigoras has been excessively corrupt in Latin terms.

Ydigoras’ foreign policy has been one of rather complete cooperation with the United States. We have become so accustomed to expecting Guatemala to vote our way in every international forum and to support our position on every international issue that we take this pretty much for granted. This record of support and cooperation reflects, however, Government policy rather than an absolute identity of U.S. and Guatemalan interests, or of Guatemalan and U.S. opinion and thought. The principal and almost only aspect of Guatemalan foreign policy which has troubled us has been the Ydigoras position on Belize—British Honduras, a claim antedating his regime. He has enjoyed pulling the tail of the British lion on this issue; it has proved a useful distraction from domestic issues; it is unlikely that this problem would ever prove more than passingly troublesome to us.

It is also worth noting that during Ydigoras’ regime, the economy of Guatemala—long dependent on the basic crop of coffee—has been adversely affected by the growing excess of coffee supplies in the world. Government revenues based on coffee export taxes to a very great extent has accordingly depreciated. Thus as demand for additional Government services has grown, the financial capacity of the Government to provide them has depreciated. Obviously the need has been for fiscal and tax reform but such measures are largely dependent on legislation and Ydigoras’ power to compel legislation has never been complete. As discussed in some detail in a separate airgram (A–120 of September 1, 1962), the U.S. outlays of aid following the overthrow of the Arbenz regime have in part made possible a continuation of a pattern of expenditures in excess of revenue, concealed or muted the need for reform and we had not until recently called either our own or the Guatemalan Government’s attention to a consideration of either need or remedies.

Ydigoras’ own temperament, his lack of creativity, his self-reliance, his lack of adequate political power, the lack of cooperation and support with which he has had to live, the U.S. attitudes, the deteriorating economy—all have had a part in history of the past four years and its accomplishments and failures.

While I think we must continue to press upon the President the need for actions to improve the political and economic situation in Guatemala, as we have been doing, I also think we should strive “to accentuate the positive” in our dealings with him. I do not suggest that we embark on a love-Ydigoras campaign, but I do suggest we strive to create in his mind the belief that we evaluate him fairly and that it is to his interest to play ball with us all the way. The establishment of such a conviction can go a long way in obtaining Ydigoras’ cooperation in the achievement of our objective of a non-Communist Guatemala.

1. Transmits guidelines for policy and operations in Guatemala. Secret. 10 pp. DOS, CF, 611.14/9–1162.