Attached for the use of the Executive Committee are copies of an October
27 paper on “Negotiations” done by the Rostow Subcommittee.
Attachment
SUBJECT
1. Khrushchev’s letter is
more likely, in our view, to reflect a decision to disengage from
offensive weapons in Cuba, saving as much face as possible, than to
represent a tactical maneuver or gimmick.
2. In a larger sense, this decision might portend a major shift in
Soviet policy. A few months ago we had said that Khrushchev was reaching a point in
his post-Sputnik offensive where, if he could not score an early
success, he would probably seek some relief from the pressures which
that offensive had placed on him. We had anticipated that he might
seek such a success in either Cuba, Berlin, or weapons development.
We had also anticipated that, if we stood firm and denied him that
success, the chances would be increased of his seeking relief from
these pressures through relaxation.
3. Against this background, our posture in the present crisis should
be designed to:
(a) make clear that the Cuban issue must be settled by the prompt
elimination of Soviet offensive weapons, and without any offsetting
concessions other than pure atmospherics, e.g., a Latin American
nuclear-free zone;
(b) make equally clear that we are prepared to undertake immediate
negotiations with the USSR on arms
control and other issues, that we are ready to go to a Summit on
these matters as soon as Cuba is out of the way, and that we would
be willing to concert now about the specific items to be taken up at
a Summit—even while Cuba was being got out of the way.
4. A memorandum is attached which outlines the approach that might be
made to a Summit meeting under the strategy discussed above. Its
substantive treatment of the issues to be taken up at a Summit is
the same as that contained in the October 26 paper on “Negotiations”
which was co-ordinated with the interested regional Bureaus and
ACDA.
