Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics

317. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 86.2-61

Washington, July 25, 1961.

THE DOMINICAN SITUATION

The Problem

To examine the political situation in the Dominican Republic and to estimate the prospects for an orderly transition to a more representative political system.

The Estimate

1. The heirs of Trujillo are seeking to regain international acceptance by relaxing the late dictator’s stringent political controls and permitting the development of democratic political activity. With the return of several opposition leaders from exile—with government guarantees for their safety—opposition forces within the country have surfaced and begun to crystallize. The violence incited by pro-Castro elements in early July has demonstrated that the liberalization of political controls involves some risk for the security of the regime.

2. The real power in the Dominican Republic is still held by the Trujillo family through Ramfis’ control of the armed forces and the police. The family also continues to dominate the economic life of the country. Ramfis is resolved to preserve what he can of his family’s economic interests, but has apparently concluded that some political relaxation is necessary for this purpose. Contrary to expectations, he has permitted the titular president, Balaguer, to encourage the open development of political opposition groups. He has also permitted Balaguer to institute important reforms in the economic field, including the dissolution of the Trujillo family monopoly in coffee and cocoa exports and a reduction in utility rates and the prices of certain foodstuffs. Balaguer has also appointed a reputable cabinet, indicated his willingness to consider the return of the OAS investigating subcommittee, and declared that he was prepared to have OAS representatives observe the national elections scheduled for May 1962. Both men probably estimate that the well-established machinery of the government-controlled Partido Dominicano will suffice to sweep the election, even if OAS observers are in attendance. Publicly organized opposition so far consists of four groups: the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), the National Civic Union (UCN), and the 14th of June Movement.

3. The PRD is a long-established organization of Dominican exiles led by Juan Bosch,² with branches in New York, San Juan, and Caracas. Its leaders have associations with ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica and President Betancourt of Venezuela. At recent rallies the party has demonstrated some drawing power among city workers, other elements of the lower class, and poorer segments of the middle class. However, the majority of the middle class, which suffered most under the tyranny, is critical of PRD leaders as men who have remained out of the country for decades and escaped hardship and abuse. Many in the middle class do not trust the PRD, some believing that it has sold out to the Balaguer government and others suspecting it of extreme leftist or Communist tendencies. At the same time PRD leaders are being denounced by the Cuban radio as agents of the US.

4. The MPD was originally organized in Cuba by Maximo Lopez Molina, a pro-Communist Dominican exile. At the time of the San Jose Conference, in 1960, Trujillo permitted Lopez to return to the Dominican Republic and establish the MPD there. He probably did this in order to demonstrate both tolerance of political opposition and a Castroist threat. Within a short time the party was suppressed, but it has recently been reactivated. It is aggressive and Castro/Communist in character, though probably still small in size. Following the early July disturbances the government threatened to suppress the MPD and took occasion to have the legislature enact an anti-Communist law.

5. The upper and middle classes were the principal victims of the Trujillo dictatorship and have a corresponding interest in the establishment of civil liberties and representative government. Until recently, however, opposition elements from these classes have remained underground because of the brutal repression which members of their group suffered at the hands of the late dictator. With the continuation in power of the Trujillos, and lacking US or OAS guarantees of their safety, they hesitated to surface until the return of the PRD leaders and the activities of the MPD showed that some political agitation could be conducted openly and convinced them that, if they did not move, political leadership would pass to extremists by default. They have established the UCN, an organization composed largely of respectable business and professional men headed by long-time Trujillo oppositionist Viriato Fiallo. They still defensively deny that the UCN is a political party, but nevertheless it does provide a rallying point for moderate elements antipathetic to the Trujillo regime, on the one hand, and to the leftist PRD and pro-Communist MPD on the other. We believe that the UCN is predominantly pro-US, despite a public statement opposing foreign, particularly US, intervention. This statement was probably designed for internal political effect.

6. There is also the 14th of June Movement,³ originally a clandestine middle class organization composed largely of younger persons. It was smashed by the late dictator in early 1960, but the remnants have recently emerged as an open political movement and have attracted support from the burgeoning student movement. The membership is divided between those who would go along with pro-Castro activists and those who favor moderation. In these circumstances some of the adherents of the 14th of June Movement may eventually merge with other opposition groups.

7. In the political vacuum created by the 30-year dictatorship, the PRD, MPD, UCN, and the 14th of June Movement are competing for leadership of the dissatisfied elements of the population. None of them has been in the open long enough to have developed an extensive political organization for electoral purposes. An evident danger is that, unless the anti-Communist opposition bestirs itself, the more aggressive MPD may capture the leadership of popular dissidence.

8. So far, political ferment is confined largely to the capital city and the larger towns. The mass of the peasants remains unaffected; the government-controlled Dominican Party is still the only political organization in effective contact with them.

9. The rapid development of open political opposition, and the potential for violence demonstrated on 7 July, put in question the feasibility of President Balaguer’s apparent plan to conduct a controlled transition to a more representative political system. The opposition parties almost certainly realize that, even with the degree of political freedom now permitted, they have little or no chance of prevailing in an election to be held only nine months from now. To gain more time for organization and campaigning, they are likely to demand postponement of the election, and might refuse to participate if it is held on schedule. Moreover, instead of relying upon the election as the means of replacing the present regime, each opposition group is probably seeking to subvert a sufficient segment of the armed forces to be able to seize power by a coup. To this end, the more moderate oppositionists would urge that the elimination of the Trujillos was necessary in order to establish a stable democratic political system and to head off the Castro/Communist threat represented by the MPD.

10. The more moderate opposition groups are not likely to seek to incite popular violence against the regime, for fear that this would work to the immediate advantage of the MPD and would provoke the eventual suppression of all political activity. In the tense circumstances, however, spontaneous disorder is a constant possibility.

11. The mechanism of the police state remains intact and, if put to use, is probably still capable of suppressing all opposition. To do this, however, would destroy the impression which both Balaguer and Ramfis have been at pains to create, of an evolution toward a more democratic system. We therefore believe that while Ramfis will act forcefully to prevent or suppress violence and disorder, he will be disinclined to suppress moderate political opposition.

12. As the political situation develops, much will depend on reactions within the Trujillo family and within the armed forces. Some members of the family are determined to defend their property and position and would resist any further political or economic concessions on the part of Ramfis which they thought would seriously jeopardize their interests. In such circumstances, they could probably count on the support of elements in the armed forces, particularly among senior officers, who see peril for themselves in any change in the political system. On the other hand, there are some junior officers who desire reform, or who are interested in the promotions which they could expect from an overturn of the system, and might therefore be open to subversion by one or another of the opposition groups. Thus Ramfis could lose control of the situation through a move from within the Trujillo family to displace him and restore the status quo ante, or through a move from within the armed forces, in conspiracy with one of the political opposition groups, to expel all the Trujillos. In either case, Balaguer’s attempt at a political finesse would have failed and a sanguinary struggle for power among many diverse elements would probably ensue.

13. In view of the flexibility and skill which Balaguer and Ramfis Trujillo have shown, the power at their disposal, and the rudimentary character of the political opposition, we believe it likely that the present Dominican Government will be able to retain control of the situation, at least until the May 1962 election. However, on the separate issue of an orderly transition to a more representative political system, we believe that there is no more than an even chance of a moderate program being carried out in view of the possibilities of a return to more forceful repression as opposition activity increases or of a power struggle among present leaders. In any case the scale and nature of US support is likely to have an important effect upon the success of the Balaguer program.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret.
2. Juan Bosch was at one time a member of the Caribbean Legion, a motley assortment of professional revolutionaries and idealists devoted to the overthrow of dictatorship. He is presently in San Jose, Costa Rica, although he makes his headquarters in Caracas. The principal PRD leaders now in the Dominican Republic are Angel Miolan and Ramon Castillo. The latter and another PRD leader, Nicolas Silfa, are naturalized US citizens. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The movement draws its name from the date in 1959 on which a Castro-supported invasion group made an abortive attempt to initiate revolution against Generalissimo Trujillo. However, a member of the movement has said that its name is intended to exploit the event, not to emulate Castro’s 26th of July Movement. [Footnote in the source text.]