Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada

140. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Strategy of the Western Alliance and Berlin

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • EUR—Mr. Kohler
  • GER—Mr. Stalder
• Germans
  • Defense Minister Strauss¹
  • Ambassador Grewe
  • Mr. Schnippenkoetter, Counselor, German Embassy

At the conclusion of his meeting with Minister Strauss, Mr. Kohler escorted him to his appointment with the Secretary.² Mr. Kohler briefly informed the Secretary of this meeting as well as of Minister Strauss’ earlier meetings with the President, Defense Secretary McNamara, and Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric.³

The Secretary mentioned his forthcoming trip to Europe and said one of the things he hoped to learn in Paris is what is meant by the French when they speak of a “reorganized NATO” and of “changes in the situation since 1948”. While a “reorganized NATO” is spoken of, no proposals have been put forth; nothing has been spelled out. Yet this might have a bearing on a NATO MRBM force. The Secretary inquired whether Minister Strauss knew what the French had in mind.

Minister Strauss said he had not been able to get any clear answers. However, President DeGaulle’s recent press conference⁴ made evident at least the outlines—the contours—of French thinking. The French appear to be saying that a defense of the West based only on the United States is a thing of the past; there must be a new system based more or less on a coalition of national armies with a low degree of integration. Such a system—as Minister Strauss interpreted French thinking—must include national nuclear components, a flexible arsenal (not necessarily flexible within the US understanding of this term), and a stronger French position in NATO command posts. Minister Strauss said he did not think the French extended this latter point to include the NATO top side, i.e. to an integrated NATO General Staff.

The Secretary went on to say that one of the purposes of his forthcoming visits to Paris, Bonn, and London was to see whether elements of pure misunderstanding can be removed and whether, where real differences exist, these differences can be identified more precisely and, if possible, resolved. In inquiring of Minister Strauss what he understood the feelings in Paris to be, he would not wish to seem in any way to appear to be separating one ally from another. He inquired because it is important to know.

The Secretary said he thought one element of misunderstanding with Paris arose from what he understood to be President DeGaulle’s feeling that the civic morale of France—(and of the army, interjected Minister Strauss)—must be rebuilt. Recalling DeGaulle’s personal experiences of 1940, this was understandable. The point of misunderstanding, however, arises when this rebuilding takes place at the expense of one’s friends. If DeGaulle seems to be saying that France must do X, Y, or Z because it cannot rely on the US, this is one thing. But if he says he must make it possible for France to assume a larger share in resolving the common problems of the West, this is another matter. The Secretary repeated that we do not feel we know enough about what DeGaulle has in mind.

Mr. Kohler said specific questions had been asked but that there had been no answers.

Minister Strauss said the French system of priorities—force de frappe, corps d’intervention, territorial defense army—does not fit into the NATO concept.

The Secretary agreed that there appeared to be certain apparent contradictions. He hoped Minister Strauss had gotten the impression in Athens that the US was moving rapidly in the direction of a multilateral sharing of the great issues and problems in the nuclear field.

Minister Strauss said he had; he considered Athens to have been a turning point.

It was an anomaly, the Secretary continued, that as we move in a direction which we would have supposed the French wanted, the French are moving in another direction.

Minister Strauss said it was all the more important, therefore, that more be learned of what France has in mind before NATO document 26/4 is discussed. Returning to the French system of priorities, he said French planning means that no more than four French divisions can be contributed in the future. At the present time, the French contribution was only 1-1/2 divisions and these were equipped with obsolete matériel.

Minister Strauss expressed his surprise at having learned from Secretary McNamara yesterday that the US had offered to reequip the first two divisions returning from Algiers but that this offer had been rejected. He would be very pleased, Strauss went on, if the US could persuade the French to accept.

The Secretary expressed his hope that a common ground could be found. He had no doubts about the essential commitment of all the NATO countries to basic principles. The differences we were experiencing are rather in the nature of family differences. But it was to be hoped these would not grow. To the press, agreement is boring; disagreement is “news”. Thus, these much publicized differences could have unfortunate effects on public opinion.

Minister Strauss thought there were, nevertheless, strong differences. He then expressed his appreciation—not merely as a “foolish compliment”—for the speeches of the Secretary and Defense Secretary McNamara at Athens. For the first time in NATO, there had been put forward for discussion a strategic concept.

The Secretary said Athens had been important because, by making the facts known, it was possible to explain how we had arrived at our strategic concept. Perhaps because of this the Minister felt that the NATO MRBM idea was dead.

Minister Strauss did not consider the idea dead. He thought rather in terms of its having failed up to now. This failure could not be ascribed to a lack of effort. A too optimistic view of the legal, technical and other problems had, however, been held.

The Secretary inquired whether these were real obstacles, or were they more in the nature of political differences among the capitals. Would France, for example, sit down and work out the legal and technical problems?

Minister Strauss thought France would sit down but would not give in. The establishment of a multilateral MRBM force would not satisfy France now.

The Secretary thought it possible that if the UK joins the Common Market without a serious dilution of the Rome Treaty, these problems might diminish. Meanwhile the US was prepared to get into these questions to the extent that our allies wish us to. We had started with the hope that our allies would discuss this matter and work it out, but there had been no progress. We continue to hope this matter will be discussed, although we would not want to table a US plan.

Minister Strauss went on to say that it was possible to distinguish two aspects of a multilateral MRBM force—the military and political. First, was it merely military; does NATO need this force to fill a gap—to have a differentiated weapons system. If the answer is yes, such an MRBM force could be set up with no changes in the present nuclear set up. Nuclear weapons would be immediately under SACEUR and control would be under the US. The Pentagon, Strauss said, appeared not to think of the MRBM force as a strong military requirement.

It was perhaps a political rather than a military requirement, the Secretary said.

Minister Strauss thought it had elements of both. Discussing the second aspect—the political—he said the question is whether the MRBM force is a good object with which to demonstrate the existence of a multilateral force. It would not change the weapons system, only command and control.

The Secretary expressed the hope that our friends in NATO realize that what has been said to the NATO Council about consultation is an attempt to go as far as possible multilaterally, subject to the physical circumstances at the time decisions must be made.

Minister Strauss inquired whether it could not be said that there are short and long run tasks to be taken up. The short run task is to work out practical guidelines to make a consultation system workable and to prove that consultation is possible. If this is not the case, the idea of a multilateral force should be dropped.

The Secretary referred to what had for a time been a matter of misunderstanding between Washington and Bonn. This related to our references to a buildup of conventional forces. Bonn had not realized that this was being thought of in the context of forward strategy.

Minister Strauss agreed and said that discussion in Bonn had been directed at identifying the borderline between conventional and nuclear weapons. Was it between conventional weapons and all nuclear weapons (including, for example, the Davy Crockett), or was the borderline somewhere within the range of the nuclear arsenal short of general war. There was no experience upon which to base an answer. There was now a new problem; how strong must our conventional forces be and at what point—i.e. in what types of conflict—would the lowest yield nuclear weapons be called into action. In other words, how can the nuclear deterrent be made more credible and how long can the use of nuclear weapons be postponed when the conventional fail. This was a matter of concern in Germany. There was every wish to avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Yet Germany could not watch the Soviets overrun part of its territory—the Ruhr or Hamburg—and accept the concept that negotiations proceed from the status quo once the conflict has been stopped.

The Secretary said he could agree with this. It was, he went on, very hard to write a scenario which includes another actor who may not play. One could imagine, on a purely theoretical basis, in the case of a blockade of West Berlin, the commitment of a small force to probe Soviet intentions, followed by a conventional, a tactical, and finally by a strategic force. The difficulty was that this theoretical circumstance might last only five minutes. We have no illusions about this. In speaking of credibility one must, however, also look at the other side of the coin. The context must be considered. A threat, for example, to invoke the deterrent if one of our jeeps is not permitted to pass through a checkpoint would, of course, not be taken seriously.

The Secretary went on to say that we should have the obvious means thoroughly to engage the two systems—NATO and Warsaw Pact—so that they (the Soviets) know the issue is nuclear war. We do not propose to accept deep intrusions into NATO territory by conventional forces. In an aside about The Guns of August, which the Secretary commended to the attention of Minister Strauss, the Secretary spoke of the breakdown of understanding among the European capitals in August 1914. A way must be found not to let this happen again. As he had told the Chancellor, we want to have clear agreement on what our vital interests are and what must be done if these are undermined. We must be sure that if we do what must be done, we can face our people and say that we had done everything possible at the diplomatic level and that our actions in no way were the consequence of negligence or inactivity. It was this that was very much in the mind of the President. Thus far, however, there are no indications that the Soviets accept or recognize our vital interests.

Minister Strauss said the “fatal thing” was that we are fighting with our backs to the wall. If we had on our side an arsenal of negotiating issues—concessions to trade for concessions—things would be less difficult.

It was true, the Secretary said, that there existed a whole range of matters which are no longer negotiable as a result of what has happened along the way. With respect to our rights in Berlin, there is nothing to bargain with.

Minister Strauss said the Soviets had dropped all hope of controlling all of Germany. This had been what lay behind the various pre-NATO and post-NATO plans for neutralized zones and the like in Central Europe. Such plans would have meant the dissolution of Europe. However, this period was now ended. The Soviets cannot afford to attack Central Europe. But with Berlin the difficulty is the unfavorable geographic location.

The Secretary spoke briefly of his itinerary. He would visit Berlin very briefly; both Berlin and Bonn had urged him to do so despite the fact that his tight schedule permitted only a few hours there. In Bonn he hoped to have some fundamental talks. Such misunderstandings as existed were, in his view, not serious. There was close to complete agreement on policy and full agreement on all the underlying issues. With respect to the role of East Germany in the Access Authority, the Soviets, upon reading this, said they would not have West Germany a member of such an authority. There could, therefore, be no differences with Bonn on this.

Minister Strauss thought an international access authority would be an improvement over the present state of affairs, inasmuch as the East Germans now control most of the traffic.

The Secretary cautioned Minister Strauss not to speak of East German “control”. So long as we are in Berlin—as he had told the Soviet Ambassador on several occasions—they do not have control.

Minister Strauss recalled in this connection having received a less than perfect grade in an English examination some years ago, because he had translated the word “control” incorrectly; in German the word has a somewhat different meaning.

The Under Secretary inquired whether any serious thought had been given to Franco-German nuclear cooperation.

Minister Strauss stated that France had made not the slightest overture—nor had the Germans. Germany, he said, was not concerned for reasons of prestige. Moreover, the right to produce nuclear weapons had been renounced.

The Under Secretary said he was, of course, thinking of peaceful uses, although some of these might at some point have military applications.

Minister Strauss said with respect to peaceful uses, German cooperation was 80 percent with the US, 15 percent with the UK and 5 percent with the French.

Referring to his earlier meeting with the President, Minister Strauss spoke of the President’s evident concern over a further diffusion of nuclear capabilities; after France more and more NATO, as well as non-NATO, countries could be expected to develop their own capabilities. Sweden, the Minister thought, would have its own capability by 1970.

Turning then to what appeared to be the French arguments for its own nuclear capability, Minister Strauss said these included an apparent belief that the US deterrent is not a reliable one. In addition, there appear to be considerations of prestige involved and, closely related to this, the feeling that what is legitimate for the UK cannot be denied to others.

This, interjected the Secretary, could be extended indefinitely.

Another apparent French argument, Minister Strauss continued, was of a more objective nature. Would not the deterrent be more credible if it consisted of a number of separate deterrents rather than of a more centralized one?

The Secretary asked to what extent, in the Minister’s opinion, was it believed in Europe that the defense of the United States and Europe is indivisible.

Minister Strauss replied that Secretary McNamara at Athens had pointed up a matter of concern. It was that a first nuclear strike by a country such as France would not do too much damage and that such a country would then in turn be wiped out. There would then be the choice for the allies of leaving such a country to its deserved fate or of going to war without regard to whether its action had been right or wrong or the fact that its action had not been given allied approval.

It was difficult to identify any nuclear issues for NATO members, the Secretary said, which was not a nuclear issue for the US.

Turning again to the apparent French belief that nuclear diffusion is desirable because of US unreliability, Minister Strauss said the argument is at times posed in terms of what will happen in 1966 when a US–USSR nuclear stalemate will have been achieved. What then will be the strategic concept? In Athens—so this argument runs—the US spoke of an overwhelming arsenal in terms of numbers and ranges of weapons, an indestructible means of delivery, and an indestructible second strike capacity. The USSR cannot yet match this. This—to interpret this French argument further—gives the US strong feelings of superiority and the conviction that it is in full control of the world. But will this US concept remain fully as reliable after 1966, or will there have to be expected a modification? It is on this basis of the post-1966 US-USSR nuclear stalemate, Minister Strauss said, that the French argue openly for the creation of their own nuclear deterrent. And this concern is not entirely absent in the UK.

If the talk was about 1966, the Secretary noted, this was really a very short time period in the historical context. If there was one thing evident, it is that there is deeply entrenched in the US on the basis of the most selfish, elementary, and national considerations, the conviction that there is no security for the United States without Western Europe.

For this reason, Minister Strauss added, one European concept must be rejected as completely wrong—that of Europe as a third force. To support Europe as a third force is to dissolve the bloc of the free world and to establish in its stead two separate centers—Europe and the United States. All steps toward European unity should rather be viewed as part—a slice—of the Atlantic Community based upon increasing interdependence. Success in achieving European unity would mean establishment of an entity of comparable size to the US. This in turn would lead to an Atlantic Community supported by, or based on, two solid pillars. The existence of such an Atlantic Community would represent a meaningful deterrent.

The Secretary agreed that a third force was not feasible. It overlooked the fact that Europe cannot be a third force inasmuch as it is Europe which is the issue between Washington and Moscow.

Returning to another facet of the French argument about the reliability of the US concept in the post-1966 period, Minister Strauss referred to the concern about placing the release of nuclear warheads exclusively in the hands of the US President. In the event of a conflict—so the argument runs—the Soviets may then attempt to blackmail the President by informing him that the release of tactical warheads to defend certain territory would be considered a casus belli. This would place the US President under severe pressure not to release, say, ten warheads, and to accept a Soviet penetration rather than expose the US to danger.

The Under Secretary noted that this was precisely the kind of blackmail the Soviets had attempted over Berlin.

If the Secretary could overcome the French arguments while in Paris, the Minister said, we will have come closer to an understanding.

The Under Secretary thought much of the French (and European) thinking along the lines outlined by the Minister was based upon a cultural lag. It was the US of the 1930’s which was still in the minds of many Europeans—a United States which had never made a total commitment. The US mood and mentality had undergone a great change. Finally, the nature of nuclear war appeared not fully to be understood in Europe.

Minister Strauss expressed his appreciation for the extremely useful talks he had had in Washington and said he hoped to see the Secretary in Bonn.

This was also his hope, the Secretary said.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/6–962. Secret. Drafted by Stalder on June 9 and approved in S on June 16 and in U on June 14.
1. Strauss visited Washington June 7–8. A summary of the visit was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 3388, June 13. (Ibid., 375/6–1162)
2. A memorandum of Strauss’ conversation with Kohler is ibid., 375/6–862.
3. No records of the meetings with McNamara and Gilpatric have been found; a memorandum of Strauss’ conversation with the President, which covered material similar to that with Rusk, is ibid., 033.62A11/6–862.
4. For a record of de Gaulle’s press conference on May 15, see Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964, pp. 172–184.