Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

208. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/5

Pitsunda, August 9, 1963, 10:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador Kohler
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Richard Davis, EUR
  • Mr. Akalovsky, ACDA/IR
• USSR
  • Mr. Khrushchev
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Mr. Vinogradov

SUBJECT

• Part II—Germany and Berlin

Using as a springboard the discussion of the sequence of events leading to a non-aggression pact, Mr. Khrushchev launched into a discussion of Germany and Berlin.¹

He said the USSR believed it would be useful for our two countries and for the world at large to resolve the most difficult, and at the same time the easiest question, because all the difficulties surrounding it were contrived, i.e., that of a peace treaty with Germany. He thought this was both a basic and quarrelsome problem. He thought it was quarrelsome because it reminded him of a story in which some official was asked whether or not he believed in God; the official replied “not at the office but at home”. Thus if one asked the US whether it was for a peace treaty it would reply “in confidence yes, but not in public”. Khrushchev recalled that in his conversation with President Eisenhower he had not gained the impression that the latter was opposed. The same went for De Gaulle, who had only insisted that West Germany should remain part of the Western alliance. To this, Mr. Khrushchev said, he had replied that would be all right and it was West Germany’s own business. As to Germany’s division, De Gaulle had said two parts were fine and three would be even better. However, De Gaulle had said things should be left as they were and we should not hurry as there would be nothing to gain. Yet such a provision could not be understood by the peoples of the world. Also, as Ambassador Thompson would remember, he, Khrushchev, had asked Eisenhower why the US was arming West Germany and thus was creating a dangerous situation. Eisenhower had replied West Germany was competing with the US in the economic field and therefore the US wanted to make West Germany spend money on arms. This, he thought, was a straightforward answer by a soldier. Khrushchev believed it was paradoxical that De Gaulle should be the most negative with regard to the negotiations, for it was De Gaulle who had gone farthest with respect to the question of borders. De Gaulle had stated borders should stay as they were, and he had stated publicly what others only whispered.

Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that if one looked at the US NATO allies Adenauer was the only one to oppose a peace treaty in substance. De Gaulle agreed in substance but was opposed in form. The reason for his opposition was that in struggling against the United States he needed a strong supporter in Europe; therefore, he placed his stakes on Adenauer. While he needed a strong state to support him, De Gaulle had assured the USSR he was against West Germany’s having nuclear weapons and that he did not want war against the Soviet Union. This course was in effect political speculation, but it could provoke bloodshed among the peoples of the world. It was also a sign of imperialist degeneration, but he, Khrushchev, did not wish to get involved in a discussion of this kind now and would prefer to leave this matter aside for awhile.

Khrushchev said that as far as the UK was concerned, the Conserv-atives were in favor but they did not wish to introduce discord in the Western orchestra. The Laborites agreed with the Soviet position on this point. Spaak too had said on several occasions that in those European countries where workers’ parties were in the government the governments were in favor of a peace treaty. Spaak was also in favor of a non-aggression pact and had stated so in public. Denmark, Norway, Holland and Luxembourg held the same position. Thus only West Germany remained, and also France. France was opposed, in the interest of a struggle for leadership in Europe. France wanted to kick the United States out of political leadership in Europe and take its place. However, France was too weak to do so alone and needed West Germany’s support.

Thus Khrushchev believed the United States’ position was the same as that of the UK. If it were not for such speculations by France, the United States could sign a peace treaty. Nothing would be lost although the gain would not be great either, but the cause of peace would benefit and the cold war would be liquidated. Adenauer has now become a leading figure in world politics, because he wanted to impose an aggressive policy on the Western powers; thus victors were now on the leash of the vanquished.

If one were to analyze the Soviet and the US position, Khrushchev continued, one would see that all NATO countries, including Adenauer, had come to the conclusion that borders could not be changed by force now, and were prepared to record this publicly but not formalize it. The objectives of a peace treaty were the same. Ten years after Dulles had spoken of rolling back socialism eastward, the West had recognized this but was not prepared to formalize this juridically. Khrushchev said he did not know what would happen ten years hence, but the USSR and other socialist states might lose patience and sign a peace treaty unilaterally. The US said this would mean war, but he believed the US would have more wisdom than stupidity, because wars were waged only when basic interests were involved. In this case Adenauer’s interests were involved, but then Adenauer might be dead by that time for all of us were mortal.

The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on the situation. First he wanted to make two general observations since they had some bearing on the German problem. He said his deepest impression on this short visit to the Soviet Union was to see Soviet people at work and pursuing their daily affairs. He had also driven by automobile between New York and San Francisco on several occasions and had seen American people at work. On the basis of what he had seen in Moscow, Leningrad, and during his very brief stay here in the south, he had no doubt that the Soviet people, just as the American people, had no greater desire than to work in peace. Therefore, it was up to our respective governments to ensure such opportunity to their peoples. Another observation he wished to make was that, in his view, Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy were perhaps the only people who realized what modern war was. There were others, of course, who knew about the military and other aspects of modern war, but it was Mr. Khrushchev and the President who carried the ultimate responsibility. It was therefore important for the two leaders to find a possibility of collaborating on as many points as possible. The Secretary noted that the President had quoted Mr. Khrushchev’s remarks on the nature of modern war. He continued that our two countries had a common historical background with respect to this situation, although the Soviet Union had perhaps greater experience because it had suffered so much from Hitler’s Germany. However, it was a fundamental fact that our two countries had fought together against Hitler and they must not permit this problem to divide them. A peace treaty as such did not bother us. In 1954, the Western powers had declared solemnly that they would not seek change of the borders by force; while the circumstances in which that declaration had been made were somewhat different, the pledge still stood and this was fundamental.

The Secretary continued that while Mr. Khrushchev might not agree with what he was going to say, he hoped Mr. Khrushchev would take his remarks seriously and accept that we are genuine in our belief. We believed that any settlements if they were to be secure and safe had to be related to the wishes of the peoples involved. The Secretary said he had no sure knowledge of how the East Germans would express themselves if they were permitted to do so, but he believed that if the Soviet Union and we separated the Germans without their consent and then walked away, this would only sow seeds of great danger and perhaps of eventual conflict in Central Europe, because the Germans were restless and wished to organize themselves according to their own desires. We agreed and held the same view as the Soviet Union that the Germans should not have a national nuclear capability; indeed we felt very strongly that there were enough nuclear powers in the world and our strong pursuit of this policy had resulted in considerable strain in our relations with France. We saw no desire whatsoever of having West Germany equipped with nuclear weapons, either through its own efforts or by somebody else.

The Secretary then said this situation should be examined. He believed that if we allowed things to develop in the proper direction, more normal relations would be brought about not only between the two parts of Germany, but also between West Germany and the socialist countries to the east. He wondered whether Mr. Khrushchev would agree that considerable improvement in this respect had already taken place as compared to the situation two or three years ago.

The Secretary also thought we could make some advance in the disarmament field. There were a number of steps which could in a significant and practical way bring us closer to the solution of the real problems of disarmament. Such steps could remove some problems in the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We believed there were difficulties at this time with respect to sweeping disarmament but we could take a number of smaller steps to begin the momentum towards real disarmament. The Secretary hoped that over the next several months points could be found on which agreement could be reached, because whatever the arrangements in Central Europe they were based on the hope for disarmament, and we hoped we could find disarmament arrangements which would apply to both the capitalist and the socialist parts of Europe.

The Secretary believed that the governments of today, indeed all of us, have inherited some problems from the immediate post-war period. Those problems were difficult and each side had inherited its own difficulties. As to the United States, we had withdrawn considerable forces from what was now East Germany and had introduced our forces in West Berlin. We had done so to abide by the provisions of the agreement which had been previously reached with respect to Germany. At that time, some people felt there would be difficulties in connection with our presence in West Berlin and some had insisted that a territorial corridor to West Berlin be established. This had not been pressed because it had been felt that it could be interpreted as lack of confidence in the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the Berlin blockade occurred; after access had been restored, the arrangements were again such as did not reflect lack of confidence in the Soviet Government. Our two sides must find ways of attempting to increase confidence by moving ahead on measures in such fields as humanitarian, trade, and cultural. Steps in these fields would all increase confidence and strengthen the hopes for the future. However, at the moment—perhaps Mr. Khrushchev would agree—acceptance of substantial responsibility by both the Soviet Union and the United States and our presence in Germany was an element of stability and not instability. For we did not know who might do what to whom if we were not there and if we did not accept responsibility for stability and peace in that part of the world.

Mr. Khrushchev nodded but said a peace treaty should nonetheless be signed. The signing of such a treaty was an unavoidable act after any war. He said he agreed with what the Secretary had said, and the Secretary’s remarks contained many reasonable points. However, the conclusion to be drawn was that a peace treaty should be signed. In the absence of such a treaty, there would always be frictions. For example, if one took the GDR, the Western Powers had communications going through the GDR territory, for the use of which the Western Powers did not pay. The GDR was obviously discontented and it could break the cables; what could be done in such a case, for the GDR would have the right to take such action. Furthermore, the US had encouraged West Germany not to pay reparations; even plants which were subject to disassembly and transfer under the Potsdam agreement had not been disassembled or transferred. While other countries, such as East Germany, Rumania, Finland, Hungary, etc., had paid their reparations, West Germany, the richest country of them all and the one most responsible for the war, had not paid and in refusing to do so had leaned on US support.

Khrushchev said the USSR agreed that a peace treaty should state that the way for a reunification of Germany remained open and that each party to the treaty would facilitate this effort. However, we should stand aside and leave it to the two German states to resolve the problem. While he said that we should stand aside, he wished to point out that naturally we had our respective positions and sympathies: the Soviet Union was for the system in East Germany. However, the West could not change the system in the GDR, nor could the Soviet Union change the system in West Germany. It was not as the Secretary had said that the people of the whole of Germany could decide their destiny; it was a question of the peoples in the two German states to decide what their future would be.

Khrushchev continued the West had corns in the GDR. They should be removed so that there would be no temptation to step on them. It was Walter Lippmann who had invented this expression, and it was a wise expression. So, a peace treaty should be signed.

The Secretary observed this was one of the problems. These corns were tempting given the geography of the situation. However, it was important to resist such temptation for it would be hard for us to apologize if our corns were under someone’s foot.

Khrushchev interjected he who stepped on corns apologized but then stepped again grinding his heel. The Secretary observed this was not very polite. Khrushchev asked whether it was polite not to sign a peace treaty and to have corns in foreign territory. The Secretary said we had withdrawn from Thuringia and Saxony to abide faithfully by our agreement. Khrushchev said the USSR did not want West Berlin. West Berlin should be a third German state with a special status to be respected by all.

The Secretary continued that with regard to the principle of unification, that was a very important point and the Chairman himself had said on several occasions that the way should remain open.

Khrushchev commented it was necessary to leave it open.

The Secretary wondered whether it was really important from the Soviets’ viewpoint to ask the two parts of Germany individually about unification, rather than to ask the German people as a whole. In saying this he was not asking that West Germany outvote East Germany, but there was an important difference here. He was not talking in terms of short-range problems or tactics, but rather in terms of long-range problems relating to the Continent. In referring to the Continent, he had in mind what De Gaulle had called Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, i.e., the entire continental area.

Khrushchev believed this matter was not subject to discussion, because both parts of Germany had their governments, their parliaments and elections. The GDR would hold elections in the near future, elections which ensured the most democratic way of soliciting popular opinion. There was no question of asking the two States again. Furthermore, had the US asked the people of Pakistan before it recognized Ayub Khan, who had dismissed the legitimately-elected government and used armed force to seize power. Also, in Guatemala bandits had seized power and thrown out the legitimately-elected president, and they had done so with the support of the US intelligence service. He wondered whether the people of Guatemala had been asked about it. Another example was Diem, who was persecuting the people of Viet Nam; the United States had recognized Diem without consulting the people, but if it were to ask the people, both Diem and the United States would be kicked out. Therefore, we should not dwell on this matter. He wished to add, however, that the United States had voted with force: it had used force to kick out the British and it had been right in doing so. The USSR had done the same; it had kicked out the White Guards and the US, UK, and Polish interventionists who had been helping the Whites. Thus, peoples had their own ways of settling their affairs. He would suggest that we do not get involved in such a discussion, because that would only lead us into a jungle. He wished to note, however, that nobody had asked the Spanish people about Franco; this bandit-like government had seized power without anybody’s consulting the will of the people. There were many governments like this.

The Secretary pointed out there was substantial difference between situations where the form of government was an internal matter, and, of course, we could have a lively discussion about many governments in the world, and the situation, such as the one under discussion, where the question was what was the state, who was to live where, and who was to live together or separately. He believed the people had to be asked these questions.

Mr. Khrushchev said he wished to interrupt the Secretary and make an unpleasant point. Under the 1954 agreement all of Viet Nam had to have elections four years later. However, the US had not allowed those elections. Consequently the US was interpreting this problem in a mercantile way, namely, it regarded as democratic everything that was profitable.

The Secretary continued he did not wish to press this point, for he realized that Mr. Khrushchev had his own position and that as much as he regretted it, it did not appear to be possible to resolve this particular point this morning.

Khrushchev agreed and suggested it would be better to put this matter aside. He did not believe the Secretary’s and his efforts would be sufficient to resolve the problem and thought history would have to come to assistance.

Khrushchev then suggested that the discussion should turn to more innocent matters, such as trade (covered in part III of the memorandum of conversation).²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was approved in S on August 28. The meeting was held at Khrushchev’s dacha. A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 53 from Moscow, August 9. (Ibid., ORG 7 S)
1. In the previous discussion Khrushchev, after expressing satisfaction about the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, said that it would be useful to move ahead on other questions and added that a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact was a question that could be easily solved. Rusk then reiterated the U.S. position that a non-aggression pact should come at the end of the road after issues like Laos and Berlin had been resolved, but stated that the United States would discuss the question with its Allies. (Memorandum of conversation, US/MC/4; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev/Rusk)
2. Part III on trade is printed in vol. V, Document 210; Part IV on Laos is printed in vol. XXIV, Document 484.