244. Telegram From the Embassy in Finland to the Department of State0
163. CODEL Johnson. Vice President accompanied by Ambassador met with President Kekkonen, Prime Minister Karjalainen and Foreign Ministry representatives for over an hour this morning. Embassy view of session well stated by Prime Minister, who told Ambassador at luncheon, “the talks were most helpful. Most useful. President Kekkonen was delighted.”
Following is uncleared memcon subject to amendment upon review:
Finland’s relations with the Soviets and the West—after brief discussion of Vice President’s program during preceding hours, President Kekkonen stressed his appreciation for President Kennedy’s understanding of Finland’s foreign policy, expressed during Kekkonen’s visit [Page 502] to Washington. He took Vice President’s visit as proof of that understanding. Kekkonen pointed out that even though Finnish Government crisis in progress, it did not inhibit foreign or economic policy discussions since in these fields changes of government had no effect.
Vice President stated that Kennedy administration’s most stressing objective was search for world peace and that this was basis of President Kennedy’s comprehension of Finland’s neutrality policy. However, President Kennedy was equally anxious that Finland remain strong in order to defend itself. Vice President stressed US belief that only the strong can be free and independent. Kekkonen agreed with statement but explained that Finland felt question of global war or peace was beyond its competence. Therefore Finland concentrated on building economic strength; it must continue to increase living standards in order that Soviets not overtake it and win Finnish workers to Communist ideology. Unemployment was therefore Finland’s gravest danger—particularly among industrial workers, among whom 10,000 unemployed more dangerous than 100,000 foresters or farmers without work.
Vice President reaffirmed President Kennedy’s explicit recognition of Finland’s right to follow policy of avoiding entangling alliances. He stated that US wanted every country to be as free to choose its policy as in US. Although present post-test ban treaty atmosphere was encouraging, progress depended on continued maintenance of our strength. Vice President promised US would remain strong and cautious in pursuit of peace. In return he asked that Finland continue its efforts to avoid entanglements with either side during any period of more relaxed East-West relations.
President Kekkonen responded that Finland would continue this policy regardless of whether tension in East-West relations lessened. Finland would maintain its independence in either event. In fact Finland’s determination was so solid that Finns were surprised when foreign statesmen sought reassurance on this point. Vice President pointed out that under type of pressure characteristic of October Cuban crisis it was not easy to forecast how even most confident individuals might react. Kekkonen replied that if Cuba had led to war, all policies and all resolves would have counted for naught.
Trade and aid problems—President Kekkonen asked Vice President to bring to attention of American Government question of AID competition with Finnish efforts to sell paper mill machinery to Turkey. He explained Finnish grievance that after three years of negotiation, when Turks were ready to agree to sale financed by a 10-year aid loan, AID by offering 20 year credit at lower interest had broken up negotiation. Ambassador Seppala confirmed President’s statements.
[Page 503]Kekkonen continued that in another similar case involving Pakistan, Finland feared repetition of this episode.
Ambassador Rowan asserted AID not deliberately trying to undercut Finland. We trying bolster specific sector Turkish economy. Turks had indicated it not really economically desirable take short-term proposal of Finns.
Kekkonen stated Finland could not perceive logic in US urging other developed countries to help LDCs and then wasting its own resources by undercutting aid attempts so inspired. Finland would like to take matter up in Washington through Ambassador Seppala and perhaps by sending special emissary to hold talks with US Government.
Vice President expressed his willingness to set up such meeting. He stated American policy in case of Turkish paper mill was that issue was for Turks to decide. If Turkey preferred to change from an inefficient government paper mill to privately owned one, that was its privilege. However, Vice President said, whichever choice was made there should be opportunity for Finnish bids to be offered. Kekkonen agreed this policy was reasonable. It might be that Turkish mill matter was too far along to be reversed, but he hoped that discussions could avoid future problems. Vice President then reaffirmed American willingness to discuss matter fully in Washington, which Kekkonen agreed to gratefully.
Turning briefly to other trade matters, Kekkonen stated that Finnish trade figures during last two years showed good progress. Vice President jokingly declared that if such successful roving salesman as Kekkonen visited America again, America’s balance of payments might be damaged to such degree we would have to seek Finnish aid. Kekkonen interjected humorously that he hoped this would take place. Vice President expressed US intention to send trade mission to Finland in May 1964 and to study possibility of participation in a trade fair in Finland in September 1964.
Kekkonen welcomed this news, pointing out also that during 1961 US share of Finland’s trade rose from seventh place to fifth, surpassing France and Netherlands. Vice President noted that last year US imported $60 million worth of Finnish goods and exported $58 million worth. Vice President also noted that trade is great tool of freedom, explaining that this was why liberal trade policy was essential part of American foreign policy. Protectionism was incompatible with these principles, for which President Kennedy had fought so successfully in last year’s Trade Expansion Act.
Post test-ban treaty prospects—Vice President then solicited Kekkonen’s evaluation of Soviets’ attitude since signature of test-ban treaty, paying tribute to Kekkonen’s experience with Soviets. Kekkonen expressed his opinion forcefully that treaty indicated considerable change [Page 504] in political atmosphere in USSR. Adzhubei in his visit to Finland earlier in week had confirmed this also. In Kekkonen’s opinion, Soviet fear of horrible war had forced them to abandon it as tool of policy.
Pointing out that the sobering effect of the Cuban crisis on both Eastern and Western leaders, the Vice President asked whether it or the crisis in USSR-Chinese Communist relations had contributed to this change. Kekkonen responded that Cuban crisis had brought Soviet leaders to edge of abyss and they saw they could not continue on prior course. Split with Chinese Communists had helped too. Kekkonen believed turn away from military solutions was fundamental change in Soviet attitude.
He quoted Adzhubei as saying Khrushchev had “turned Soviet policy completely around.” Kekkonen was confident Soviets would not use violence against Finland. Therefore, Finland must strengthen its economy to prevent USSR undercutting democracy’s appeal with workers. Vice President reminded him that this entailed also watching constantly to avoid becoming dependent on USSR in fuel supply or in any other field. Kekkonen replied that Finland naturally aware of this. He pointed out that Finland’s trade with Soviet bloc constituted less than 20 percent of total trade.
Vice President inquired whether Finnish Communist Party was likely to profit from post-test-ban treaty atmosphere. Kekkonen replied to contrary. Many of non-Communist parties expected to gain more. Finnish Communists had not gained prestige from treaty. In fact, because of Soviet-ChiCom split it had great trouble within itself; only recently had pro-ChiCom old guard been defeated and party brought firmly to Soviet side in this dispute. Kekkonen stated that Soviets never deal with Finnish Government through Finnish Party. Finnish Communists resented this treatment and at recent Party rally someone in the rear had shouted accusation that Khrushchev was toying with workers and dealing behind their backs with non-Communists.
As to USSR’s next step after treaty, Kekkonen forecast that Soviets would press for agreement on plan to prevent surprise attacks and for Warsaw Pact–NATO non-aggression pact. He added that German question of course remained on agenda. Asked which treaty Soviets would seek first, Kekkonen said that he could not predict, but he believed they were moving steadily toward both and that if satisfactory arrangements were made in these fields, German question could probably be deferred. On other hand if no progress were made German question would become acute.
Questioned by the Vice President about [garble—Sov?] attitude in recent months following Cuban crisis, Kekkonen remarked that Adzhubei had shown great appreciation for President Kennedy. Kekkonen had been surprised at emphasis Adzhubei had given this view. [Page 505] Kekkonen had concluded in view of this circumstance that President Kennedy’s untiring and responsible search for world peace had made great contribution and was finding sure response.
Other topics—Vice President commended Ambassador Seppala’s services to US-Finnish relations and congratulated Finnish Government on Finland’s record in the UN. Vice President expressed deep appreciation for warm welcome given him and his party by Finland’s government, people, and press.
Vice President concluded meeting by concisely summarizing topics covered and consensus reached, which Kekkonen accepted fully.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US (Johnson). Confidential. Vice President Johnson visited Finland during a September 2–17 trip to the Scandinavian countries.↩