Office of the Historian

188. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Grant) to the President’s Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles)0

Washington, February 6, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Objectives of your Visit to the United Arab Republic

Pursuant to your request I submit the following as an addendum to the briefing papers previously prepared regarding objectives to be sought and particular points to be discussed in your conversations with President Nasser.

Essentially what we envisage is (a) progress toward the establishment of mutual confidence; (b) the planting of certain of our ideas in Nasser’s mind; (c) learning something of Nasser’s feelings and intentions; and (d) your recommendation whether the President should invite Nasser for a state visit in April or delay until after the election. Thus, we do not look for specific commitments but rather for creation of a platform of mutual confidence from which further discussions and, hopefully, a direct confrontation between Nasser and President Kennedy might be launched.

In this connection, we hope you can make Nasser understand the following points: [Page 466]

1.
Our confidence in Ambassador Badeau (who will accompany you).
2.
Our desire for cooperation to the extent that the UAR also desires it.
3.
Our acceptance of UAR neutrality provided it is truly neutral.
4.
Our world objectives and approaches to them.
5.
That we are quietly confident of our military posture.
6.
The constancy and magnitude of our assistance despite pressures against us.
7.
Nasser’s opportunity for genuine statesmanship as a neutral and damage he does to his image by extremism; he should realize the UAR is independent and without challenge to its independence.
8.
That his freedom to be neutral depends on the economic, cultural and military strength of the West.
9.
That UK interests in Middle East are confined to Persian Gulf and South Arabian protectorates. No internal support in UK for another Suez or other adventures in Middle East.
10.
Need for stability and development in Near East; West is not pushing Fertile Crescent scheme and does not intend to.
11.
Strenuous efforts of US to maintain impartiality between Arabs and Israelis and also as between Arab states.
12.
Mischief-making of Sino-Soviet Bloc keeping area upset; false documents and rumors.
13.
Objectives of our African policy.
14.
Our support for concepts social reform and social justice, and positive contributions of our system thereto.

The following are points upon which we would like Nasser’s frank views:

1.
Depth and source of UAR jitters over its security, means to alleviate.
2.
Nasser’s view of his relations with the West, present and future; need for good relations with Western Europe if UAR development needs are to be met.
3.
UAR intentions versus Israel and reasons for increasing its armaments; attitude toward Dimona Reactor and Jordan Waters.
4.
UAR objectives vis-à-vis Iran and other Arab states.
5.
UAR African policy.
6.
UAR view of Kuwait impasse.

We would suggest the following tactics be used in connection with Nasser and others:1

2.
Care and deliberation in use of words; Nasser’s English is not the best.
3.
Care not to interfere in intra-Arab affairs.
4.
Avoidance of serious concern at Soviet role in UAR.
5.
Avoidance of details of US aid and UAR desires.
6.
Avoidance of proposals for Near East arms limitation (presently not practicable for internal political reasons in UAR).
7.
Concentration on what we hope for the future, rather than on troubles of past.
8.
Full opportunity to Nasser and others to express their point of view.
9.
A relaxed approach since Nasser will likely be prepared to spend several hours with you.
10.
Engage in wide-range discussion of problems on first meeting; attempt in second meeting to summarize and conclude bringing out points of difference and points of agreement.

As regards dealing with other personalities, we would attach considerable importance to talks with Vice Presidents Baghdadi and Muhieddin, with whom you can be frank. Foreign Minister Fawzi is reliable, though not influential. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/2–662. Secret. Drafted by Strong and Barrow. Additional briefing material, entitled “Suggested Points for Discussion by Ambassador Bowles with Senior Officials in the United Arab Republic,” attached to the source text, is not printed. It contained a series of papers on key trouble spots in other parts of the world, disarmament, neutralism, Africa, U.S. policy toward the Middle East, and U.S.-UAR relations.↩
  2. Subparagraph 1, which reads: “Utter frankness,” has been crossed out.↩