Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

272. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State⁰

Rome, May 15, 1962, 8 p.m.

3044. For Talbot and Cleveland from Joseph Johnson. Johnson and Moe met with Israeli Foreign Minister Meir for about two and one-half hours on May 10, one and one-half hours on the 11th, and with Prime Minister Ben Gurion for an hour on the twelfth. Raphael, Yaari and Arad of the Foreign Office were present during the two meetings with the Foreign Minister, and the first two with the Prime Minister. Moe also met informally with Arad at Arad’s request after the second meeting with the Foreign Minister. The main points Johnson gave as his impressions from his Arab talks were as follows:

(A) He had in each meeting with the Arabs explained that his mission was not only limited to paragraph 11, but circumscribed by the fact that as a UN official he could not recommend anything that would threaten the independence of Israel, a full-fledged UN member. No Arab statesman took exception to this as a proper definition by Johnson of his mission.

(B) All the Arabs had told him in various ways that war on Israel by the Arabs would be folly and he believed they were sincere. On the other hand they had serious fears of Israeli expansion or aggression.

(C) None of them showed any disposition to respond favorably to the Israeli “feeler” that Johnson had transmitted concerning some form of mutual declarations of non-aggression.

(D) All had insisted in conformity with the Riyadh resolution that Israel must accept paragraph 11 in principle and none had expressed a willingness to accept Johnson’s ideas even as a basis for discussion before such acceptance. Johnson told Mrs. Meir he believed that this was largely because for internal and inter-Arab political reasons they could not afford to appear to “sell out” and that the failure to accept could not yet be definitely characterized as rejection.

(E) They acknowledged when reminded that the phrase “live at peace with their neighbors” had significance but they felt that it did not imply a prior undertaking by refugees rather that the attitude of returnees would depend on their treatment by Israel.

(F) Despite the generally negative tone he had the feeling that there was or would be if the repatriation point could be met in some reasonable fashion a greater willingness in the Arab countries to consider his suggestions for implementing paragraph 11 than in Israel. (This impression was based largely on Johnson’s strong, though unexpressed, conclusion that the whole tenor in Israel’s stand from last September to that point had been to parade every possible argument for doing nothing.)

At the first meeting with the Foreign Minister, Johnson made the first five points above and only touched on (F). He received essentially another long speech from the Foreign Minister on Israel’s security problems. At the second meeting largely in order to crystallize the issues he emphasized (F). This gave the Israelis a jolt and they made some effort to contend that there had been a change in Johnson’s attitude or position between the two meetings. The Foreign Minister specifically expressed disappointment although the meeting ended on a friendly basis personally. Arad later told Moe in some heat that Johnson’s comparisons disadvantageous to Israel might lead to a stormy session with Ben Gurion. It is clear, however, that while they resent the idea of comparisons, responsible Israelis want to avoid appearing publicly to be an obstacle to progress, and cooler heads prevailed.

Ben Gurion, well briefed by Raphael, received Johnson very warmly. He opened the meeting with a summary of what he understood were Johnson’s main points from the previous two meetings with the Foreign Minister. He asked if his summary was accurate. Johnson said it was in substance though a little sharper and less shaded than what he had actually said. Ben Gurion then said that despite the fact that Israel had no moral obligation to help solve the refugee problem Israel wanted to help as this could be a step to peace and accordingly he asked Johnson what specifically he wanted from Israel now.

Johnson replied that at this point he was only asking Israel to agree to think through seriously in cooperation with him to see if it would not be possible to develop a workable scheme along the lines he had suggested. He described in some detail his ideas as in his Working Paper 5, introducing for the first time the idea that Israel agree to examine repatriation applications “in good faith”. He emphasized his view that the scheme would have to be in harmony with paragraph 11, make clear present realities to the refugees and safeguard Israel. Referring as in the two meetings with the Foreign Minister to the difficulties that open and formal undertakings would present to the Arabs (and might present to Israel) on certain issues he stressed the possible value of the concepts of acquiescence and tacit acceptance.

Ben Gurion said he still did not understand what Johnson wanted and launched into a fervent exposition of Israel’s danger repeating much that had been heard in all sessions in 1961 and this year with the Foreign Minister and from himself last year, and emphasizing that Israel must be the sole judge in these matters. Johnson acknowledged the last, while reserving his right to try to persuade Israel on specific points in connection with the development in detail of any scheme. He tried again to explain what he wanted and this time Ben Gurion seemed to understand better. He confirmed Meir’s earlier statement that “Israel had never said not a single refugee could return”, but said there were two limitations: (A) There could be no “free choice”; and (B) There could be no repatriation without resettlement.

Johnson explained the difference between “free choice” and “preferences”, and acknowledged (B) saying (without contradiction) that this statement—repeated soon afterward—gave him hope as he assumed this was a two-way idea, namely that if the Arabs agreed to do something on resettlement, Israel would on repatriation. He concluded with an appeal that the same imagination and creativity that Israel had shown on other problems be applied to this refugee problem, not to solve it, but to dissolve it.

The meeting concluded on this note having been on a friendly plane throughout with occasional moments of humor. Raphael confirmed to Moe later that Ben Gurion retained his high opinion of Johnson and that the formulation “dissolve” had intrigued him. The parting note with Raphael was the importance of continuing to work at the problem and assurances that Israel would give serious thought to this.

Reinhardt

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/5–1562. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and USUN.