Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel⁰

Washington, May 24, 1962, 7:08 p.m.

755. In informal conversations with Department¹ and Defense² this week Shimon Peres laid groundwork for new GOI approach for US concessions in military field. Without going into details he told Department officials Israel hopes for US assistance in meeting financial burden of increased armament; reconsideration USG’s refusal to sell Hawk missiles; and accelerated consideration Israel’s requests to purchase conventional military equipment. He made same points to DOD officers and in addition suggested closer US identification with Israel military.

Peres based his case on growing military strength UAR and alleged conviction Nasser is committed to strike at Israel when he has achieved sufficient arms superiority. He referred to UAR’s access to MIG-21s and Soviet naval vessels or equipment as evidence Nasser is making substantial strides towards military superiority goal. Peres said that expanded US assistance to UAR increases Israel’s security problem in that it enables Nasser continue rearmament program with USSR while dealing with critical domestic economic problems. Inasmuch as Israel thus directly affected, he argued, US should make compensatory gesture on Israel’s behalf.

Under Secretary McGhee expressed understanding Israel’s apprehensions arising from its exposed position but commented US has great respect for Israel’s military competence and estimates it as being match for some time to come for any Arab combination. He remarked US has no evidence beyond propaganda statements that Arabs contemplating military move against Israel. He also pointed out that any drastic increase in Israeli armament, particularly to more sophisticated weapons, would likely result in corresponding increase in UAR possibly leading to uncontrolled escalation which might add to rather than decrease instability in region.

USG representatives made no commitment to Peres, although he was informed USG willing to study question of air defense once more.

In conversation with McGhee and Talbot, Peres made frank defense of retaliatory raid as valuable instrument Israel policy. Such raids, he said, employed when Israel is convinced local incidents such as recent Lake Tiberias conflict have central government instigation. He cited relative calm since raid as proof this policy’s efficacy and disagreed with Talbot’s remark that UN agencies’ efforts were principal factor. McGhee and Talbot both questioned not only propriety but efficacy of retaliatory raid policy, McGhee observing that UAR decision to embark on major increase in defense with Soviet assistance appears to have been a result of such a raid.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5/5–2462. Secret. Drafted by Hamilton on May 23; cleared by Tucker (DOD/ISA) in substance, Talbot, and Pezzullo (S/S); and approved by McGhee. Repeated to London, Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Amman, and Jerusalem.
1. Peres met with McGhee on May 21. The memorandum of conversation on the Near East arms balance is ibid., 784A.56/5–2162; that on Israel’s retaliatory raid policy is ibid., 784A.00/5–2162. Peres then met separately with Talbot on Israel’s arms requirements (memorandum of conversation, May 21; ibid., 784A.5/5–2162) and with Strong (memorandum of conversation, May 23; ibid., 784A.86B/5–2362).
2. See Document 273.