160. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
There’s more smoke than fire in Joe Alsop’s reputed line that Nasser is going to invade Saudi Arabia and that the Pentagon is raring to use the Sixth Fleet but the softheads in the State Department are opposed.
We’ve already done a lot to deter the UAR from escalating. We’ve had destroyers visit Saudi port, bombers flying in, now a Special Forces team is there. We’ve warned Nasser again not to step on our toes. As to Pentagon eagerness, however, when State tried to get them to agree to station a fighter unit in Saudi Arabia if the Saudis would agree to lay off in Yemen, Taylor, the JCS, and Nitze were opposed (and still are). A quick check indicates no identifiable warhawks in the Pentagon.
True, Nasser may still try greater pressure on Saudis, but Faysal is asking for it. We’ve consistently estimated (dead right so far) that Nasser would escalate rather than quit in Yemen. He’s already resumed bombings, and we discovered UAR parachute drop of supplies to presumed [Page 353] partisans in Hejaz. Some in CIA think UAR may try to promote a revolution in the Hejaz or a raid on Saudi supply dumps.
We’re warning Nasser again, and trying to get fighter offer to Faysal agreed to by DOD. But to commit ourselves to take on Nasser in defense of Faysal’s right to intervene covertly in Yemen seems folly: (1) it would be unpopular with most Arabs except Faysal and Hussein—it would outrage Iraqis and Algerians; (2) it would thrust Nasser back on the Soviets—and he can cause a lot more trouble if he’s against us than if we have an “in” with him; (3) it would only confirm Faysal in his idea that we’ll bail him out if his scheme to bleed Nasser in Yemen leads to retaliation.
Painful and uncertain as it is, I see no alternative to our present effort to damp down the Yemen affair, by working on Faysal as well as warning off Nasser. We must make any commitments to Faysal dependent on his willingness to play ball. Instead of fiddling around in Yemen Faysal needs to shore himself up domestically as the chief means of protecting himself against Nasser virus. In the long run we won’t save our oil just by giving Faysal a blank check on us. Nor will we necessarily lose it if we let Faysal get bloodied a bit.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, Vol. I. Secret. An attached note from Komer to President Kennedy reads: “When Joe Alsop sees you today he may blast off on Yemen. Attached is a rundown on our current efforts. I’d add that the YAR/UAR seems to be winning again, the new Iraqi team apparently offered troops to help (SENSITIVE), and that now is no time to choose up sides in an inter-Arab quarrel.”↩