176. Editorial Note
On March 4, 1963, during a 70-minute meeting with President Nasser in Cairo, Ambassador Badeau delivered the oral message from President Kennedy contained in Document 175. Badeau also executed instructions contained in telegram 1653 to Cairo, March 3, that he emphasize to Nasser U.S. concern over UAR air attacks on Saudi Arabia and the detrimental implications that continued UAR military involvement in Yemen had on the disengagement process and U.S. Congressional support for economic assistance to the UAR. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN) Badeau reported on the conversation in telegram 1379 from Cairo, March 5. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) For text, see the Supplement, the compilation on Yemen.
A summary of the highlights of the conversation, prepared in the Department of State for the information of the White House, but not sent, reads as follows:
“1. Yemen
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“a. Ambassador Badeau emphasized:
- “(1) the tolerance we had displayed toward UAR activities in Yemen;
- “(2) our determination to protect our vital interests and uphold the integrity of Saudi Arabia;
- “(3) that UAR violations of the Saudi border were prejudicial to the Bunker–Bunche mission and pushing us perilously close to activating our commitments to Saudi Arabia.
“Ambassador Badeau apparently did not put forward our proposal that the UAR make an initial cut in its forces simultaneously with a temporary Saudi suspension of support to the royalists as a means of getting a disengagement process started. However President Nasser himself held open the possibility that if the currently stepped-up UAR military offensive to end the situation succeeds some UAR withdrawal from Yemen might be effected.
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“b. In his reply President Nasser emphasized:
- “(1) The bombardments were not intended as deliberate provocation but were an integral and successful element of UAR military strategy;
- “(2) Every day of continued Yemen fighting meant loss of UAR lives and as leader of the country he could not escape responsibility;
- “(3) That the UAR could not wait another five months for disengagement;
- “(4) When Ambassador Badeau underscored the souring political effect of these attacks, Nasser promised, however, to order Marshal Amer to suspend trans-border activities pending the outcome of the Bunche–Bunker efforts which Ambassador Badeau stated would consume about two weeks.
“2. UAR Clandestine Radio
“Ambassador Badeau indicated we knew the location of the UAR clandestine radio and suggested termination of broadcasts which are doing great harm to US–UAR relations. Nasser tacitly acknowledged responsibility but gave no commitment regarding termination.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 YEMEN)
On March 5, Komer sent Bundy a note suggesting that when Bundy showed Kennedy telegram 1379 from Cairo he also give the President the following memorandum from Komer to Kennedy. Komer added, “I’m a bit worried by Badeau’s pitch.” Komer’s proposed memorandum to the President reads as follows:
“Nasser’s reply (Cairo 1379) to your warning is just about as responsive as could be expected. After justifying his bombings as intended merely to cut off Saudi gun-running rather than to overthrow Faysal, he in effect says he’ll hold off further attacks for a few weeks to give our mediation efforts a chance.
“This may in fact only postpone our confrontation with Nasser, but it’s hard to see how he could have said more. His answer also shows that our new policy has given us leverage with him.
“It’s a pity that Badeau rested his argument so heavily on our need for time for Bunker and Bunche efforts. If these stall, Nasser can argue that he’s entitled to resume. But we’ll now push hardest to turn Faysal off.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Correspondence)
On March 8, Badeau sent to Nasser’s office a copy of the memorandum of the March 5 conversation with a letter from Badeau to Nasser informing him, on instructions from the U.S. Government, of the following:
“Although Dr. Ralph Bunche has returned to the United States, the United States Government does not consider that his mission has been terminated. It has reason to believe that he will either be received in Saudi Arabia or will hold discussions with Saudi Arabian representatives in New York. Ambassador Bunker will also continue his efforts in Saudi Arabia.
“In view of the above, the United States Government considers that the United Arab Republic’s commitment to cease attacks on the soil of Saudi Arabia continues in operation. It considers that this commitment applies to every type of indirect and direct action (including naval) and not simply to aerial bombardment.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 SAUD–UAR)