Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

220. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts⁰

Washington, December 8, 1962, 5:44 p.m.

1066. Following is summary of conclusions of Harriman Mission to India:

1. India now recognizes Red China as its principal and long-term enemy, but is less clear about long-term threat of Soviet communism as imperialistic force.

2. Majority of Pakistanis consider India primary enemy of Pakistan. Notable exceptions are Ayub and some of immediate entourage who recognize communist north the long-term threat.

3. Dramatic reaction in Pakistan to US military assistance to India has at least in part been encouraged by Pakistan’s leaders, including Ayub, as device for bringing pressure on US and in attempt achieve certain internal political objectives.

4. Only settlement Kashmir can change attitude of Pakistan towards India. There is some movement at least on Indian side towards easing tensions between two countries. Ayub appears believe there is unusual opportunity reach accommodation on Kashmir which, though unpopular with Pakistanis, will be acceptable. Ministerial talks must be encouraged by US and UK. We should continue press both governments persistently to move towards each other even if there some resentment this by both.

5. Indian leadership undergoing changes which should be encouraged. Malevolent influence Krishna Menon officially removed and Nehru’s overpowering stature and freedom of action has been diminished to a point which permits rise of younger, more dynamic, generally more pragmatic leadership to top.

6. India is now determined to build and maintain larger military establishment. This determination, and degree of our association with it, are already producing increasing strains on subcontinent. Settlement with Pakistan could produce significant strengthening subcontinent against Communist China.

7. Indian Armed Fores suffered severely under Krishna Menon. Indian Army has shaken up senior commands and is restoring leadership competence. Caliber of fighting men continues good and morale not seriously impaired. Army’s plans for build-up appear soundly conceived and within its capacity execute with outside help. The Air Force effective at operational level, still has weaknesses at top. Effectiveness its plan for expansion requires considerable study by US and UK.

8. While India will not accept Chinese “cease-fire” plan, it will probably minimize provocation for resumption hostilities in near future. There is no guarantee Chinese will not initiate new fighting and we must be prepared for surprise Chinese attacks at times and places of their own choosing.

9. In case of further Chinese attacks, Indians should be in position use tactical air. This will require major political decision by GOI and may involve certain contingent arrangements for supplemental US and preferably Commonwealth air activity.

10. It doubtful India can rapidly expand defense production beyond simpler ordnance items. We will need more study before we can decide on degree to which India’s intermediate requirements can be met from own resources. We should discourage India from attempting production of sophisticated military equipment and encourage concentration on feasible ordnance items.

11. India’s diplomatic and propaganda efforts have been inept. Senior officials realize this and are correcting shortcomings. US and UK should discreetly assist.

12. India’s “non-alignment” policy will undergo considerable substantive reinterpretation in manner favorable our interests. However, we should not seek formal association of India with US or West in general. Formal Western guaranty would tend diminish extent Indian effort and force a break with Soviet Union, bringing Soviet Union closer to Red China. However, there is great value in strengthening Commonwealth association both India and Pakistan.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1591/12-862. Secret. Drafted by Schneider, cleared in substance with FE, and approved by Talbot. Sent to Kabul, Kathmandu, Colombo, Karachi, New Delhi, Moscow, Rangoon, London, Paris, Hong Kong, Djakarta, Phnom Penh, Cairo, and Accra.