Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

317. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, October 22, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Mission to the Congo
• September 25–October 19, 1962
• Accompanied by Mr. Wayne Fredericks

Purpose:

To support United States policy in the Congo: achievement of the unity of the Congo under a moderate, stable Central Government through support of the United Nations Mission there. In particular, to further the Secretary General’s Reconciliation Plan as the most likely way of achieving reintegration of Katanga into the Congo.

Immediate Objectives:

With Tshombe.

(1) To convince Tshombe, through direct representation from you and the Secretary in a friendly and conciliatory way, of the firmness of United States support of the Plan and of our determination to see the Plan through, without directly threatening him with forceful measures.

(2) To obtain assurances from him that he accepts the Plan and is willing to carry it out without delay and without the injection of contingencies or procedural blocks.

(3) To secure his agreement to certain specific steps, both under the Plan and in support of it, which could be undertaken immediately.

(4) To convince him that we will in our policy toward him be guided only by his actions—not his promises, and that we have set his performance in following through on certain specific undertakings as a standard for judging his willingness and ability to carry out the Plan.

With Adoula.

(1) To assure Adoula of United States support in the carrying out of the Plan and, without being any more specific than necessary, that in the event the Plan fails after he has made every possible effort to carry it out, that we will back him with stronger measures.

(2) To persuade him to consult with Tshombe with respect to the Constitution to the end of securing Tshombe’s agreement or, failing this, to remove the Constitution as an issue in the carrying out of the Plan.

(3) To persuade him to be as forthcoming as possible in negotiations with Tshombe, and in meeting Tshombe halfway in whatever gestures the latter makes, to the end that maximum forward movement is made with respect to the Plan.

Strategy:

An essential element in the strategy pursued was not only to further specific steps under the Plan which are now ready for agreement and execution, but to initiate such parallel actions which would contribute to the forward movement sought. Hopefully this would have the effect of involving Katanga and the Central Government in cooperative actions which would further the integration and conciliation process, and provide a momentum which would facilitate resolution of the difficult issues to be faced under the Plan.

Progress Achieved:

With respect to the Plan.

(1) Tshombe agreed that he would not, as he had hitherto done, set the promulgation of a Constitution favorable to himself as a prior condition to carrying out other aspects of the Plan.

(2) Tshombe agreed that he would facilitate the work of the Commissions and recognize that their purpose is to assure action under the Plan.

(3) Agreement was initialled by both sides covering a standstill and Tripartite Observation Teams. Tshombe agreed to oath-taking by his gendarmerie contingent on a suitable amnesty by Adoula. Action was, however, halted by Adoula’s disavowal based on his internal political difficulties but ostensibly on the basis that the agreements were not fully responsive to his position which had not been properly communicated to his representatives by the United Nations.

(4) Tshombe agreed that he would make a token payment of two million dollars foreign exchange and two million dollars revenue, which was deprecated but not spurned by Adoula. Considerable progress was made on procedural arrangements both in the Revenue and Foreign Exchange Commissions.

(5) Adoula revealed the Constitution drafted by United Nations experts to a meeting of all Provincial Presidents, except Tshombe who declined to be present, but indicated that he did not back the Constitution in its entirety and that it could be changed during its consideration in the Parliament.

Outside the Plan.

(1) Tshombe agreed to and in fact did on October 27 open the Lubilash Bridge and send two carloads of copper to Matadi with the understanding that taxes would be paid to the Central Government on export in the usual way. Agreement was indicated that if this shipment was satisfactory the traditional percentage of Katanga copper would be shipped by this route.

(2) Tshombe agreed to the opening of telecommunications between Elisabethville and Léopoldville, which was in fact done on October 15 and is still in effect.

(3) Adoula agreed to the opening of the Elisabethville Airport to direct flights and although this has not yet been accomplished, immigration and customs officials have been sent to Elisabethville by the Central Government for this purpose and the necessary Katanga personnel have been recruited.

Immediate Obstacles:

(1) Adoula has, as a result of strong political opposition, denounced the standstill agreement and suspended further negotiations. In his final statement to me, however, he promised to resume negotiations.

(2) Fighting between the ANC and Gendarme continues in North Katanga, reportedly accompanied by bombing by the Katanga Air Force and irregular fighting instituted by Munongo, Katanga Minister. Both sides blame the other for the continued fighting.

(3) The Military Commission, having been diverted by the standstill negotiations, has not yet faced the many issues which it must resolve before integration of forces can be achieved.

(4) The Revenue and Foreign Exchange Commissions have not yet faced the difficult question of the division as between the two parties. Firm offers have been made by Katangese of twenty-five percent Revenue and Foreign Exchange and there is admission on the part of the Central Government that some compromise below the fifty percent provision in the Plan will be required.

Over-all Evaluation:

(1) The major task in carrying out the Plan lies ahead. There is no firm basis for assurance that it can be accomplished. The parties are deeply divided, not only on specific issues but by traditional rivalries and suspicions. There is no basis for confidence between them.

(2) Some forward movement has, however, been accomplished with respect to the Plan and particularly through initiation of parallel activities outside the Plan which involve cooperation between the two parties. Hopefully, if these activities can be carried forward, sufficient momentum may be attained to resolve the more difficult issues remaining under the Plan.

(3) In view of the above, and the risks involved in application of stronger measures of coercion against Tshombe, it is believed that we should for the time being continue our present policy of attempting to carry out the Plan by agreement between the parties.

(4) In the course of carrying out the Plan, it may become apparent that even though it cannot be accomplished in its entirety, that sufficient progress can be made to achieve a modus vivendi politically acceptable to Adoula and which may offer sufficient promise for the future to be acceptable to the United Nations and ourselves.

(5) If there is not progress under the Plan shortly, Adoula may be forced by the dissident elements in his own Cabinet to seek a more drastic solution to the Katanga problem, or his government may be overthrown by more radical political elements in the Congo. Before this occurs our present plan must be reevaluated and a suitable alternative found.

Recommended Actions:

(1) Attempt to persuade both Adoula and Tshombe to accept the Secretary General’s appeal for a standstill without negotiating a formal agreement and put into immediate effect Tripartite Observation Teams to ensure an end to the fighting in North Katanga.

(2) Encourage both sides to assure that their delegates in the Military, Revenue and Foreign Exchange Commissions negotiate flexibly so the remaining problems facing these commissions can be worked out as expeditiously as possible.

(3) Keep pressure on both parties to continue to carry out the cooperative arrangements taken outside the Plan and to put into effect additional similar projects.

(4) Move to improve United Nations operations in the Congo by:

(a) Stepping up the UN contribution to the overall import program to assure a minimum level of $100,000,000 of imports in the next six months, by inducing other nations to match contributions by the United States;

(b) Improving UN administration by putting in UN budget control at the Provincial level and UN specialists in executive positions within the Provincial Governments.

(5) Support Adoula politically to the maximum extent possible in addition to actions under (4), revealing to him recommendations of the Greene report for the strengthening of the ANC and, in cooperation with the United Nations, assist in carrying out the recommendations of this report.

(6) Prepare a contingency plan involving stronger measures in support of Adoula to be applied in the event we are forced to conclude that Adoula and Tshombe cannot work out their differences by agreement and carry out the Plan.

George C. McGhee

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Congo Security 1962. Secret. Apparently drafted by McGhee, although the source text does not so indicate. He sent a copy to Rusk with an October 23 memorandum stating that it was going forward to the President that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2362)