Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa

416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations⁰

Washington, September 27, 1963, 8:03 p.m.

866. South West Africa. Dept believes our objective for forthcoming Committee IV and Plenary discussion SWAfrica should be to continue to avoid any GA action (e.g. revocation of Mandate, sanctions) which would prejudice ICJ case and thereby reduce likelihood of eventual solution based on rule of law. Such unilateral “political” action would have little or no chance of changing SAG’s policies re territory, whereas action based upon ICJ decision would offer some hope. Since African Heads of State Conference as well as Committee of 24 refrained from urging immediate revocation of Mandate (former emphasized importance of ICJ case), Dept has been cautiously optimistic that outcome of 18th GA consideration this item might be adoption of a res along lines May 10, 1963 Committee of 24 resolution (which we supported despite reservation).¹

However, ICJ granting SAG delay until Jan 10, 64 to present its counter-memorial (originally due Sept 30) may heighten African impatience with Court proceeding and increase danger of unilateral action by 18th GA, e.g. revocation Mandate or sanctions. While we encouraged by opinion of Yomekpe (Ghana) as reported USUN’s 946,² that Africans committed await ICJ decision before supporting UN action re status of territory, we wonder whether when he made these remarks he knew of delay ICJ case.

Dept requests Mission’s estimate as to how issue likely develop in Committee IV, as well as views on best means prevent undesirable action. We suggest you discuss problem with Gross, since if ICJ case still to be used as means forestall precipitate action he (and his clients) in best position dampen down African impatience. Suggest you also discuss with UKUN.

Views of USUN and Emb Pretoria requested on advisability our disclosing during Committee IV debate our diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis SAG on SWAfrica. Such disclosure would show we have followed up our UN speeches with quiet diplomatic efforts and might take some steam out of calls for severance diplomatic relations. On other hand, it would tend imply US has more influence with SAG this issue than is actually the case, and public disclosure our demarches might reduce SAG’s receptivity to future private representations on SWAfrica.

In any case, we would not make such a statement without consulting UK, our chief partner in this diplomatic exercise. In line with Ambassador’s March 22 talk with Louw it would also seem necessary, subject to Embassy Pretoria’s views, inform SAG our intention make such a statement. We would anticipate such statement would be couched in general terms, without giving text of Ambassador’s oral or written presentation, along lines USG undertook strenuous diplomatic campaign in 1963 to seek to induce SAG to (1) take a cooperative attitude toward UN presence and implementation res 1805; and (2) take steps soonest to adjust its administration of Territory to conform with Mandate and SAG’s international obligations.

If we decide proceed with such a statement, it likely other countries who, at our urging, joined us in representations to SAG (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Italy, Japan, UK and probably Austria, Greece, New Zealand and Venezuela) would disclose in debate the steps they took.³

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL-19 SW AFR/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Parker on September 26; cleared by Strong, Streeter in draft, Friedman, and Buffum; and approved by Wallner. Also sent to Pretoria and repeated to London.
1. See footnote 3, Document 400.
2. Dated September 24. (Department of State, Central Files, UN 10)
3. On November 13, by a vote of 82 to 6 with 16 abstentions, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 1899 (XVIII), “The Question of South West Africa.” The United States voted against the resolution after unsuccessfully attempting to eliminate language calling South West Africa “a serious threat to international peace and security” and language calling for an oil embargo. For text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 705-708.