Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State⁰

Phnom Penh, October 12, 1963, 5 p.m.

284. Embtel 283.¹ Message in two sections. Section one.

In his recent series of spoken and written tirades against Khmer Serei-Son Ngoc Thanh-Sam Sary and particularly in Neak Cheat Niyum article reported reftel, Sihanouk has employed emotional and defensive tone which betrays almost obsessive concern. Most likely explanation this phenomenon lies in his violent reaction to any development appearing contradict or threaten picture of Cambodia and Cambodians completely unified under his leadership and which thus could represent challenge and threat to him. Also, although we have no evidence support for Khmer Serei inside Cambodia (which in any case likely be handicapped by association this movement with Thais and Vietnamese), Sihanoukmay actually fear it represents threat to him either politically or personally, particularly if he believes it has significant external backing. Timing recent campaign consistent this analysis inasmuch as it appears to have begun about time resumption Khmer Serei broadcasts from Viet-Nam (mid-August) and to have been greatly stimulated by Khmer Krom loyalty demonstration to Diem (Embtel [source text illegible]), which Sihanouk has repeatedly and violently denounced as forced.

Purposes of current campaign, to extent it represents more than instinctive lashing-out by Sihanouk against anything or anybody appearing oppose him inside Cambodia, could include following:

1. Discredit Khmer Serei and hold their accusations up to ridicule;

2. Apply pressure on us to cease our alleged support to (or make sure we do not begin to support) Khmer Serei and influence Thais and Vietnamese to put an end Khmer Serei activities on their territory;

3. Prepare way for possible future political move such as recognition Hanoi, recognition FLN, or some move for closer relations ChiComs, with an accompanying act against or bargaining away of portion of U.S. position here.

In regard 2 above, which Embassy views as paramount and most immediate purpose of campaign, likely Sihanouk’s fears may have been increased and he may have been emboldened make public accusation US involvement through CIA by recent public speculation CIA role Viet-Nam.

Sihanouk running certain risks by pursuing his campaign. Continued inflammatory attacks on GVN, accompanied by orchestrated campaign resolutions on part many organizations and communities in favor territorial claim to Cochin China, could conceivably irritate Diem to point of bringing on closing of Mekong (Embtel 260).² Publicity given by Sihanouk’s speeches and writings to Khmer Serei broadcasts could stimulate Cambodians to devote more attention to content these broadcasts, which, according Sihanouk’s own statements, announce that troops of Khmer Serei “movement of liberation” ready to invade Cambodia to liberate it from Sihanouk’s corrupt, high-handed and immoral rule. Moreover, hard to believe Sihanouk does not recognize possibility adverse reaction by us to repeated and unjustified accusation might affect our willingness continue our aid to him.

Section two.

I do not see how we can ignore direct accusations by Chief of State of US complicity contained Neak Cheat Niyum editorial (reftel) which in effect charges US with aiding movement seeking overthrow Sihanouk and RKG. (Opening paragraph of his signed editorial reads: “After rather long disappearance the Khmer-Serei (‘free’ Cambodians) reappear noisily on the stage of this ‘anti-Sihanouk theater’ whose stage-managers are named: Diem, Sarit and CIA”. I recommend that Ambassador Nong Kimny be called in at highest possible level in Department and informed that USG deeply disturbed by completely unfounded accusations in published editorial signed by Chief of State of friendly country Should also be pointed out to Kimny that our support and assistance Cambodia and our respect its neutral position are matter public record and have not wavered and USG deplores and opposes activities of dissident groups representing threat to RKG and Sihanouk and to stability and unity of Cambodia. Further recommend I be instructed make simultaneous approach to Acting SecState FonAffs along same lines, informing him I am doing so under instructions. Approach to latter would ensure its being brought to Sihanouk’s attention and would further emphasize seriousness US concern at his accusations. Such approach is preferable to direct confrontation with Sihanouk, which would involve loss of face for him and might lead to unpredictable reaction.

While foregoing would serve place us on record with Cambodian Government that we are aware of and resent Sihanouk’s unfounded accusations, Sihanouk will still be looking for positive US action stop Khmer Serei activities and he may very likely publicize démarche as part of continuing public pressure campaign on US for such action, even to point repeating his previous disbelief US denials involvement in absence any indication cessation Khmer Serei activities (see reftel). It might therefore be helpful if we could at same time make some public gesture (possibly of type suggested Embtel 269)³ which would give expression in general terms our attitude toward Cambodian neutrality without directly linking such action to Sihanouk’s recent outpourings. This two-pronged action—in effect rebuking privately and soothing publicly—seems to me to be best we can do at present. Whether or not it will be effective in halting public charges against us is another matter. That will depend largely and unpredictably upon Sihanouk’s mood and motives. We know the former is now black, and we cannot be completely sure of latter. In meantime, dependent upon results investigations suggested Embtel 279. [4 lines of source text and footnote not declassified]

Sprouse

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB-S.VIET. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPACPOLAD.
1. In telegram 283, October 12, the Embassy sent the text of an editorial in the official paper Neak Cheat Niyum, entitled “Operation Khmer Serei,” which in effect charged the United States with aiding a movement seeking to overthrow Sihanouk and his government. (Ibid.)
2. Dated October 2. (Ibid., POL 17 S.VIET-CAMB)
3. In telegram 269, October 5, Sprouse suggested using one of President Kennedy’s or Secretary Rusk’s press conferences as an occasion for a firm public statement of U.S. support for Cambodian neutrality and to remind Cambodia of U.S. economic and military support supplied over the past years in full knowledge of that policy of independence. (Ibid., POL 1 CAMB)