191. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State0
New York, September 16,
1961, 4 p.m.
782. Re: West New Guinea.
- 1.
- At his request I met 14 Sept. for one and one-half hour discussion with Sukarno of which principal subject, at his insistence, was West New [Page 430] Guinea. Other subjects, which he sought exclude insofar as possible, being reported separately.1
- 2.
- Sukarno began by saying flatly Indonesia would not raise WNG at 16th GA. He and Subandrio noted growing desire in Netherlands on part not only of businessmen but more recently also political parties to find some way disengage Netherlands from WNG. Political leaders of Catholic and Labor Parties had contacted Sukarno, most recently in Vienna, and said on personal basis they sought face-saving means to turn WNG over to Indonesia. Subandrio said that in response to Indonesian query as to whether these leaders could also speak on behalf of their political parties, these leaders had later sent word that views they expressed had been endorsed by and become part of platforms of their respective political parties.
- 3.
- Sukarno claimed that in his 17 Aug “State of Union “speech2 he had attempted respond to this situation by making distinction between “sovereignty” of WNG and “administration” of WNG. When he proposed that good relations between GOI and Dutch could be, and should be restored if Dutch would agree turn over administration of WNG to GOI, he had sought not only avoidance of hostile relations and possibly, physical acts between GOI and Dutch, but also full restoration of diplomatic relations and mutually profitable economic relations. He regretted there had been no response by Dutch Govt to his 17 Aug statement. He felt progress toward solution now could be assisted by us.
- 4.
- With deliberate vagueness Sukarno and Subandrio then outlined their ideas for utilizing UN as “conduit” through which “administration” would be passed from Dutch to GOI. They felt Dutch could save face by passing “administration” of WNG to UN for one—at most—two year period after which administration would pass to GOI; role of UN apparently being to supervise or implement this passage. Sukarno several times referred to Dutch “turning over WNG to SYG” in this connection.
- 5.
- They noted Dutch made much of self-determination for Papuans but dismissed this as false issue because (a) they had tape recording of statement by Labor Party leader to effect issue of self-determination had been “invented” by Dutch, (b) sovereignty of GOI included WNG and it could not be permitted that under guise of self-determination encouragement would be given to secession. (They commented US-supported attempts break up Republic of Indonesia through armed rebellion had failed and they could not accept similar attempts under new guise of self-determination in regions which rightfully belonged to GOI.) Included in [Page 431] rationale was argument self-determination could be defended only on basis of ethnic differences of Papuan people; but these ethnic differences existed to greater or less degree in other parts of Republic. They pointedly stated GOI claims extended only to limits of former Dutch-East Indies and did not, and would never apply to British and Portuguese controlled areas on fringes, i.e. North Borneo, Sarawak, Timor and East New Guinea.
- 6.
- Sukarno said Dutch, in seeking way disengage, considering idea of UN commission to investigate conditions in WNG, but he rejected this concept emphatically on basis colonial power could always point to puppets, schools, hospitals and roads, as they had in Indonesia before independence, and deceive commission as to reality. Hundreds of “nationalists” who escape to GOI every month testify to Papuan longing to become again part of Indonesia.
- 7.
- Sukarno said Luns most stubborn of stubborn Dutch and noted he already in US for 16th GA. Said he would not rule out bilateral discussions with Luns so long as there were prior agreement as to purpose and some indication Dutch sought solution. He also thought possibility existed Luns might leave govt this winter.
- 8.
- Neither Sukarno nor Subandrio asked questions as to Dutch intentions, either in general or at coming GA, nor did they make specific request for US good offices. However, Subandrio expressed himself as greatly encouraged by his recent talks with Amb Jones and they clearly sought our assistance in furthering their scheme for taking possession of WNG. Sukarno said he hoped we had noticed that in his wisdom he had not sought have his position on West Irian endorsed at Belgrade.
- 9.
- In attempting gain insight into actual mechanics which Sukarno had in mind we met with no success. We suggested at one point that whether “real” or “invented”, issue of self-determination for Papuans seemed clearly endorsed by Dutch people and political parties, and therefore if Sukarno sought face-saving device it appeared necessary and reasonable that self-determination would in some way be included. We suggested that if UN were to take over administration of WNG, while leaving unsettled conflicting claims as to sovereignty, during term of administration UN would undoubtedly remove any barriers of communication between Papuans and their neighbors. We foresaw possibility that after several years UN administration might find conditions had been achieved which would permit self-determination through plebiscite at which point GOI might, for constitutional reasons, have take public position of opposing plebiscite yet in fact acquiesce in its being held with full confidence that results of plebiscite would be favorable to GOI and would settle question of sovereignty once and for all.
- 10.
- Neither Sukarno nor Subandrio rejected this concept but Subandrio remarked Dutch influence, particularly military and police forces, would have be eliminated during UN administration.
- 11.
- We also suggested some form of UN commission of member states would seem necessary in order supervise administration by UN; there was no objection to commission of this sort.
Stevenson