212. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

SUBJECT

  • West New Guinea

I think you might want to raise at the planning lunch today the question of the report to the President on West New Guinea.1 This activity last week was caught up in and superseded by the work on Friday on the letter from the President to Sukarno and related instructions.2 Follow-up talks with the Dutch, Australians and British were held yesterday.3 They were told that we took a very serious view of the situation and were invited to offer suggestions as to where we go from here. Replies should be received in the next several days.

I fear that in the absence of a really thorough consideration of the whole problem, the negotiating effort in which we may now become involved will lack a sense of clear direction. There seems to be a considerable reluctance in the government to take any kind of clear-cut decision on the problem. I do not know what views the President has expressed on this problem in connection with work on the draft telegrams last weekend. However, so far as I can tell, the only change that was made in the telegrams was to shift the location of the paragraph referring to the President’s discussions with Sukarno up to an earlier place in the telegram.

Perhaps the President is satisfied that the general approach we are taking is a desirable one. However, I think he ought to be given an opportunity to face the entire question in a more systematic fashion than he has been given an opportunity to do to date.

[Page 484]

The differences within State on this subject are so considerable that any paper produced by the normal coordination process is likely to be quite lacking in clarity of purpose or direction of action. I suggest that you explore at the planning lunch today two possible alternative approaches to the preparation of a general paper:

a.
A coordinated paper prepared in State which would outline clear-cut alternative approaches. This would give FE, IO and EUR each an opportunity to submit its own alternative approach.
b.
A paper prepared by the Policy Planning Council and containing a single set of recommendations submitted after receiving comments from other parts of the State Department but without full coordination.

I would recommend the alternative proposed in a.4

Bob
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 12/11/61–12/15/61. Secret. Also sent to Kaysen, who replaced Rostow as the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs as of December 1. Rostow became Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of its Policy Planning Council.
  2. At the apparent instigation of William P. Bundy, an interagency group began to discuss various foreign policy questions informally over lunch on Tuesdays in the summer of 1961. Bundy’s records of some of these meetings are in Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240. Additional accounts are scattered in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330. No complete set has been found nor has a discussion of Indonesia on December 12 been located.
  3. See Documents 209 and 210.
  4. Reported in telegram 514 to The Hague, December 11; telegram 277 to Canberra, December 11; and telegram 3219 to London, December 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–1261 and 656.9813/12–1361)
  5. In a December 12 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Komer offered a “hearty amen” to Johnson’s memorandum. “How the devil,” Komer asked, “do we get President and SecState to focus on problems like these which, though not immediate, are those where intelligent anticipatory action will save us all sorts of later grief?” Komer continued, “West Irian is going to Indonesia. Our problem is how best to accommodate to this trend, and to use it if possible to our advantage. If we can get the President and Secretary to start from this premise, the rest will fall into place.” Komer asked if another planning paper was not the best way to get Kennedy and Rusk to focus on the issue. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 12/11/61–12/15/61)